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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The Problem of This Study 
The problem of this dissertation is to formulate a 
theory of hoping, based upon Gabriel Marcel's analysis of 
hope, and to indicate what implications this theory of hop-
ing has for the work of the psychiatrist and the Bdnister. 
To study hope, or the hopiag process, necessarily 
involves the consideration of& (1) the conditions of hope's 
occurrence; (2) the distinctiTe indicators of hoping, in 
contrast to other modes of expectation; and (3) the dyn&Bdc 
consequences of hoping. 
Gabriel Marcel's analysis of hope considers these 
problems, as well as others, and it, therefore, proTides a 
foundation for further study. 
There are several different meanings attributed to the 
word -nope.• There are many more meanings implied by the use 
of the word in eTeryday oonTersations. Hope has become a word 
that is often used but rarely with the same meaning. This is due 
partly to the lack of descriptiTe analyses of hope with impli-
cations relating to those persons, who would most likely apply 
the analyses to conditions of life. The purpose of this study 
is to make such an analysis. 
1 
2. Some Previous Concerns 
The subject of hope has received renewed concern 
and study in recent years. For theology this revived in-
terest reflects a traditional attention that has been given 
to the understanding of the meaning of hope. 
There have been attempts of organized Christianity 
to bring together the various notions of hope in order to 
form a composite understanding of hope's meaning and sig-
nif'icance. 
The most recent such attempt was that of the Second 
Assembly of the World Council of Churches at Evanston, 
Illinois in 1954 when the assembly dealt with the subject 
of hope.l Special preparation was made prior to the meeting 
ill suoh books as ~ Christian Hope ~,!!:! Second Coming 
by Paul Minear,2 and~ Christian Hope: The Presence and 
~ Parousia by J. E. Fison.3 
2 
Historically the word ~ope• has been variously uader-
stood and used ~thin Christianity. These manifold applioa-
1 the Christian tope and the Task of the Church, Evanston 
preparatory volume, New York: Harper andBrothers, 1954). 
2paul Minear, the Christian Hope and the Second Coming 
(London: WestminsterPress, 1954).---
3J. E. Fison, The Christian Hopi: The Presence and the 
Parousia, (London: Longmans, Green, 95'4"). --
3 
tions and considerations continue to remain and to confuse 
the issue. 
Other disciplines, as well, have made attempts to 
understand this subject. Particularly is this true of the psy-
chologically oriented disciplines. However, consideration of 
the meaning of hope is relatively new for these groups. Due 
to the newness of this interest, it is difficult to find many 
references to the subject of hope within the professional writ-
ings of such fields as psychology or psychiatry. 
Some of the more notable examples are the chapter on 
-aope" in Karl Menninger's ~Against ~,1 Paul Pruyser's 
paper "On Phenomenology and Dynandos of Hoping,"2 Thomas 
French's several volume work~ Integration of Behavior,3 and 
the psychobiological laboratory studies of curt Riohter.4 It 
is quite possible that new interest has been generated by Dr. 
Menninger's address on ~ope• before the American Psychiatric 
Association in Philadelphia, in 1959.5 
lKarl A. Menninger, Love Against Hate {New York:Harcourt, 
Brace, and Co., 1942), pp. 214-59. ----
2paul w. Pruyser, •on Phenomenology and Dynamics of 
Hoping,• (unpublished paper, The Menninger Foundation). 
3Thomas M. French,~ Integration~ Behavior (3 vols.; 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952-1958). 
4curt P. Richter, "On the Phenomenon of Sudden Death in 
Animals and Man," Psychosomatic Medicine, XIX (May-June, 1957). 
5Karl A. Menninger, -aope,• American Journal~ Psychiatry, 
CXVI {December, 1959), 481-91. 
4 
Notwithstanding such efforts, the problem of understand-
ing the meaning of hope remains nearly the same. Conjecture 
concerning hope continues to range presently, as it has histor-
ically, from the metaphysical to the phenomenological and from 
theological and philosophical categories to metaphorical anal-
ogies. 
There continues to be a need for an analysis of the 
meaning of hope that is descriptive in nature and which makes 
implications that meet the interests of the two fields most in-
terested in the subject of hope at the present time--religion 
and psychiatry. This need proTides some of the incentive for 
this study. 
Also the impetus for this study follows from another di-
rection. The implication, alluded to by the address of Karl 
Menninger! and by others such as Paul Pruyser2 and Albert Ellis,3 
that hope might well be a significant variable in the reoov-
ery and the treatment of a patient, lends more importance to 
any attempt to understand the meaning and the dynamics of hope. 
For the minister, who also makes it his business to help trou-
bled people and who often purports to bring The Hope to those 
1Ibid., P• 486. 
3Albert Ellis, ~elping Troubled People,• Pastoral 
Psychology, IX (March, 1958), 33. 
5 
he serTes, there would be a significant need for further study 
of the concept of hope. 
3. Some Concepts of Hope 
A comprehensive, historical surTey of the varying con-
oepts of hope is neither possible nor desirable in the con-
text of this dissertation. 
The real need at this point would appear to be the es-
tablishment of some relationship between the genesis of the 
concepts of hope and the present understanding of the term. 
Such a connection is represented in at least two historical 
positions. These positions are: (1) hope conceived as the 
expectation of eTil or as evil itself, and (2) hope seen as 
an expectation of the future good. 
i. Hope as the Expectation of Evil 
--- --
Hope was seen as the expectation of evil or as evil 
itself. Often it was evil simply because there was a certain 
risk involved in comDdtting oneself to that promise which may 
go unfulfilled. This is TiTidly expressed by Pindar who writes, 
• ••• The chase of a cheating prey with hopes that shall never 
be fulfilled.•! 
1Pindar Pythian ~ iii. 23. 
6 
Theognis of Megara writes in the Odes that, Wffope and 
risk in the world are alike: they are both spirits difficult 
to do with.•l Solon of Athens gives similar counse1.2 
This impression of hope has not escaped the writings 
of the more recent poets such as Cowper and Shelley. In his 
Prometheus Unbound, Shelly has hope abandoned as a failure,3 
and considers the absence of hope to be a blessing.4 Cowper 
writes that hope is the delusion which • ••• sets the stamp 
of vanity on all, that men have deemed substantial since the 
fall.•5 
There was a period in Greek classioal literature when 
hope was Tiewed as having aspects of both the evil and the 
good. This was especially true in the period dated by the 
writings of Homer (c. 700 B.c.) to those of the Greek his-
torian, Herodotus of Halicarnassus (484?- 425? B.c.). 
1Theognis ~ i. 637-38. 
2J. M. Edmonds (ed.) ~and Iambus, (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1941), I;]p. l49. 
3Peroy B. Shelley, Prometheus Unbound, ed. Vida Scudder 
(Boston: D. c. Heath and Co., 1897), P• 427. 
-'Ibid., pp. 462-66 • 
Swilliam Cowper, ~Poetical Works of William Cowper, 
(London: Frederick Warne and Co., n.d.), PP• 152-53. 
7 
Homer wrote in the Iliad, "Like strength is felt from 
hope and despair."l The word •hope" occurs at least twice in 
the Odyssey and holds only a neutral position in respect to 
the expectation of either good or evil.2 
Plato still writes within this general vein of ambig-
uity, but tends more than earlier writers to be moving in the 
direction of using hope to mean the expectation of the good 
more than the evil. Plato writes in the Republic, •But to him 
Who is conscious of no sin, sweet hope as Pindar charmingly 
says, is the kind nurse of his age: ••• "3 Again Plato writes: 
And therefore, I do not grieve as I might have done, 
for I have good hope that there is yet something remain-
ing for the dead, and as has been said of old, same far 
better thing for the good than for the evil.4 
Hoping always that God will diminish the troubles 
that fall upon them by the blessings which he bestows, 
and will change for the better the present evils; and 
as to their blessings, hoping that they, contrariwise, 
will with the help of good fortune, be increased.s 
1Homer Iliad xii. 852. 
2Homer Odyssey xvi. 101. xix. 84. 
3Plato Republic 33la. 
4plato Phaedo 63° • 
5Plato Laws i. 732° • 
8 
11. Hope !! Expectation .2.£ ~ ~ 
The concept of hope which appears the most prevalent 
historically is the notion of hope as expectation of obtain-
ing that which is considered to be the •good• or the •desired.• 
This view of hope as the expectation of the good found 
its greatest support in the Judaeo-Christian tradition. 
Ever since its Gospel origins, Christianity has forced 
theology and philosophy to become explicit aeout hope, to 
inculcate hope, to assume hope, to extol hope, to help 
people towards hope. Not that it invented hope or suddenly 
discovered its existence, but it called oognitively and 
dynamically man's attention to the fact that he is a hop-
ing being.l 
1) Hebrew Hope 
The Hebrew words most often translated as ~ope• are 
tikwah and seber. Mikweh, kislah, and tohelet are also thus 
rendered but they are more closely denotin~ trust, waiting 
for, and expectation.2 
The earlier Jewish hope was centered in the glorious 
and blessed future of the nation of Israel and did not go much 
beyond the range of contemporary circumstances. •In its tradi-
tional form the hope of Israel was nationalistic in character.•3 
lpruyser, op. cit., P• 3. 
2Adolf Guttmacher, ~ope• The Jewish Encyclopedia 
Vol. VI (New York: Funk and Wa!naTIS Co., 1906), P• 459. 
Saudolf Bultmann, Primitive Christianity~!!! 
Contemporary Settinf, (New York: Living Age Books Published 
by Meridian Books, 956), P• 81. 
9 
Hope was then seen as the belief that all things of the world 
are controlled for the happiness of man, particularly the cho-
sen of Israel, who had God as their special guardian! and as 
their redeemer.2 
In addition, hope was essentially significant as the 
anticipation of help and aid from God that would came in future 
time and Which was expected to counter the present troubles and 
difficulties. In e.mergencies the people would turn to the Lord 
and cry out, •o Lord, the hope of Israel,•3 and expect tore-
ceive help from God. 
In a real sense, these nationalistic hopes were rep-
resentations of earthly hopes such as the hopes of social re-
generation and well-being. These were prophetic types of hope 
or expressions of hope. There was an active expectation that 
God would deliver the nation from its oppressors and restore 
the former glory of the Davidic kingdom under the rule of the 
ayessiah,• who was to be from the house of David. Israel was 
to be a righteous nation that would be immortal.4 Men waited 
for the realization of their hope and "the greater the oppres-
1Isaiah 41:8. 48:20. 
2Exodus 6:6-8. Deuteronomy 7:6. Isaiah 43:4. Psalms 
103:13. 
3Jeremiah 14:8. 17:13. Psalms 119:116. 
4II Samuel 7:12,16. Psalms 89:35-36. Jeremiah 23:5. 
10 
sion, the more excited the expectations and the more certain 
the conviction that the end is at hand and the greater their 
eagerness for its dawning."l 
Later views of hope were to take on more supernatural 
connotations. The Messiah became more a figurehead of a gov-
ernment whose king was actually to be God himself. This was 
based on the conviction that God who is the moral judge of the 
world would bring about the final censure of vice and the 
justification of the righteous.2 Broadly, whenever the nation-
al expectations foundered, the hope of Israel was centered and 
anchored in the expectation of the messianic kingdom.3 The 
more often these hopes were dashed by unfulfillment the more 
frequent became the emphasis upon the supernatural rule of 
God through the Messiah. 
Gradually the enemies of God were seen as more super-
natural than human. The seer in Daniel describes some fantas-
tic beasts that are enemies of God and the •saints of the most 
high.•4 But all enemies of God can and will be destroyed, even 
1
Bultmann, ~· ~·· P• 80. 
2Daniel 7. IV Ezra 7:33-37. 
3Jamas Hastings (ed.) A Dictionar~ of the Bible, Vol. II 
(New York: Charles Scribner's-Sons, 1899 ,]pp:-412-13. 
4Daniel 7:1-7, 26, 27. 
11 
by the word of his mouth.l 
Whatever war that was envisioned as necessary to bring 
about the rule of the Messianic Kingdom, it was considered to 
be one that would be settled by supernatural powers. The ob-
ject of hope became salvation that follows some kind of cosmic 
catastrophe that would do away with the present world.2 T.he 
doctrine of the resurrection of the dead is significantly at-
tached to the rule of the Messianic Kingdom so that those who 
had suffered while waiting for its coming would not miss it, 
but theywould be resurrected to enjoy the blessings of it. 
Rudolf Bultmann writes that the most important devel-
opment, during this period of emphasis upon the ruling Messiah 
coming in a future age, was the growth of apocalyptic writings 
and the working out of a cosmic eschatology while Israel was 
under Babylonian and Persian influence.3 
T.his Hebrew eschatology was dedicated to the prophecy 
of two ages, the present age and the age to come. There was 
a definite period of separation between the two ages and Hebrew 
eschatology also attempted to discover when this division of 
the ages would come and how the people of Israel might recog-
1Psalms of Solomon 17:27, 39. 
2naniel 7. 
3
Bultmann, ~· ~·· P• 82. 
12 
nize the signs of the approach of the new age. Equally impor-
tant was the consideration of the changing of the hearts of 
the inhabitants of the world and the judgment by God of that 
world. The result of the judgment was to be the rewarding 
of eternal life to the righteous and the destruction of the 
ungodly. 
The book of Daniel describes this judgment. The judge 
is God whose clothing and hair are white as snow and who appears 
as the •Ancient of Days." He is to be ministered unto by "thou-
sands of thousands" while •ten thousand times ten thousands• 
stand before him for judgment, and set before him and opened are 
the books in which the deeds of men are recorded.l 
Follo~ng the judgment, "one like unto a son of man• is 
to be given dominion, and glory, and a kingdom, a kingdom where 
all the people and nations will serve him. The •saints of the 
MOst High,• who receive the kingdom, will possess it forever 
as the reward of the righteous.2 It is then that the new age 
b.egins. The hearts of the inhabitants of the world are to be 
changed into a different kind of spirit. Evil is blotted out 
and deceit extinguished. Corruption will be vanquished. 
Faithfulness will flourish and truth will be made manifest.3 
1Daniel 7:9-10. 
2Daniel 7:13-14, 18, 27. 
Srv Ezra 6:26-28. 
13 
The n6W age is a return of Paradise where plenteous-
ness is made ready, wisdom prevails, death is hidden, oorrup-
tion forgotten, sorrows placed behind, and where the treas-
ures of immortality are made manifest.l 
2) Hope of the New Testament 
The New Testament continues to emphasize hope as the 
expectation of the good. This agood" is often expressed as 
a joyful expectation of eternal salvation and is found in sev-
eral places of the New Testament.2 Hope is variously described 
in the New Testament by such terms as "good hope,•3 "blessed 
hope,"4 "hope of glory,•S and ~ope of righteousness."6 
In general the New Testament eschatology, marked by 
the preaching and teaching of Jesus, is in agreement with the 
Old Testament's imminent expectation of the Messianic Kingdom.7 
It is still open to question as to whether Jesus thought the 
reign of God was immediately imminent or already present in 
his person. Today the latter is called •realized eschatology.• 
liv Ezra 8:52-54. 
2Aots 23:6. 26:6-7. Romans 8:24. I Peter 1:3. 3:15. 
Hebrews 6:19. Titus 3:7. 
3II Thessalonians 2:16. 
4Titus 2:13. 
5colossians 1:27. 
6Galatians 5:5. 
7Mark 1:15. 
14 
However, Jesus does repudiate the nationalistic form of hope 
by stress upon the coming spiritual reign of God. 
This spiritual reign begins partly now as it is with-
in individuals that God is to reign according to the New 
Testament. 8 The Kingdom of God cometh not with observations: 
Neither shall they say, Lo herel or, lo therel for, behold, 
the kingdom of God is within you.•l Nevertheless, it is said 
by the Scriptures that there is a future time when the "Son of 
man" shall come in the clouds with great power and glory. !he 
sun aDd the moon will be darkened, the stars of heaven will 
fall, and the evil powers shall be shaken. The Son of man 
will send his angels to gather together the elect from the 
utter.most parts of the earth, and it is to be a time of gather-
ing of which no one knows but the Father and for which men must 
prepare and watch.2 Bultmann writes of Jesus: 
He never looks back upon the past epochs of world his-
tory or attempts to date the End. He never invites his 
hearers to look for signs of the end in nature or history. 
Equally, he eschews all elaboration of detail as regards 
the judgment, resurrection and future glory. All these 
elements are absorbed in the single all-embracing thought 
that God will then reign.3 
New Testament eschatology concerning hope can be under-
stood fran at least three different viewpoints: (1) realized 
ltuke 17:20-21. 
2Mark 13:24-27, 32-37. 
3Bultmann, .!!.E.. ~·· p. 87. 
16 
hope 6 (2) the fulfillment of hope as yet to come 6 and (3) a com-
bined view that hope is at once fulfilled and future. 
The viewpoint of hope as realized is influenced largely 
by such vi~s of eschatology as c. H. Dodd's theory of •real-
ised eschatology.•l The effect of such a theory is that the 
final age is considered to be already present. The present days 
are seen as the last days and this age is to be the final phase 
of God's dealings with men. Hope is to be fulfilled in this 
present age and man's hope for salvation is to be made complete 
and final. 
Support for this view is gathered fram the teachings of 
Jesus that declare that the time is fulfilled and the reign of 
God has came near or is at hand2 and from the belief of Jesus 
that in his own work the powers of God's kingdom were already 
being unleashed.3 Satan, who once held the world under his 
power 6 is now on the way to being conquered by God. 
And the seventy returned again with joy, saying, Lord 
even the devils are subject to us through thy name. .And 
he said unto them, I beheld Satan as lightening fall from 
heaven. Behold, I give unto you power to tread on serpents 
and scorpions, and over all the power of the enemy, and 
nothing shall by any means hurt you.4 
1c. H. Dodd 6 The Apostolic Preaching and~ Development (2d. ed. New York: Harpers and Brothers, 194"4'). passim. 
3Luke 11:20. Matthew 12:28. 
4tuke 10:17-19. 
16 
The viewpoint of realized hope is also based upon Christ's 
expectations of the coming of the Son of man. •For as the lightn-
ing cometh out of the east. and shineth even unto the west; so 
shall also the coming of the Son of man be.•l The Son of man was 
expected by Jesus to come in all the glory of his Father in heav-
en2 and to have the power to •confess• and "deny• men before the 
angels of God.3 Additional support to this position by reliance 
upon the teachings of Jesus is found in Jesus' concern with the 
resurrection of the dead and the life that follows4 and with the 
coming judgment.5 
The writings of Paul are also considered by some to add 
support to the argument of the "end as having come.• Paul makes 
reference to those who are now perishing and those Who are now 
being saved.6 Paul believes that Christians have been made a 
new creation.? Those who are of the new creation are seen by 
Paul as having been bought by the blood of Jesus and thus brought 
from death to life8 and delivered from the dominion of darkness.9 
lMatthew 24:27. 
2Jiark 8:38. 
3Luke 12:8-9. 
4Ma.rk 12:18-27. 
5Luke 11:31-32. 
611 Corinthians 2:15. 
7II Corinthians 5:17. 
8Romans 6:13. 
9colossiacs 1:13. 
17 
For those who are of the new creation there is now no condem-
nationl because they have received the atonement2 according 
to Paul. 
We, then, as workers together with him, beseech you also 
that ye receive not the grace of God in vain. (For he saith, 
I have heard thee in a time accepted, and in a day of sal-
vation have I succoured thee: behold, now is the accepted 
time; behold, now is the day of salvation.)3 
In summary, it has been suggested that one way of per-
oeiving hope is as hope based upon the eschatological position 
that the "end• is already realized in the person of Jesus. In 
terms of the expectation of the good, this view of hope would 
see the good as, at least partially, already being fulfilled. 
Another position taken on hope is that hope has not 
been realized or fulfilled and is yet to come in future time. 
It is based primarily on an eschatological position that con-
tends that the •end is yet to come.• This view in some ways is 
an extreme continuation of the Hebrew apocalyptic strain, and 
th:i. s position would declare that the kingdom is to be inaugu-
rated by a cataclysmic intervention at which time Christ will 
return in fUll power to establish the divine rule.4 
lRomans 8:1. 
2Romans 5:11. 
3II Corinthians 6:1-2. 
4aarold L. DeWolf, ! !heology of~ Living Church 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), PP• 396-07. 
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Support for this view. like the first position, comes 
basically from the teachings of Jesus and how one interprets 
those teachings. It is held that the New Testament not only 
speaks of what has happened in the past and What is presently 
taking place, but that the New Testament also looks forward 
to a future consumation of what has already begun. 
It is argued that the portion of the prayer taught by 
Jesus to his disciples that asks "Thy Kingdom Come"l can be 
interpreted as support for the future fulfillment of that king-
dom. Jesus called himself a sign like unto the sign of Jonah 
that would be a signal of the kingdom co.ming.2 But. the coming 
of the Son of Man, Who is to be a sign of the kingdom, will be 
at a time when men thin~ not.3 
Jesus spoke of haVing seen Satan fall like lightning 
from heaven,4 but Paul wrote of Satan as still at work on the 
earth.5 
The apocalyptic purport of peace, that is to come with 
the kingdom. must remain to future fulfillment When consideration 
is made of Christ's claim that his present coming was to divide 
lMatthew 6:10. 
2Luke 11:29-30. 
3Luke 12:40. 46. 
4Luke 10:18. 
6r Corinthians 7:5. I Thessalonians 2:18. 
rather than to give peace.l 
Jesus described the world following the resurrection 
of the dead* which apocalyptic literature held to be a part 
of the new age and the kingdan of God, as one where men are 
not given in marriage nor can they die anymore since they 
have become the children of God.2 
Before such a resurrection takes place there shall 
be wars, earthquakes, famines, pestilences, fearful sights, 
and great signs fran heaven but still the end is not yet. 
Jesus proclaims that before the end shall come there shall 
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be signs in the sun, moon, and the stars; there shall be dis-
tress and perplexity among nations of the earth where men's 
hearts fail them for fear; and then shall men see the Son of 
man coming in a cloud with great power and glory.3 Jesus 
concludes, •so likewise ye, when ye see these things come to 
pass, know ye that the kingdom of God is nigh at hand."4 
In summary, another way of perceiving hope is as hope 
based on the eschatological position that the "end" is yet to 
come in future time. In ter.ms of expectation of the good, 
this view, while not necessarily denying that some hope is 
already fulfilled, houds that the good is yet primarily future. 
ltuke 12:51. 
2tuke 20:34-36. 
3tuke 21:7-11. 25-27. 
4tuke 21:31. 
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In light of the apparent opposition of hope viewed as 
•having come" or "realized• and as •yet to come• it would seem 
that a third position is necessary. Falling somewhere between 
the poles of the two previous positions is a combined view of 
hope that declares hope, that is expectation of the good, to be 
both fulfilled and future. This position is based upon that 
eschatological position which would hold that the eschatologi-
cal vision includes past, present and future, and that eschato-
logical thought is concerned with the beginning and the end. 
This view contends that Christian eschatology cannot 
be directed taward the future only because the salvation for 
which the Christian hopes has already been given him in part. 
Paul says that the Christian has already received an earnest or 
a guarantee of the future life by the presence of the Holy Spirit 
in the heart of the Christian.l 
Jesus made it clear that he thought the reign of God was 
approaching and, if nothing more, his own presence was for the 
purpose of drawing men to consider his presence as indicative 
of the present as a time of decision. 
Jesus clearly believes that the present age is ebbing 
out. Mark's summary of his preaching (•The time is ful-
filled, and the reign of God has drawn nigh," ~Ark 1.15) 
is a fair representive of numerous sayings of Jesus which 
point to a new future and characterize the present as the 
time of decision •••• The unique feature of his teaching 
is the assurance with Which he proclaims that now has the 
time come. The Reign of God is breaking in.2 
ln Corinthians 1:22. Ephesians 1:14. 
2Bultmann, ~· ~., pp. 87-88. 
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Though the time for God's reign may be considered to 
be breaking into this age, it is perceived as something yet to 
come. The New Testament sees the Christian person as having 
passed from death into life and as having become a child of 
God when he has responded to Christ's love with a similar love 
for his "brother.•l The Christian's salvation is not made 
complete, however, until Christ returns at the end of the age, 
and at which time he will make all of the redeemed persons com-
pletely "like him.•2 The children of God or the Church may be 
seen as already in the kingdom of God, but they continue to 
hope for the coming of the kingdom at the end of the "age" at 
which time the kingdom will be complete. 
In essence this third view combines the first two views 
of hope, which were based upon the eschatological positions that 
the "end has come" or that the "end is yet to come.• This third 
viewpoint contends that the two former views do not, as it were, 
contradict but actually complement each other. In respect to 
hope as the expectation of the good, this viewpoint would hold 
that the fulfillment of that expectation is both present and 
future. 
Essentially it is this position which was adopted by the 
biblical scholars who made pre-Evanston preparations fo the 
Second Assembly of the World Council of Churches in 1954. These 
li John 3:14. 
21 John 3:2. 
22 
biblical scholars agreed that the concept of the Kingdom of 
God in the New Testament is presented as both present and 
future. 
It is to this third eschatological view of hope that 
this study will subscribe~ adding the supplementary caution 
of Walter Horton and J. E. Fison that the ~ystical~ spirit-
ualizing tendency to rejoice in Christ's presence" is no com-
plete •substitute for the hope of his parousia.•2 Mysticism 
and eschatology seem to complement each other in the New Testa-
ment's concept of hope. 
At the mystical level of love the end can be both ex-
pected imminently at any minute and also experienced or 
realized immanently as having already oocured. The 
parousia can be the presence too; indeed it must be, or 
else the future reality is merely phantasy.3 
3) Some Christian Writers 
The theme of hope as the expectation of the future 
good is continued by numerous Christian writers. Some of the 
historically important writers are considered here for the 
purpose of indicating the continuation of this theme of hope 
to the present time. 
laeport of the Zetten Conference on the ~eaning of 
Hope in the Bible," Ecumenical Review~ IV (July, 1952), 424. 
2walter Horton, Christian Theology: An Ecumenical 
Approach (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), P• 267. 
3Fison, op. cit., P• 197. 
Saint Augustine quoting from Romans 8:24, which says 
that Rwe are saved by hope,• adds: 
23 
As, therefore, we are saved, so we are made happy by 
hope. And as we do not as yet possess a present, but 
look for a future salvation, so it is with our happiness, 
and this •with patience•; for we are encompassed with 
evils, which we ought patiently to endure, until we come 
to the ineffable enjoyment of unmixed good; for there 
shall be no longer anything to endure.l 
Elsewhere he argues that hope will not be deceived 
and that the saints are blessed in hope in this life. Pos-
session of happiness in this life is seen as false unless it 
is related to a hope in what is beyond this life.2 For "hope 
deals only with good things, and only with those which lie in 
the future, •• •3 • 
For Thomas Aquinas hope is a necessary virtue because 
it meets the qualifications of causing its owner to be good 
and because its works are good. It is a theological virtue 
because its object is God. In consequence of this virtue and 
a belief in it, hope stirs the believer to expect that through 
God's help he may gain possession of the goods he naturally 
desires.4 
!Augustine, CJty of God, trans. Marcus Dods (New York: 
Modern Library, 1950 , P• 680. 
2~., pp. 698-99. 
3Augustine, Confessions ~Enchiridion, vol. VII of 
the Library~ Christian Classics, trans. Albert c. Outler 
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1955), P• 340. 
4Thomas Aquinas, Compendium~ Theolo,y, trans. Cyril 
Vollert (St. Louis: B. Herder Book co•, 1947 , P• 313. 
Before a thing can be hoped for it must first be a 
desired good. Things that are not desired are not objects 
of hope but rather they are feared or despised. It is also 
true that what one already has he does not hope for, because 
the expectation in hope is for that which is still future.l 
Apparently scholastic theologians continue generally 
to emphasize hope as a movement of the appetite towards a 
future good, which is considered to be possible of attain-
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ment through difficult means. In its widest acceptation, hope 
is described as the "desire of something together with the ex-
pectation of obtaining it.•2 
Martin Luther stresses that hoping is man's expect-
ing the passing of evil and the coming of good things. 
Though they are uncertain of the future, yet they 
hope with certain hope and hereby they are meanwhile 
buoyed up, lest falling into the further evil of des-
pair, they should break down under their present evil 
and do some worse things.~ 
The •coming of good things• is often embodied by 
Luther in his treatment of eternal life. The hope of attain-
ing eternal life is the expectation of the good things being 
libid., P• 324. 
2Joseph F. Delany, Wfiope• ~Catholic Encyclopedia, 
VII (New York: Encyclopedia Press, l9l3), P• 465. 
3Martin Luther, The Works of Luther, vol. I of the 
Philadelphia Edition ~ladelphii: Muhlenburg Press, 1943), 
PP• 146-47. 
fulfilled. 
Moreover, this is also written that we might preserve 
in our minds a sure hope of the future and eternal life. 
All the things God wants done on the Sabbath are clear 
signs of another life after this life. 'Why is it neces-
sary for God to speak ~th us through His word if we are 
not to live in a future and eternal life? If we are not 
to hope for a future life why do we not live like people 
~th whom God does not speak and who do not know God?l 
John Calvin dealt with hope as it related to faith. 
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In summation of an exposition on the relationship of hope and 
faith he concluded: 
So that in one word hope is nothing more than the 
expectation of those things which faith previously be-
lieves to have been truly promised by God. Thus, faith 
believes that God is true; hope expects that in due sea-
son he will manifest his truth.2 
Modern day theologians continue the theme of hope as 
the expectation of the good. Karl Barth defines hope by con-
trasting the eternal and the temporal hope. Hope is really 
only one for Barth. But in this one hope there is a great 
hope and a small hope. Hope is the expectation of the good 
in this life and also the temporal expectation of the great 
hope of eternal life.3 
lMartin Luther, Luther's Works, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan, 
Vol. I (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1958), PP• 80-81. 
2John Calvin, Institutes of~ Christian Religion, trans. 
Henry Beveridge, vol. I (London: James Clarke Co., 1953), P• 506. 
3Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. IV:The Doctrine ~ 
Reconciliation, trans. G. w. Bromiley from Die Kirohliche Dogmatik, 
IV: Die Lehre von der Versohnung, (New York: Charles Scribner's 
and Sons, 1956), p. 120. 
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Emil Brunner sees hope as one of the ways in which ~t 
is merely future and potential is made present and actual to 
us. The hope of the Christian is both "closely bound up with 
the present" and the ultimate. The former is considered to be 
more necessary to human life than the latter, though. he contends 
that it becomes increasingly difficult for immediate hope to 
survive where ultimate hope no longer exists. He asks how can 
personal hopes be "nourished in an atmosphere of general hope-
lessness?•! Both immediate and ultimate hope express an expeo-
tation of good for Brunner. 
Hope as expectation of the future good, becomes most 
clear in Brunner's discussion of the personal and universal as-
pects of hope. In either case, whether personal or universal, 
Brunner sees the expected good as embodied in the perfection of 
God's kingdom and in eternal life. Uncertainty, as to whether 
that which is to come will be good or bad, causes anxiety. 
Hope is able to overcome any such anxiety by its expectation 
of future good based on the belief that Christ has overcome 
the uncertainty of death.2 
Rudolf Bultmann bases his concept of hope on the conten-
tion that Christ understood his present days to be decisive ones 
lEmil Brunner, ~Eternal Hope, trans. Harold Knight 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1954), pp. 12-13. 
2Emil Brunner, Faith, Hope~~. (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1956), p. 54. 
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because the time had arriTed when the old promises and hopes 
would be fulfilled. In addition Jesus made no promises about 
the splendid future of Israel and the restoration of the house 
of David, but instead promised only salvation and a life that 
would be like that of the angels in heaven.l Bultmann makes 
it clear that he believes that each man anticipates the future 
and is continually •stretching forth • into the future. Hope 
is one of the devices used by men to stretch forward into the 
future in expectation of the approaching good.2 
Finally, it may be said that hope has been viewed from 
two historical positions in respect to hope as expectation. 
Either of these positions may be understood to be present when 
the word •hope• is used. However, the most predominant position 
presently is that of hope expressed as the expectation of future 
good. 
This Tiew of hope has long been supported by the Judaeo-
Christian tradition in at least three ways: (1) hope as real-
ized, (2) hope as yet to be fulfilled, and (3) hope as fulfilled 
both presently and future. This study proposes that the most 
universal concept of the nature of hope is: that hope is the 
expectation of future good, partially being fulfilled presently 
and partially to be fulfilled at some future time. 
lRudolf Bultmann, ~Presence~ Eternity: History~ 
Eschatology (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), PP• 32-33. 
2~., PP• 140-41. 
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4. The Limitations or This Study 
The brier survey or this chapter of the prevailing con-
cepts of hope raises many theological questions. Some of the 
problems raised are: (1) the ~riety versus the unity of bib-
lical eschatolo~y, (2) the problem or true and false hope, (3) 
the traasrormation occasioned in passing from earlier to later 
forms or hope, (4) the relationship or hope to faith, and (5) 
personal versus universal aspects of hope. But because these 
questions raise problems that are not coTered in the scope or 
this dissertation, they will be referred to only when they are 
related to the development of the purpose of this dissertation. 
This study will be limited to Gabriel Marcel's defini-
tion of hope and a descriptive analysis based upon Marcel's 
work. From this descriptive analysis certain implications 
will be drawn and applied to the work or the psychiatrist and 
the minister. This study now moves to Marcel's analysis of 
hope in the following chapter. 
CHAPTER II 
GABRIEL MARCEL'S .ANALYSIS OF HOPE 
Gabriel Marcel's analysis of hope provides the the-
oretical basis for the descriptiTe analysis of the hopin~ 
process to be discussed ia later chapters. It is there-
fore necessary to examine Marcel's analysis. 
1. The Process of Hope 
Hope is seen by Marcel as a process, an actiTity. 
This concept of hope as process confirms Marcel's emphasis 
upon ~eing• that necessarily means ~eing on the way.•l 
Hope is understood to be •on the way• as well. ~ope is 
not a kind of listless waiting; it underpins action or it 
runs before it, but it becomes degraded and lost once the 
action is spent.•2 
Perhaps the best indication of Marcel's intentions 
to make hope a process, is his usage of •hope• and ~oping• 
lGabriel Marcel, Homo Viator: Introduction to a 
Metaphysic ~Hope, trans:-1iriii:a Craufurd (Chioago:-Henry 
Regnery Company, 1951), p. 11. 
2Gabriel Marcel, ~Philosophy of Existence, trans. 
Manya Harari (Hew York: Philosophical Lrbrary, 1949), p. 20. 
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interchangeably. In aay case, he states that process and ac-
tivity are involTed whenever anyone is engaged in "hope• or in 
"hoping.• Hope is vital and energetic. It is like knowledge 
that becomes more than a matter of having past information con-
earning a condition, it is present knowing. Hope is more than 
having completed an act; it is acting. Marcel claims that hope 
"is for the soul what breathing is fo~ the living organism.•! 
Where this hope is lacking, the soul will dry up and wither and 
become no more than a function fit only as an object of study.2 
Hoping is a process that involves more than the indi-
vidual person, for •hope is only possible on the level of the 
~· or we might say of the agape, and that it does not exist 
on the level of the ego, ••• •3 
He who hopes, inasmuch as his hope is real and not to 
be reduced to a mere platonic wish, seems to himself to be 
inTolved in some kind of process; and it is only from 
this point of view that it is possible to realise what is 
specific, and, I should add super-rational, perhaps also 
super-relational, in hope.~ 
Hope is engaged in the weaving of experience now in 
process. In other words, hope is engaged in an adventure now 
going forward.5 
lMarcel, ~Viator, PP• 10-11. 
2Ibid. I p. 11. 
3Ibid., p. 10. 
4Ibid., P• 35. 
5Ibid. I p. 52. 
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As an activity or process, hope performs in various 
fashions. Hope is the being's active and veritable response 
to any sense of captivity or trial that may arise. Such cap-
tivity may be in the form of sickness, separation, exile, or 
slavery. Existence itself is seen as captivity by Marcel.l 
From this it would appear that at the back of hope 
lies some sort of tragedy. To hope is to carry within 
me the private assurance that however black things may 
seem, my present intolerable situation cannot be final; 
there must be some way out •••• The first and perhaps 
the main point is that the assurance cannot just be 
overlaid on something inert. The being who hopes is 
putting forth a sort of interior activity, even though 
it may not be easy to define the nature of that activity.2 
Hope as a process also transcends the particular ob-
jects to which it at first seems to be attached. 
Hope, by a nisus which is peculiar to it, tends in-
evitably to transcend the particular objects to which 
it at first seems to be attached.3 
Marcel sees hope as a process engaged in an adven-
ture directed towards the future. Hope appears to pierce 
through time and thereby to become prophetic. 
Hope appears as piercing through time; everything 
happens as though time, instead of hedging conscious-
ness round, allowed something to pass through it. It 
was fran this point of view that I previously drew 
attention to the prophetic character of hope. Of 
course one cannot say that hope sees what is going to 
happen; but it affirms as if it saw.4 
libid., PP• 30-32. 
2Gabriel Marcel, ~Mystery of Being, vol. II: Faith 
and Realitl, trans. Rene Hague (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 
l9 51 ) ' p • 60 • 
3Marcel, ~Viator, P• 32. 
4Ibid ., P• 53. 
Hope is not seen by Marcel to be a kind of listless 
waiting, but rather it is hope that underpins actions and 
runs before them. Hope is the prolongation into the unknown 
of an activity that is central and rooted in being.l 
2. The Context of Hope 
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For Marcel, there is a particular time at which hope 
can and does occur. Marcel describes these specific times or 
situations as those perceived by the individual to have the 
nature of captivity. 
i. ~Nature 2.!_ Captivity 
This state of captivity, so perceived by the individ-
ual, may be described by such terms as illness, separation, 
exile, or slavery. Whatever description is used, the indi vid-
ual is considered to be in a captive state whenever he finds 
himself forced by external constraint into a compulsory mode 
of existence. This existence involves restrictions of every 
conceivable nature, and consequences, which may touch any of 
one's person~l activities, result. 
The climate in such a situation is that of impossibil-
ity. There is a pervading feeling that there is no possibil-
ity of moving or acting in a manner that is relatively free. 
More importantly, in this state of captivity, it is not con-
sidered possible to gain the freedom necessary to ascend to a 
lMarcel, The Philosophy of Existence, P• 20. 
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"certain fullness of life, which may be in the realms of sen-
sation or even of thought in the strict sense of the word.•l 
It is quite clear, for instance, that the artist or 
writer ~o suffers from a prolonged sterility has liter-
ally a sense of being in prison, or if you prefer, in 
exile, as though he had really been taken out of the 
light in which he normally has his being. We can, there-
fore, say that all captivity partakes of the nature of 
alienation.2 
ii. The Relationship~ Hope~ Captivity 
Hope is not seen as something that is outside the 
struggle of captivity. Indeed, it is to these "tragic" and 
"impossible" situations that hope is invited and in which 
hope participates. For Marcel, it is impossible to separate 
hope from the framework of the trial. 
For the purposes of illustration, let us suppose that 
an individual or the group to Which the individual belongs is 
going through a time of trial. The individual would long for 
some deliverance, either for himself alone or for the group. 
In this case, Marcel would see the •I hope• as directed towards 
salvation, and would see the liberated individual as "coming 
out of a darkness" in which the individual had been plunged 
previously.3 
1Marcel, ~Viator, P• 30. 
34 
It is obviously impossible in such oases to separate 
the "I hope" from a certain type of situation of which it 
is really a part. Hope is situated within the framework 
of the trial, not only corresponding to it, but consti-
tuting our being's veritable response.l 
The situation where the tragic element seams to be 
absent does not invite the presence of hope. The dwelling-
place of hope is at the very center of captivity. 
By a paradox Whioh need surprise only the very super-
ficial thinker,~ less life!! eElerienoed ~~ oap-
tivit;y ~!.!!!~soul will~ ale to !!!. ~shining 
of that veiled, m;ysterious light, which, we feel sure with-
out any analysis, illumines the very centre of hope's 
dwelling-place. 
There is no hope except where the feeling of captivity 
is so great that the temptation to despair exists. Hope is 
the aot by which this temptation is actively and victoriously 
overoo.me.3 But hope first aooepts the trial as an integral 
part of the self while at the same time it considers the trial 
to be ~ned to transmutation through •the inner workings of 
a certain creative process.•4 
"It seems strangely enough, that, in hoping, I develop 
1Ibid. 
2 ~·· P• 32. 
Zrbid ., P• 36. 
4 ~·· P• 39. 
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in connection with the event, and perhaps above all through 
what it makes of me, a type of relationship, • w1 
• • 
Precisely when human existence takes on the appear-
ance and form of captivity, this human existence then becomes 
subject to hope. Conversely, those situations, in which the 
tragic element seams to be absent, do not invite but rather 
seem to reject the presence of hope. 
Everything goes to show that hope does not bear upon 
what is in me, upon the region of my interior life, but 
much more on what arises independently of my possible 
action, and particularly of my action on myself: ••• 2 
3. The Object of Hope 
Marcel's theory concerning the object of hope appears 
to offer one of the more valuable contributions to the under-
standing of hope, because it is here that one can begin to 
make distinctions between Marcel's theory of hope and such 
ter.ms as wishing, illusions, and delusions. This theory of 
hope equally provides a difficulty in description due to the 
emphasis upon the ~ystery" of hope concerning the object. 
i. E:!!, Nature 2£. the Object 
Marcel's approach, at this point, is very similar to 
the one taken by the Apostle Paul who writes, "For we are 
2 ~·· P• 41. 
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saved by hope: but hope that is seen is not hope: for what a 
man seeth, why doth he yet hope for? But if we hope for that 
we see not, then do we with patience wait for it.•l 
The similarity of Marcel's theory of hope to Paul's 
description of •hope for that we see not• is most predomi-
nant in Marcel's claim that hope •tends inevitably to trans-
cend the particular objects to which it at first seems to be 
attached.•2 This distinction is indicated through the usage 
and comparison of the absolute statement •I hope ••• " and 
the particular and concrete statement •r hope that • " • • • 
The expression •I hope• is directed in all its capac-
ity towards salvation.3 Salvation in this sense becomes a 
global or universal object rather than a particular object. 
In sensory terms, at least, salvation as object is seen as 
abstract rather than concrete. 
"I hope• is opposed to •I hope that" beoause, for 
Marcel, real hope transcends the imagination of a specific 
and concrete object. 
The individual does not allow himself to imagine a 
concrete object of his hope. To "hope that• a particular 
lRomans 8:24-25. 
2Marcel, Homo Viator, P• 32. 
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thing will occur or that a particular thing will happen at a 
specific time, is to reduce hope to self-made conditions that 
attempt to bind a future that is without one's control. To 
Marcel, the formation of suoh conditions actually becomes an 
obstacle that limits the process of hoping. 
Let us say again, to fix the meaning of the word ob-
stacle more precisely, that in so far as I make my hope 
conditional I myself put up limits to the process by 
which I could triumph over all successiTe disappoint-
ments .1 
In addition to becoBdng an obstacle to hope, such con-
ditional setting of limits may lead to and increase the possi-
bility of despair. This would be due to the fact that the in-
dividual's expectations failed to materialize in a specific 
fashion or at a speoifio time. Marcel would conceive it pos-
sible on the other hand, that one, who sets no relative oon-
ditions and who abandons himself in absolute confidence, could 
transcend all possible disappointment.2 
ii. ~Mystery 2£. Hope ~Relation ~ the Object 
This process of hoping is not seen by Marcel as a 
problem but rather as a mystery. As a mystery hope is super-
rational and super-relational. However, hope as a mystery 
does not imply or allow for such a statement as: •r am in the 
secret, I know the purpose of God or of the gods, whilst you 
1~., P• 46. 
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are a profane outsider; and moreover it is because I have the 
benefit of special enlightenment that I say what I do.nl It 
is meant by Marcel that mystery communicates a fundamental in-
sufficiency in any attempt to reduce the process of hope to 
rationalistic interpretations. The object of hope is one of 
these portions of the hoping process that remain such a mys-
tery. 
Hope consists in asserting that there is at the heart 
of being, beyond all data, beyond all inventories and all 
calculations, a mysterious principle which is in connivance 
with me, which cannot but will that which I will, if what 
I will deserves to be willed and is, in fact, willed by 
the whole of my being.2 
According to Marcel the treatment of hope as a mystery 
is to understand the very essence of hope. One of the major 
arguments directed against hope is that based on past exper-
ienoe. This past experience of specific cases and instances 
may lead to the individual's denial of any different possibil-
ities that may form the unspecified object of hope. The es-
sence of hope, which remains mysterious, is to exclude subser-
vience to such cases. In addition, hope is to rise to a plane, 
which transcends but does not deny, the level of all possible 
empirical disproof of the object of hope. 
1Ibid., P• 35. 
2Marcel, ~Philosophy ~Existence, p. 16. 
It is quite useless to tell me of discouraging oases 
or examples: beyond all experience, all probability, all 
statistics, I assert that a given order shall be rees-
tablished, that reality is on my side in willing it to 
be so. I do not wish: I-assert; such is the prophetic 
tone of my true hope.l 
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Furthermore, Marcel considers any attempt to be tragic 
that judges or condemns the object of hope through the usage 
of past experiences. It is tragic in the sense that such an 
attempt causes whateTer may be specific in hope to vanish from 
proper perspective. 
But postulated at the very basis of hope is the non-
validity of such assertions, the truth that the more the 
real is real the less does it lend itself to a calculation 
of possibilities on the basis of accepted experience.2 
Because the object of hope is not specific and concrete, 
hope is not interested in the technical question of how the end 
or the object is to be achieved. ~e who hopes says simply: 
'It will be found'•3 The one who relies on past experiences 
only ~11 eventually deny the possibility of change except 
when it repeats the patterns of past experience. 
In hoping, I do not create in the strict sense of the 
word, but I appeal to the existence of a certain creatiTe 
power in the world, or rather to the actual resources at 
the disposal of this oreati ve power. Where, on the other 
2Marcel, ~Viator, P• 51. 
3Ibid., p. 52 • 
hand, my spirit has been as it were tarnished by catalogued 
experience, I refuse to appeal to the creative power, I 
deny its existence; all outside me, and perhaps within me 
also (if I am logical) appears to me as simple repetition.l 
In a very real sense, Marcel sees hope to be the affir-
mation of Being as sustaining the worth of whatever deserves 
one's wholehearted allegiance. Hope is directed toward Being 
itself and rises above or beyond the plane of empirical event-
ualities and is directed toward salvation ••• the affirmation 
that man ean be related to Being. 
Marcel says for example, ~en one hopes for a friend 
Who is seriously ill, one's fundamental affirmation is that 
reality cannot be indifferent to the stricken person. Tb hope 
specifically for his recovery is to form an expectation that 
may or may not be ~shful and distorted, depending on how spe-
oific the expectation is. From this viewpoint a great deal 
that is called ~ope" is merely desire wrapped up in illusions. 
But, if one should ask about the value of the ill person's life, 
he is also asking about the value of his own life. The hope 
which arises at this point goes beyoDd both factual information 
and illusions concerning empirical eventualities. It is not 
the individual's conviction or words that are essential for 
hope. The primary thing for the individual is openness toward 
a realitywhich is capable ot being invoked. T.he object of 
hope is liberation understood to be non-specific and non-concrete. 
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4. The Subject of Hope 
The involvement of the self in the hoping process is one 
of the most interesting concepts of Marcel's theory of hope. 
It is interesting because the individual aims are somehow to be 
transcended if the person is to hope. For hope takes place on 
the level of the •usn or the •r-Thou.• It is at this point that 
Marcel makes distinctions between the process of hoping and other 
processes described by such terms as optimism, doubt, fear, and 
desire. These differences will be discussed later in this study. 
i. .!!!!!. Nature _2!, ~Subject 
1) The Subject's Attitude 
Hope, for Marcel, does not exist on the level of the soli-
tary self that is sanehow induced into concentrating exclusively 
on individual desires. !nese individual desires must be tran• 
scended if the person is to hope. 
To transcend the individual aims and desires is to free 
hope from being centered upon the subject himself. The subject 
in •r hope ••• n is in no way identical to the subject in •r my-
self ••• • which Marcel believes is so prevalent in statements 
of doUbt, certainty, and optimism.l 
In statements of doubt, certainty, and optimism, Marcel 
feels that the subject must come to the surface, as it were, to 
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answer the challenge presented to the subject by another in-
dividual. 
The ~· I said, very often, in fact almost invariably, 
needs to refer to some other person felt or conceived of 
as an opponent or a ~tness, or again merely summoned or 
imagined as an echo or a rectifier. Yon have your doubts, 
because you are ill-informed or because you lack inner 
stability, or for any other reason; as for me, I am sure--
and (be it understood) I am proud of the fact.l 
However, Marcel feels that the involvement of the ego 
in such exchanges is in keeping with the nature of such expres-
sions as "I doubt• and "I am sure •" In the instance of the 
hoping process, the circumstances are quite different. The sub-
jeot in the hoping process cannot be involved in defiance or in 
provocatLon, as it is in the oases of 11I doubt• and -I am sure,• 
else the process becomes something other than hoping. 
What is the cause of this difference? It is surely due 
to the fact that "I hope• is not orientated in the same way: 
there is no statement directed towards, and at the same time 
against, some other person either present or imagined. Of 
course, there is nothiog to prevent me from saying in cer-
tain cases, "For my part, I hope, whilst you do not." But 
there would be none of that suggestion of aggressive self-
complacency which, on the contrary, so often characterises 
"I am sure• or 11I doubt.•2 
2) The Involvement of the Subject in the Hoping Process 
The individual who is hoping, 11inasmuch as his hope is 
real and not to be reduced to a mere platonic wish, seems to 
be involved in some kind of process; 
libid., p. 33. 
2Ibid. 
• • • 
•3 
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The subject of hope, as the object, is involved in the 
"super-rational• and •super-relational• that Marcel calls a 
mystery. There is no claim made by the subject upon special 
enlightenment. Instead there is stress placed upon the quali-
ties of humility and modesty. 
I believe it must be answered that, speaking meta-
physically the only genuine hope is hope in what does 
not depend upon ourselves, hope springing from humil-
ity and not from pride .1 
Pride consists in the individual's drawing of strength 
and seouri. ty from himself alone. This pride outs the indi Tid-
ual off from •a certain for.m of communion with his fellow men• 
and acts as a •principle of destruction.•2 Creativity ceases 
and degradation begins at the point ~re the individual falls 
into •self-imitation" and •self-hypnotism."3 
The two internal attitudes expressed by the subject, 
who is hoping, are the subject's presence and availablity. It 
is admitted by Marcel that these terms are on the levels of the 
mysterious and the meta-problematical. 
Presence is intended to be more than an idea. Presence 
•corresponds to a certain kind of hold which being has upon us; 
••• •4 It is the ground for relationships between the subject 
lMarcel, ~Philosophy!! Existence, P• 19. 
2.!!!.!·· p. 20. 
3Ibid., PP• 20-21. 
4rbid., P• 23. 
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and others~ and is revealed unmistakenly in •a look, a smile, 
an intonation, or a handshake.•l It is a relationship of a 
subject to subject and being to Being and not subject to ob-
ject or subject to subject-object.2 
Availability is simply the subject's williness to give 
of his presence to another. Presence and availability of that 
presence are important for hoping in that they aid the individ-
ual to escape his self-interest and self-imitation, which tend 
to hold him captive and make him non-creative. 
3) The Prophetic Character 
There is a prophetic character in hope that seems to 
reside within the subject who hopes. It is prophetic in the 
sense that it recognizes no •clear line of demarcation between 
what it knows for a faot on the one hand and What it wishes or 
desires on the other."3 
The subject recognizes the significance of his circum-
stances, but refuses to limit or presume to limit these cir-
cumstances to probabilities based on past experience. Instead 
the subject is granted and accorded a ~nowing that outstrips 
the unknown,•4 a knowing which Marcel calls prophetic. 
1~., P• 26. 
2Ibid. 
3Mareel~ ~ Viator, P• 10. 
4Ibid. 
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The prophetic nature of the subject is to say that this 
captive situation has aa answer, and the hoping subject asserts 
that the answer will be forthcoming .1 
ii. The Subject's Acceptance 2!_ Capti Ti ty 
Marcel believes that there is a definite relationship 
between the way in which the self is centered or not centered 
in itself and the subject's reaction to the duration of time, 
which includes the possibility of change in reality. There is 
an affiniV,r, about which little is known, between hope and pa-
tience and between the subject's ability to relax. 
Thus, the hoping process means that the subject accepts 
the trial and its duration •as an integral part of the self,• 
but while so doing the subject also considers the trial "as 
destined to be absorbed and transmuted by the inner workings of 
a certain creative process.•2 It means that the subject places 
confidence in the possibility of change and in a certain process 
of growth and development. Having confidence implies the em-
bracing of the creative process so that the process is promoted 
fromwithin the subject. 
An example is given by Marcel of an invalid who is at 
first tempted to exclaim, while naively identifying recovery with 
l:Marcel, ,!!!.! Mystery 2.! BeiJl!, p. 159. 
2Marcel, ~Viator, P• 39. 
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salvation, "Everything is lost for me if I do not get well by 
a certain time.• Marcel sees the invalid as not accepting his 
captivity and instead as actually setting an obstacle in the 
way of his hoping. The obstacle is due to the fact that he has 
obviously set a definite time period for his recovery. To pass 
this definite time period is to increase his despair due to un-
fulfilled expectation.l 
If, however, the invalid hopes, then he accepts his 
captivity as an integral part of himself and his thoughts rise 
above the formulations upon which he first was tempted to de-
pend. In accepting his oaptiv.Lty he recognizes the fact that 
everything is not necessarily lost if there is no cure. It is 
likely that his attitude toward the possibility of recovery will 
have changed or will be changed. Marcel contends that he then 
will be more relaxed and patient, and time no longer will be con-
sidered an insurmountable obstacle on the way towards the tran• 
scendenoe of captivity.2 
This is another way of saying that the subject himself 
puts limits upon the process of hoping and the transcendence of 
captivitywhen the subject makes hope subservient to conditions 
of time or past experience. Likewise, this is Marcel's manner 
of comparing and contrasting the security of •being" with the 
insecurity of •having." 
1~., P• 46. 
2Ibid. 
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5. Religious .Aspects 
Hope has its religious elements tor Marcel. These aspects 
are largely included wi. thin the concept of 'mystery.' We have 
seen that hoping is a mystery and not a problem to Marcel. 
Hope is bound to some of the same basic dynamics that 
are found in faith and love. Like faith. hope must transcend 
all laying down of conditions, and must involve a response of 
the creature to the infinite being. This response must be one 
of surrender to the 1Thou' and one ot expansion from a •closed 
time• to an •open time.•l To move to •open time• is to •open 
a credit in favor or• or •to place oneself at the disposal ot• 
the Thou.2 
Hope is like love in the degree that it involves self-
denial. Hope must aot remain centered on the self • but must 
be self-giving in order to bring about true hope on the level 
of the •us.•3 For hope •does not exist on the level of the 
solitary eg•. self-hypnotised and concentrating exclusively 
on individual aims.•4 
The process of hoping is always an intimate aot of com-
munion for Marcel.s The context of hope must provide an inter-
lMaroel, ~ !ystery ~ Being, pp. 161-62. 
2Ibid •• PP• 77-78. 
3yaroel, ~Viator. P• 66. 
4:rbid •• P• 10. 
-
5Ibid., P• 58. 
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personal •r-T.hou• relationship. This interpersonal relation-
ship is considered by Marcel to be the "only possible source 
from which this absolute hope springs."l 
It appears as a response of the creature to the infi-
nite Being to whom it is conscious of owing everything 
that it has and upon whom it cannot impose any conditions 
whatsoever without scandal.2 
The communion of the subject with the •Thou" is a vi tal 
aspect of Marcel's theory of hope. It is only in absolute 
Reality that one finds the answer to his dilemma as a oapti ve, 
and absolute Reality is identified by Marcel as the absolute 
8 Thou.• Despair is the very opposite response for Marcel and 
is an open "declaration that God has withdrawn himself• from 
the despairing individual.3 Despair also represents solitude 
and an absence of communion. 
Hope represents a rise from the "humble forms of com-
munion which experience offers the most despised to a communion 
which is more intimate and more abundant, ••• •4 Hope then is 
regarded as foreshadowing the complete act of communion. 
"I hope in thee for us• is the expression chosen by 
Marcel to represent the dynamics suggested by the verp •to hope" 
1 ~., p. 47. 
2rbid. 
3rbid. 
4rbid., p. 60. 
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and the mysterious union of the subject and the nThou.•l This 
•Thou• is both the guarantee of the union and the very mortar 
that binds the ni-Thou" relationship into one. Thus. to say 
"I despair of myselfn is to say "I despair of the Thou" as we11.2 
In essence. this union or bond of the subject and the 
•Thou• is religious. Any such boad would presuppose the making 
of a judgment on the existence of God. one's own existence, and 
the possibility of communion between the two. The establish-
ment and continuation of such a bond is considered to be •spir-
itual" and "mysterious.• It is something which the person 
knows and to which he responds. Hope contends that a union ex-
ists. that Being affirms the individual being. and that Being 
cannot help but will what I will if what I will is the "Good," 
according to Marcel. Not knowing the total good. the hoping 
subject does not presume to determine the concrete answer to 
his captivity. but instead only asserts that there is an an-
swer. The result of the union is preservation and renewal. 
This aspiration can be approximately expressed in the 
simple but contradictory words: ~ before, ~ differently 
and better than before. Here we undoubtedly come once again 
upon the theme-or liberation, for it is never a simple re-
turn to the status quo, a simple return to our being, it is 
that and much more. and even the contrary of that: an un-
dreamed-of promotion, a transfiguration.3 
2Ibid., P• 60-61. 
6. Some Other Aspects of Hope 
i. Courage 
Marcel's discussion on courage is of importance pri-
marily due to the fact that he uses courage in hope as an 
argument against the usage of or the need for denial in hope. 
For Marcel, there is no deluding of oneself or denial where 
courage is concerned. The summit of courage is reached ~en 
the situation is most clearly appreciated."! 
Courage is seen as the •driving force behind hope.•2 
The hoping person can only begin to hope after he has com-
pletely recognized and accepted his captive situation. Hope 
is an active reaction against a state of captivity, and hope 
begins in the realization that one is a captive. Courage seems 
to be the ability of the individual to look tragedy squarely 
in the face and say that this intolerable situation cannot be 
final. It is the direct opposite of capitulation ~thin des-
pair, whereby the individual disar.ms before the seemingly in-
evitable and appears to fall apart under the sentence of cap-
tivity. Courage is only a portion of the hoping process, but 
it plays an important part in providing the necessary energy 
to both recognize the captive situation as it is and to direct 
lMarcel, The Mystery~ Being, p. 159. 
2~., P• 160. 
hope's response to the situation. 
ii. Patience 
Marcel discusses patience when he is seeking an an-
s~r to how one can refuse to accept his captive situation 
as final and at the same time avoid tightening and stiffen-
ing up oneself. The need is that one be able to relax while 
refusing to accept situations as necessarily inevitable as 
they presently stand. 
The key to this discussion for Marcel is his conten-
tion that: 
There exists a secret and rarely discovered connec-
tion between the way in which the ego is either centred 
or not centred in itself, and its reaction to the dura-
tion of time, or more precisely to the temporal order, 
that is to say to the fact that change is possible in 
reality .1 
There is an affinity between hope and relaxation. 
Hope accepts the trial and also considers it destined to be 
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absorbed and changed. The hoping person then actively awaits 
this transmutation. This awaiting is patience. 
Patience is neither weakness nor complacency. These 
are considered to be degradations of patience by Marcel. In-
stead, patience seems to be "a certain pluralisation of the 
self in time.•2 The patience that is in the hoping person 
lMarcel, ~Viator, P• 39. 
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places confidence and belief in a certain process of growth and 
development. The patient, hoping person does not despair of 
either himself or of the other person. 
It is radically opposed to the act by which I despair 
of the other person, declaring that he is good for nothing, 
or that he will never understand anything, or that he is 
incurable. That is, of course, the same despair which 
makes me proclaim that I shall never be cured, that I shall 
neTer see the end of my captivity, eto.l 
In the same fashion that the patient person recognizes 
and respects the different "rhythm• of life within another per-
son and that person's need for time to preserve his vital rhythm, 
so hope through patience awaits the vital rhythm of absolute 
Being .2 
This patience is not quietism. The idea of inert hope 
is contradictory to Marcel's notion of hope. The patience of 
the hoping person is not a kind of •listless waiting,• but 
rather it is that which "underpins action.•3 
3uarcel, Philosophy 2.£ Existence, p. 20. 
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7. Hope Distinguished From Other Processes 
i. Wishing, Daydreaming, Illusions 
1) Marcel's Distinctions 
Marcel distinguishes hope from wishing, daydreaming, 
illusions and like states and processes. A special emphasis 
is made in his handling of the object of hope. 
The object of hope is seen as non-concrete and non-
specified. Marcel illustrated his position by the usage of 
the phrase -r hope ••• • to indicate a non-particular and 
even diffuse effect; and he used the phrase -r hope that. • 
• • 
to indicate specificity of an object and to introduce a pro-
cess other than hoping. 
In psychiatry the ter.m &wishing,• viewed psychodynam-
ically. is forem.ostly associated with psychoanalysis. When 
defined in the lay sense as desire or want, it includes with-
in the definition the forces in the unconscious that strive to 
become external. A wish could be described as an impulse, a 
tendency. a desire, a striving. More broadly. wishing may be 
understood as a process that tends toward tension satisfaction 
or discharge.l 
These unconscious wishes strive for gratification 
through the cathexis of psychic energy to some objeot outside 
the individual, it is thought, or to the object's representation 
lteland E. Hinsie and Robert J. Campbell, Psychiatric 
Dictionary (3rd. Ed.; New York: Oxford University, 1960), p. 779. 
in the mind of the individual. Dynamically understood then, 
wishing, it is felt, represents repressed mental material, 
which for-mulates a tendency towards gratification by the 
cathexis of psychic energy to a concrete object or to a con-
scious representation of a specific object. 
If I wish ardently for a certain thing, it will be 
said, I shall represent it to myself very distinctly, 
I shall realise it in my imagination and immediately, 
by the same process, I shall believe it is actually 
going to happen .1 
Marcel indicates that when hoping is true hope and 
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not wishing then the object of hope is less than specific and 
concrete. Instead, the object is diffuse and abstract. It 
is as if Marcel proposed a continuum on which he placed, at 
opposite ends, the expressions •I hope ••• • and "I hope 
that •• • • • The more •r hope ••• • tends toward the exclu-
sion of a specific object the more likely it is that this is 
true hope and the less likely it is wishing. Conversely, the 
more concrete the object intended by the phrase •I hope 
that ••• • the more likely it is wishing and the less likely 
it is true hope. 
Daydreaming usually ~plies an idle indulgence of the 
imagination during the waking hours and may be called wishful 
thinking. These dreams may take on the value of reality, as 
in certain forms of psychoses, but thereby become symptoms 
1Marcel, ~ Viator, P• 44. 
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and more than what is usually understood to mean daydreaming. 
Generally, daydreams include some pleasurable memories 
of past experiences that are revived by some present exper-
ience or thought. These memories cause the individual to at-
tempt to recreate and relive these past experiences in the 
mind, with the notion of some future fulfilment. The forces 
that cause the daydreaming are thought to be some unsatisfied 
and undisguised wish.l Again the cathected object is specific 
and concrete, and thus, daydreaming is also a process distinct 
from hoping, for Marcel. 
An illusion is an erroneous perception of sensory data 
by definition. An object of the enVironment has been falsely 
responded to by the individual. Marcel sees hope's object 
differently in the sense that the more true hoping is involved 
the less possibility there is of a specific and concrete ob-
ject being falsely perceived. 
On the contrary, the more hope transcends imagination, 
so that I do not allow myself to imagine what I hope for, 
the more this objection seems to disappear.2 
2) Marcel and Menninger Compared 
It appears that Marcel would differ with Karl Menninger's 
approach to wishing and hoping, which suggests that 8 hope is a 
1teland E. Hinsie and Robert J. Campbell, Psychiatric 
Dictionary, p. 175. 
2Marcel, ~Viator, p. 45. 
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consciousness of the realizable wiah.•l In Marcelian ter.ms, 
a realizable wish would have a more definite object than would 
hope. The former would only be a matter of goal-directed be-
havior until the object is obtained. With hope there is no 
such definite and concrete object for Marcel, therefore, no 
goal-directed behavior in a sense similar to the process of 
wishing. Hoping and wishing are thus distinct and different 
processes. 
Menninger contends, in addition, that the psychologi-
cal motive forces of both wishing and hoping are the same.2 
Marcel would quite possibly agree with this though he would 
more specifically identify the motive for hoping as a captive 
situation. Wishing can also be a response to a captive sit-
uation, but Marcel would add that such a situation is neces-
sary in order for hope to occur. 
As an additional attempt to identify hoping with wish-
ing, Menninger points out that the delusions of schizophrenics, 
like the daydreams of children, are hopes. Such hopes, for 
Menninger, are true hopes because the objects of these hopes 
are real for the schizophrenic, whether they are for anyone 
else or not. Maturity is an indicator of the development of 
1Menninger, ~ !gainst Hate, p. 215. 
2 ~·• P• 217. 
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hoping because the individual becomes ~ore and more practical, 
which is to say that he begins to test reality and finds out 
which hopes can be realized and what restrictions the external 
world places upon them.•l 
Marcel agrees that 'this is true for wishing but not for 
hoping. Wishing is in reality "merely a calculation concern-
ing certain chances I am considering, a practical little prob-
lem of probabilities."2 Hoping is something different again. 
The process of hoping is not dependent upon past experience in 
the determination of ita object. In fact, hope stands in con-
tradiction to any such calculation of probabilities based on 
past experience alone. 
We have arrived then at the important conclusion that 
what is specific in hope is lost sight of if the attempt 
is made to judge and condemn it from the point of view of 
established e:Perienoe •••• The truth is much more that 
hope is engaged in the weaving of experience now in pro-
cess, or in other words in an adventure now going for-
ward.3 
Futhermore, Marcel feels that to accept the perspec-
tive of established experience is to imply that time ~11 bring 
nothing new beyond an added confirmation of previously engraved 
experiences.4 
!Ibid., P• 218. 
2~aroel, ~Viator, P• 29. 
3Jbid., P• 52 • 
4Ibid., p. 10. 
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Hope is different fromwishing in that it asserts pro-
phetically that there is something to know beyond the •known." 
Hope is a knowing which outstrips the unknown--but 
it is a knowing which excludes all presumption, a know-
ing accorded, granted, a knowing which may be a grace 
but is in no degree a conquest.l 
Marcel would quite likely agree with Menninger's state-
ment that there are differences between hoping and wishing such 
as a •difference in the ~ of the impulse, the degree wi. th 
which it is correlated with reality, inhibited by internal 
fears, supported by other motives, • •2 • • 
It is the contention of Marcel that there are differ-
ent results for hoping than for wishing. Wishing may bring 
the additional result of disappoiRtment if the specific object 
of the wish is URobtainable. If the patient's wish, say for a 
specific kind and time of recovery from his illness, remains 
unfulfilled then the result may be additional disappointment. 
But, hope sees that everything is not necessarily lost if a 
specific cure is not obtained at a particular time. Marcel 
suggests that such a hopeful attitude may result in an entirely 
new inner security and a new faculty £or relaxing, patience, 
and £orbearance.3 
1Ibid., P• 10. 
2Menninger, ~Against Hate, p. 217. 
3Marcel, ~Viator, P• 46. 
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Hoping and wishing differ in the way in which they deal 
with reality. Hope, as seen by Marcel, does not deny reality 
as ~shful thinking might because hope is a response of the 
individual to tragedy that has been faced squarely and clearly. 
Any departure from reality would result in illusion and de-
lusion and no longer be true hope for Marcel. For hope means 
accepting the trial as an integral part of oneself while at 
the same time considering it ordained to be absorbed and trans-
mutted.l 
Internal conditions support both wishing and hoping for 
Marcel. However, courage is a part of hope, while fears are a 
part of despair. Hope reacts to a captiTe situation with cour-
age and not with fear as hope clearly recognizes and accepts 
the real situation. Another internal condition of hoping, but 
not of wishing, is patience. Wishing seeks immediate gratifi-
cation. Hoping will wait with patience while permitting no 
departure from reality to alter its response.2 It is expected 
that hope will transcend imagination, which breeds wishing, and 
thus expose itself to critical reflection. 
ii. Desire and Fear 
Desire, like wishing, generally is described as a term 
which indicates some conscious or unconscious impulse. There 
llbid., PP• 30,39. 
2Ibid., pp. 29-30. 
60 
remains some controversy over whether there is any actual iden-
tity of the unconscious impulses with the conscious •desires•; 
and also whether or not wishing and desiring, at least psycho-
logically, are only different terms for the same activity.l 
Fear has a twofold nature, namely real fear based on 
actual experiences, and neurotic fear that arises, according 
to psychoanalysis, whenever a libidinal excitation is aroused, 
but is neither discharged nor satisfied. In psychoanalysis, 
however, there is no basic differeace in what one fears either 
neurotically or objectively. Both are actually fears of one's 
own libido • 2 
Desire and fear are treated separately from wishing be-
cause this is the fashion employed by Marcel in treating these 
subjects, though he makes no direct reference to their dis-
tinctive differences in relation to wishing. All of these 
processes, like hope, are looked on as possible responses to 
a given situation of captivity. 
The differences again between these responses and hope 
are based on how concrete and specific the object is. "Desire 
is always to desire something," whereas to hope is essentially 
not to have a specific object in mind.3 •Desire and hope are 
lHinsie and Campbell, op. cit., P• 204. 
2~., p. 292. 
3Marcel, The Mystery ~ Being, p. 162. 
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to be found in completely distinct spheres of spiritual life.•l 
Hope is regarded as a virtue, but it becomes desire whenever 
what is mystery in it becomes a problem instead. 
Hope is then regarded as a desire which wraps itself 
up in illusory judgments to distort an objective reality 
~ich it is interested in disguising from itself.2 
A futher distinction between desire and hoping is that 
desire is egoistical and self-centered Whereas hope strives to 
escape eentering on its subjeot.3 
Fear and desire are correlated to each other. Neither 
can be correlated to hope.4 Both are bound up with expeotation,S 
and the world of fear and desire is the -world of the proble-
matical.• Fear and desire are inseparable in this respect.6 
iii. Optimism ~Pessimism 
The delineations of the states of optimism and pessi-
mism from the hoping process find their ground primarily in 
the stuqy of the subject within the hoping process. 
Optimism and pessimism remain more strictly than hope 
!Ibid., p • 158. 
2Marcel, Philosophy ~Existence, P• 17. 
3Mareel, ~ Viator, p. 66. 
~reel, Philosophy ~Existence, P• 16. 
5Marcel, The »ystery ~Being, p. 158. 
6Maroel, Philosophy ~Existence, p. 18. 
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in the realm of the "I myself.• They aggressively assert the 
importance of the "self" or the •I• in all judgments where 
there is a question of certainty or doubt • 
The ego, I said, very often, in fact almost invariably, 
needs to refer to some other person felt or conceived of 
as an opponent or a witness, or merely summoned or imagined 
as an echo or a rectifier.! 
The optimist may say for example, •You have your doubts, 
because you are ill-informed or because you lack inner stabil-
ity, or for any other reason; as for me, I am sure--and (be it 
understood) I am proud of the faot."2 
Hope to the contrary does not employ defiance or provo-
oati on. Why the difference? 
It is surely due to the fact that "I hope" is not 
orientated in the same wayz there is no statement directed 
towards, and at the same time against, some other person 
either present or imagined.3 
Marcel defines the optimist as one "who has a firm con-
viction, or in certain cases just a vague feeling, that things 
tend to 'turn out for the best•.•4 He sees the optimist as one 
who always withdraws a "sufficient distance• from the experience 
in order to allow •certain contradictions to become alternated 
or fused into a general harmony."6 
lMaroel, Homo Viator, P• 33. 
2rbid. 
3Ibid. 
4rbid. 
6Ibid ., P• 34. 
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In addition# the optimist is •like a spectator with par-
tioularly keen sight#• who might say something like: "If your 
vision is as good as mine# you are bound to see ••• " .1 
In contrast# the person who hopes is one who finds him-
self involved in a process. The character of hope is that of 
~umility," •timidity#" and "chastity.• To be optimistic is 
to be proud and to rely on oneself, while to hope is to be hum-
ble and to seek strength in another. 
I believe it must be answered that, s;zaking metaphysi-
cally, the only genuine hope .4 hope in at ~ not ~­
pend on ourselves# hope spring1ng from h1mdlity and not 
from pride .2 
Pessimism is largely seen by Marcel as only a counter-
part of optimism. There is little fundamental distinction be-
tween them as "they are like the inside and the outside of the 
same gar.ment.•3 There is the same pride and ego-centrality in 
pessimism as in optimism, and as a process pessimism is distin-
guished dynamically from hope in the same fashion as optimism. 
iv. Despair 
Marcel perceives despair as possible "in any form, at 
any moment and to any degree, and this betrayal WJ.y seem to be 
2Maroel, ~Viator# P• 34. 
3yarcel, Philosophy~ Existence, p. 14. 
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counselled, if not forced upon us by the very structure of the 
world we live in.•1 Hope is seen as a corollary to despair in 
the sense that there can ~e no hope except where the temptation 
to despair exists."2 Hope becomes the process whereby this 
temptation to despair is actively overcome. 
T.he notion of despair is a comprehensive one for Marcel. 
One can despair of reality as a whole just as readily as he des-
pairs of another individual or object. Whoever responds to re-
ality with despair is making this affirmation: "There is nothing 
in the realm of reality towhich I can give credit--no security, 
no guarantee.•3 Hope places itself opposite this affirmation 
for hope implies credit. 
Despair, as a statement of complete insolvency, has sev-
eral levels of degradation. One level is defeatism which in-
volves putting things at their worst. Another level, which seems 
to follow the level of defeatism, is one where the individual 
comes to desire the worst. The absolute level of despair for 
Marcel would appear to be the state of dejection. Here there 
is complete immobilization of life. The person in a state of 
dejection is one "who expects nothing either from himself, or 
lMarcel, Philosophy £!Existence, p. 14. 
2Maroel, ~Viator, P• 36. 
3Maroel, Philosophy ~Existence, P• 15. 
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from others. or from life.•l 
The despairing person sees no promises for the future. 
It is this same despair that causes one to look at another in-
dividual and say that he is •good for nothing• or that he is 
•incurable.• This presence of despair causes the individual 
to say of himself as well. •I shall never be cured, ••• • or 
•I shall never see the end of my captivity, ••• •2 
The hoping person, to the contrary, looks into the teeth 
of difficulty when he hopes; and the temptation to despair, 
brought on by one's perceived situation of captivity, is over-
came. It could be said that hope and despair are different 
responses to the same experiences. 
It remains true, nevertheless, that the correlation of 
hope and despair subsists until the end; they seem to me 
inseparable. I mean that while the structure of the world 
we live in permits--and may even seem to counsel--absolute 
despair, yet it is only such a world that can give rise to 
an unconquerable hope.3 
Within each captive situation resides an element of the 
temptation to despair. The taaptation is to view the surround-
ing conditions as stifling and as unchangeable. The individ-
ual may see his illness as captivity and say. ~erything is 
1Marcel, The !fstery ~ Being, p. 158. 
2Marcel, ~ Viator, P• 40. 
3yarcel, Philosophy~ Existence, P• 16. 
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lost for me if I do not get well."l 
Opposite the response of despair is the response of 
hope. Reality is seen differently by the hoping person. Tonus, 
the hoping individual accepts the trial as an intregal part of 
the self, but in addition, sees the trial as destined to be 
•absorbed and transmuted.•2 Reality is seen as having the pos-
sibility of being greater than What one can perceive at any 
given moment. There is always a certain possibility of the 
contradiction of circumstances left to the hoping individual. 
The one who is ill would say instead, if he hopes, ~verything 
is not necessarily lost if there is no cure, ••• •3 
In relation to time, despair is the consciousness of 
time as closed or as a prison while •hope appears as piercing 
through time; everything happens as though time, instead of 
hedging consciousness round, allowed something to pass through 
it.•4 
v. Anticipation ~ Expectatioa 
Marcel deals only in a very cursory fashion with expec-
tation and anticipation as alternative processes of response. 
lMarcel, ~ Viator, P• 46. 
2Ibid ., P• 39. 
3rbid., P• 46. 
"'bid., P• 53. 
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This is primarily due to the fact that anticipation and expec-
tation are involved to some degree in all modes of response 
concerning the future. 
It is important, however, to treat them separately be-
cause of their subtle and dynamic influences upon other modes 
of response. The study of these is also important to Marcel 
because he feels that anticipation and expectation unfulfilled 
become some of the major contributors to disappointment and 
perhaps despair. 
Anticipation and expectation, like many other modes of 
response, ha~ ordinarily a specific or concrete object. It 
is at this point again that Marcel finds the primary differ-
ence between these states and hope. 
Marcel believes, in addition, that there is a tendency 
for one, whose anticipations and expectations have been disap-
pointed, to personify the experiences that failed. The ten-
dency is first •to count on" the anticipation being fulfilled. 
When the expected action does not follow the anticipation, then 
the individual is left with the feelings of a •creditor• to 
whom experience owed a certain obligation and failed to pay it. 
Disappointment results from the failure. Marcel describes such 
activity as presumption on the individual's part to attempt, in 
advance, to chain down reality to one's own desires.l 
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Hope acts quite differently when employed by the individ-
ual, because for Marcel hoping excludes any presumption to chain 
reality in advance to any specific demands. 
Perhaps, it is simply that hope shows the originality 
and, I must add, the supreae dignity, of never claiming 
anything or insisting upon its rights.l 
Should hope make any attempt to presume such a contrac-
tual notion, then Marcel contends that an inevitable degradation 
will occur in the hoping process. 8 To anticipate" or •to ex-
pect from• can become •to have due to me," that is •to count 
on.• •To count on• can become •to claim" or "to demand."2 This 
is not seen as the true nature of hoping. 
8. Summary 
Marcel indicates a dissatisfaction at having to reduce 
hope to any kind of definition or summary. For Marcel feels 
that so much of what is real hope is irreducible to definition 
because human life is a drama, an ever changing process, which 
cannot always be enclosed within the "devitalizing method• of 
thought forms. 3 
Nonetheless, following his dialectical analysis of 
hope, he allows himself to •attempt• a definition of hope: 
2Ibid., p. 56 • 
3r bid.. p. 10 • 
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We might say that hope is essentially the availability 
of a soul which has entered intimately enough into the ex-
perience of communion to accomplish in the teeth of will 
and knowledge the transcendent act--the act establishing 
the vital regeneration of which this experience affords 
both the pledge and the first-fruits.l 
This hoping process is a mysterious knowing of the un-
known, a knowing that is granted and received and which ex-
eludes all presumption. 1.his hope DeTer demands or expects a 
specific anrwer to a perceiTed captive situation, but instead 
the hoping person actively awaits an undertermined and non-
concrete answer with patience, humbleness, and •openness• of 
spirit. 
Only those conditions perceiTed by the individual as 
captiTe·, where the indiTidual is restricted by external con-
straint to a compulsory mode of existence, are in need of aad 
subject to hope. Hope is an active response to such captivity. 
This response accomplishes the •transcendent act• that restores 
and renews, thereby achieTing the aspiration of hope--liberation. 
Marcel has proTided the theoretical foundation with 
respect to some conditions of occurrence, distinctive indicators, 
and dynamic consequences. 
The next chapter is an attempt to move from Marcel's 
abstract and theoretical analysis to a more descriptive one. 
lrbid., P• 67. 
CHAPmR III 
mE HOPING PROCESS: .A. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
Gabriel Marcel's analysis or hope has provided the 
theoretical ground work. There is now a need for redefining 
hope in more descriptive terms so that it can be understood 
better. The intention of this chapter is to present a de• 
scriptive analysis of the hoping process based upon Marcel's 
theoretical work on hope. 
There are three basic considerations that primarily 
determine the principles involved in this descriptive analy-
sis of the hoping process. They are: (1) the conditions of 
occurrence, (2) the distinctive indicators of the hoping pro-
cess, and (3) the dynamic consequences related to the hoping 
process and its occurrence. 
1. The Conditions ot Occurrence 
or prime concern to any descriptive activity are ques-
tions relating to the appearance of the event. One desires 
to know the anBWers to such questions as how, when, and where 
did the event occur. It is to these questions and others that 
this section is addressed. 
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The word ~opiQg.• as used iQ this section. is under-
stood to be equal in meaniQg to ~ope• as interpreted by 
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Marcel. As Marcel suggests. hoping is not a meaningless wait-
ing but is supportive and aotivatiQg.l In this way hoping is 
understood to be a process or a state of readiness that is ca-
pable of being invoked and directed to a giveQ state of affairs. 
Hoping equally corresponds to activity involving more 
than one person. It is interpersonal activity. 
I think this is a first step in the psychological di-
rection. Hoping is a process. an activity of persons. 
It is not an idea. but a real. live ooourrenoe in a con-
crete and knowable setting.2 
Through the use of the terms ~oping• or •the hoping 
process• it is intended that hope be understood as a process 
or activity involving more than one person. 
i. Boping ~ Response ~ Captivity 
Hoping is a peculiar kind of process because it is di-
rected as a response to a particular type of experience. This 
experience is called captivity by this study. The hoping per-
son interprets his environment and its connection to himself. 
He then reacts to the perceived conditions of that environment 
in a way peculiar to the hoping process. 
1Marcel. ~ Philosophy 2!_ Existence, p. 20. 
2pruyser, op. cit •• P• 4. 
7he situation, Which provides the stimuli to draw the 
respoDse of the hoping person, has been described by Marcel 
as a captive one. 
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Paul Pruyser equates this sense of captivity or the 
visitation by calamity with the psychological term of •stresa.•l 
This implies the subjection of the individual to external pres-
sure. Stress is certainly involved in captivity, but it does 
not mean all that Marcel gave to the situation perceived by 
the individual as captivity. 
The nature of the situation, broadly described as cap-
tive, is subject to the following conditions: (1) it is exter-
nally produced, (2) it exerts considerable stress, restriction, 
and influence on the individual involved, and (3) it appears to 
be formed by circumstances unavailable to alteration by the in-
dividual alone. 
Captivity, actual or threatened, is externally produced. 
The individual is confronted by elements of his environment 
whioh cause him to feel that he has been or will be incarcer-
ated. No longer does he consider himself free to aot and to 
choose as he was able to do prior to the confrontation. 
Not only is the captive condition seen to be •outside 
oneself,• but it is also viewed as being ~eyond oneself.• It 
is outwardly perceptible and equally considered to be •out of 
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reach.• Those forces of the environment, which create the 
problem for the individual, are thought to be greater than 
the forces of the individual. The person does not consider 
them changeable by himself alone. In this sense they are 
•out of reach.• The conditions called captive are beyond the 
individual's power to control. 
Some occasions that can be included in this category 
of captivity are contracting a contagious disease, being caught 
in a severe storm of nature, social codes or laws that are im-
posed, competitive situations, a physical defect, and approach-
ing death. 
The second condition of a captive situation is that it 
exerts considerable stress, restriction, and influence upon 
the individual involved. 
Stress results from interference with goal-directed be-
havior. Personal needs go unsatisfied and desires become 
thwarted. But the situation becomes most captive in nature 
when the individual understands it as a permanent threat to 
self-realization. 
It should be recognized that no one situation includes 
the factors of captivity for everyone. Some persons may, due 
to inborn or early acquired differences, see themselves as 
threatened by conditions that would not affect others. Osten-
sibly benign circumstances for one person may be significantly 
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threatening to another. In eaoh oase of confrontation it then 
becomes a question of how the individual perceives his situa-
tion. It is significant to say that the individual sees his 
experieace as captive. 
Accompanying the feelings of stress and frustration, is 
the feeling of restriction in captivity. The individual sees 
himself as forced into a compulsory state of existence. The 
avenues open to aotion and to freedom of ohoioe are threatened 
fromwithout. Though the menacing event may appear to involve 
only an area of the person's whole experience, the individual 
views it as a threat to his total welfare. 
Time then beoomes an additional factor in the individ-
ual's determination of the strength and duration of his captiv-
ity. Where once he felt free to aot or to choose, he now feels 
enslaved to the dictates of an external force. The person sees 
his ~eing,• to be what he wants to be and to do what he wants 
to do, threatened. The present loses its prior meaning and val-
ue because of this restriction. 
Not only does the individual believe his ~eing• to be 
restricted, but his ~ecoming• as well. The possibilities for 
~provemeat, growth, and development are limited by the environ-
ment. Again in respect to time, the future loses same of its 
promise because it is restricted. 
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The conditions of the present environment affect the 
impriaonment; the prospects of the situation changing in the 
future pronounce the length of sentence. Together they de-
termine haw the captive situation ~11 look to the individual. 
The feeling of impossibility becomes prevalent in those 
who perceive themselves caught by time as well as by circum-
stances. Little or no prospect is seen for changing the re-
strictive conditions either presently or in the future. As a 
result, complementary feelings of stress and frustration in-
crease. 
With stress aad restriction, the question arises concern-
ing the influence of captivity. The influence that the captive 
situation has upon the behavior of the individual is based on 
several things. Among them are the person's age level, his en-
vironmental background, and his social acceptance. 
The age level ordinarily determines the kind of stress 
that is exhibited when one is confronted by the environment. 
The infant may give evidence of frustration in the total organ-
ism if its vegetative needs are not fulfilled. The young child 
becomes enraged When he wants something that he is not allowed 
to have and which has been placed out of his reach. The adult 
tried by circumstances attempts to control his frustration along 
complex, predetermined avenues of behavior. 
The environmental background helps determine how well 
the person advances to the more mature and especially to the 
socially accepted patterns of behavior. 
Perhaps most important of all, in relation to the in-
fluence of the captive situation upon the individual, is the 
need for acceptance by society. 
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The older the child becomes the more important his inter-
personal relationships become. Concurrently it is significant 
that his desires be accomplished because thereby he gains some 
measure of approval and acceptance from others. Any obstacle 
in the path to accomplishment is likely to bring frustration. 
Almost at any age the apparent price for a sense of belonging 
is to achieve success in one or more areas of activity. 
The captive situation is a ~jor obstacle to the accom-
plishment of a person's desires; consequently, it influences 
the individual's behavior. 
Because of the confrontation of the individual by this 
kind of setting, the individual may feel lonely and separated 
from others and from any help they might give him. Other 
people may seem isolated and inaccessible to the individual's 
needs. There is also the threat of losing one's self-esteem 
because the person sees no likelihood of change, and certainly 
no sufficient power within himself that he may use to alter 
the external circumstances. 
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Apart from the benefit of companionship, two individuals 
perceiving the same situation as captive would add only exter-
nal validation of the suspected experience. This would increase 
the sense of being •caught.• When the same situation is per-
ceived as captive for one and not for another, it ~uld appear 
that the latter could be a source of help for the former. When 
the perception of separate circumstances is involved, there 
would appear to be little means for one aiding another. 
The third condition of a captive situation is that it 
has the appearance of being formed by unalterable circumstances. 
The frustrating experience is beyond the individual's power to 
regulate. He may feel helpless before such conditions. 
The unhappy situation is intensified if the person finds 
that previously acquired behavior patterns are of little or no 
use. For.merly exercised behavior habits may neither fulfill 
his desires nor lessen the frustration. This would give rise 
to a more complete feeling of imprisonment. 
During the encounter with the threat of captivity. it 
is likely that the individual would exercise his previously 
acquired modes of response in order to ward off imprisonment. 
Should other modes of response fail to provide relief from the 
stress of the situation. then hoping may be exercised. There 
is then an expressed need for the response of hoping. 
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ii. .!!!!_ !.!!! !2!. ~ Hoping Response 
The need for the hoping response lies precisely at the 
point of failure in other responses. 
tivity requires an adequate response. 
The need aroused by cap-
Though not as readily 
available as some, hoping becomes more accessible as other re-
sponses fail. 
The individual feels that he is a prisoner and he tries 
to make his escape by various responses. The person probably 
will choose first those responses which are most familiar to 
him in terms of former usage. Should he discover that these 
familiar responses are unacceptable to the new situation, he 
may turn to totally different responses. Hoping may be se-
lected. 
It is assumed that the individual desires to escape or 
else he would not take the trouble to exercise the response 
of hoping. The implicit suggestion is that unless one finds 
himself confronted by a captive experience, he has no need and, 
quite likely, no real possibility for exercising hoping. 
It is not expected that hoping will be the chosen re-
sponse to any or all situations perceived as captive. Nor is 
it likely that all persons would desire release from a captive 
situation. But hope is an alternative that an individual may 
select as a response to a captive experience. 
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For the purpose of illustration, the threat of approach-
ing death may be considered by an individual to be a captive 
situation. It is certainly a condition to which the person 
must adjust. 
Death. particularly premature death is one of the most 
important situations in all societies, demanding complex 
emotional adjustments on the part of the dying person ••• 1 
The possible responses available to the individual fac-
ing such a condition as approaching death are many. A group 
of responses readily available are the defensive attitudes one 
has used throughout his life to face other difficult circum-
stances. This is not to suggest that the person will neoes-
sarily choose the same ones, but that he will likely, from 
habit, fall back upon familiar attitudes first. 
Daniel Cappon writes of a study made at a general hos-
pital of patients who were dying. These dying patients were 
compared qualitatively and statistically with other patients 
suffering from a non-fatal illness. Cappon reports: 
Psychologically, the dying differed little from other 
patients physically ill, or, for that matter, from other 
patients emotionally ill with respect to their fear of 
death, motivation, and personality. They died as they 
lived; their thoughts, feelings, and actions frozen by 
the buffetings of life in the same too often distorted, 
ugly patterns •••• The reaction in those seeing it as 
a threat was not miraculously different from all the 
other reactions to threats incurred before. The hostile 
lTalcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, cited by 
Daniel Cappon, •The Psychology of Dying,* Pastoral Psychology, 
XII (February, 1961), 35. 
became more hostile, the fearful more fearful, the weak 
weaker. They each hung on to their habitual defenses--
regressing, denying, withdrawing, projecting, as before.l 
A possible defensive attitude toward approaching death 
would be denial of death and its reality by the avoidance of 
•getting things in order.• Aaother attitude is a counterphobic 
exposure to extreme danger. Rationalization by use of philo-
sophical and religious systems is yet another defensive atti-
tude used to face approaching death. 
Wishing is a possible and accessible mode of response. 
Sigmund Freud has postulated the aggressive wish to die as one-
half of a dual drive theory. 
Counterphobic behavior, the nihilism of despair and de-
pression, the psychopathic seeking for destruction at the hands 
of social authorities, the disintegration and immobilization of 
schizophrenia, the self-inflicted attempts to destroy oneself 
by use of drugs and alcohol, and other attempts at suicide ap-
pear to lend support to Freud's thanatology. Perhaps, the de-
fensive mechanisms of the individual are really reactions against 
the wish to die. 
But Freud also postulated a wish to live as the other 
half of the dual drive system. Karl Menninger suggests that 
hope is an aspect of this life instinct or this drive to live.2 
1Daniel Cappon, •The Psychology of Dying," Pastoral 
Psychology, lii (February, 1961), 36. 
2Karl Menninger, ~ope,• The American Journal of 
PsY?hiatry, CXVI (December, 1959~485-86. 
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It may be argued that to wish to live in the case of 
approaching death is only another ego defense against the fear 
of yielding to the great unknown of death. However, for the 
purpose of the comparison of wishing with hoping, it is pre-
sumed that wishing is employed as a separate attempt to re-
spond to approaching death by an individual who is not satis-
fied with the prospect of death. 
It is characteristic of the wishing process to strive 
toward tension satisfaction first through the cathexis of psy-
chic energy to some outside object. If this fails to bring 
the necessary relief or satisfaction, the psychoanalytic theory 
holds that the energy is then directed inwardly to the object's 
representation within the individual's mind. The solution to 
the tension of approaching death is then to wish it away or to 
conjure up through wishful thinking an object judged suitable 
to the attenuation of the forces of death. 
Marcel indicated that the tendency for wishing in the 
case of approaching death would be to wish for a specific so-
lution within or by a specific time. 
Unlike wishing, hope has no specific object or time of 
incidence. Instead, the hoping person discourages the formation 
of images that can be said to be •the object,• but states, rath-
er, that there is an object, though yet unknown, which is the 
answer to the situation of captivity. 
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T.he hoping process is a different approach to the same 
problem of death, and is obtainable as a response in the same 
manner as are wishing or the defensive mechanisms. The need 
tor the hoping process as a response is equal to that for wish· 
ing or for ego defenses: to combat fear and at the same time 
prevent the disintegration of the ego. The need for hoping in-
creases as other modes of response prove inadequate. 
2. The Indicators of the Hoping Process 
Identification of the hoping process at work is the 
next concern of this chapter. Hope has distinguishable char-
acteristics that make it recognizable from other modes of re-
sponse. These characteristics are to be called •indicators• 
by this study. 
Some of these indicators are themselves •modes of re• 
sponse.• Most are included as parts of more general responses. 
Together they are the hoping process or indicators of its ac-
tivity. 
i • Acceptance 
Because of its apparent adaptive intentions, the hoping 
process is considered to be within the categories of ego func-
tions and processes. The indicator of acceptance is an adap-
tive function. 
There are aspects of acceptance that are assumed to be 
peculiar to the hoping process. This is true in the sense 
that these various functions, yet to be described, are con-
sidered necessary to the total response of acceptance in the 
hoping process. 
After confrontation by and perception of the captive 
situation, the next aspect of aoceptanoe is acknowledgement. 
By the term •acknowledgement,• it is meant that the individ-
ual recognizes the situation as fact and thus as pertinent 
to him and to his experience. 
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The individual acknowledges the presence of the exter-
nal forces which present the problem, the need for some kind 
of response, and the fact that he does not have the necessary 
equipment within himself to alter the external conditions and 
their control upon him. The person also recognizes the per-
sonal affect Which accompanies this confrontation. 
In this respect, hope is then situated, as Marcel pro-
poses, within the actual framework of the trial or captivity. 
The individual accepts the trial as an integral part of the 
self and as part of the life space in which the self partici-
pates. 
The hoping person accepts the involvement of the self 
and reasons that there is no escape available to his own pow-
ers alone. In conjunction with this attitude is patience, and 
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another indicator of hoping is revealed. 
ii. Patience 
Having accepted the captive nature of his situation, the 
hoping person waits in patience for a change to occur. Invol-
ved within the attitude of patience is the assertion, made 
fir.mly and privately by the individual, that the present sit-
uation is not necessarily as inevitable and final as it now 
appears. 
This assertion may be criticised as magical wishing be-
cause of its expectation of fulfillment by some external agent. 
In reply, the individual is actively involved in the process of 
response to the captive situation. He is not sitting passively 
by and waiting. Patience is an active awaiting that takes com-
mand of the hoping response. 
When the hoping process is employed by the individual, it 
activates and mobilizes the energies of the individual to at-
tempt to understand the concrete conditions of reality and to 
evaluate his own role clearly. The present is not emptied of 
value, instead the hoping person places as much emphasis upon 
the present as upon the future. 
There is an affinity between the hoping process and re-
laxation. The hoping person need not hurry his response. Time 
is no problem because the assertion concerning the limitations 
85 
of the captive situation fixes no time boundaries. The hoping 
individual has exhausted his own possibilities of changing the 
situation so he waits in patience for an external solution to 
the problem, or until external conditions allow him to solve 
the problem. 
Patience within the hoping process is not intended to 
mean either weakness or complacency. It is actively awaiting 
a solution reinforced by confidence and belief in the acknow-
ledgement and the assertion made concerning the situation. 
Hi • Reduced Self-reliance 
Marcel suggested that hoping is somehow beyond the indi-
vidual. First, this is true due to the seemingly unchangeable 
quality of the situation. The assertion made about the cap-
tivity is based on a belief in something more than oneself. 
The person accepts his own limitations and recognizes his need 
for help. 
The hoping person then seeks a more non-specific and gen-
eral object, which he feels will provide the solution that he 
needs. 
As a result of the frustration of his experiences of at-
tempting to change the situation by his own action, reliance 
upon an external object nb,yond the self• increases. In the 
case of Christian hoping, it is signified by an increase in 
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the individual's reliance upon the omnipotence of God and upon 
God's ability to bring a solution to the problem of captivity. 
A second factor in the reduction of self-reliance is 
found in the hoping person's preference for the more general 
and global objects of hope. Because of this preference and 
the avoidance of specific objects the individual aims and de-
sires are set aside. The effect of this is to free the in-
dividual's attention from being centered upon himself and his 
situation. 
The smug assurance of doubt. optimism, and certainty 
that is directed towards and at the same time against some 
other person or object is not present in the hoping person. 
The emphasis is not so much upon the failure of the in-
dividual's own powers to solve his problem as it is upon the 
humility of accepting one's own limitations in respect to the 
problem. Self-reliance lessens in proportion to expressed re-
liance upon an external object. Yet this is not self-depreci-
ation. It is an acceptance of a need for help. It is also a 
part of the assertion that the necessary help is forthcoming. 
iv. Alteration of Personal Attitudes 
ly definition of the captive situation to which the hop-
ing person responds, the individual can neither alter the en-
vironment nor choose a more advantageous one, except by flight 
into fantasy. 
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The individual is then basically left with the remaining 
choice, which is no longer a choice if he desires to adapt, ot 
altering his own personal outlook. This includes the alter-
ation of attitudes, expectations, and desires. 
Many decisions and activities have taken place prior to 
the inception of the hoping process. Tb quote Heinz Hartmann, 
•A state of adaptedness exists before the intentional processes 
ot adaptation begin.•l Other modes of response may precede the 
exercise of hope. Much reality testing will be done before the 
individual recognizes his situation as captivity. !hen as a 
part of his decision to respond by hoping, the person also ac-
knowledges the need to alter his own attitudes. 
This activity of alteration is not new to the individual. 
As an infant he had to alter his views of himself, others, and 
his relationships. 
T.he first clue to the development of the hoping process 
or a tendency to hope seems to be in the oral exploratory 
stage. Here the infant tries to explore the objects of his 
environment and to differentiate them through oral inoorpor-
ation. Perhaps the infant even tries to master the inoreas-
ing stimuli of his environment through incorporation of var-
ious objects of his environment. 
lHeinz Hartmann, Ego Psyoholo~y and the Problem of 
Adaptation, trans. David Rapaport, 'N~ork: InternatiOnal 
Universities Press, Inc., 1958), P• 26. 
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The hoping process seems directly related to this when 
the individual acknowledges the captive situation as a part 
of himself and his life space. The captivity is considered 
to be an integral part of the self. The hoping process is 
an attempt at mastery of the situation by a form of incorpor-
ation. As a result of this activity, the individual is able 
to better evaluate the situation and make his decision of ac-
ceptance. 
The earlier attempts of the child to incorporate the 
omnipotence of his parents by identification is similar to 
the individual's waiting for some external force to master 
the situation of captivity. Identification with the omnip-
otence of reality's possibilities or with the omnipotence of 
God appears in the hoping process. 
The mechanism of waiting or patience in hoping seems to 
have some affinity with what Erik Erikson calls 8 basic trust.•l 
The infant learns to have confidence in the sameness and in the 
consistent activities of the external environment, which pro-
vides and cares for him. 
Through introjection the infant begins to feel and act 
•as if an outer goodness had become an inner certainty.•2 
lErik Erikson, Childhood and Society, (New York: w. w. 
Norton and Co., 1950), PP• 219-22:2. 
2~., P• 221. 
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Erikson suggests that this basic trust depends more on the 
•quality of the maternal relationships• than on the •absolute 
quantities of food.•l From this maternal relationship come 
feelings of ~elongingness,-2 which in the hoping process help 
the individual to assert that the isolation and loneliness ex-
perienced in the situation of captiVity cannot be final. 
The consistency of the environment and its enduring pat-
terns would seem to decrease potential anxiety over time and 
thus increase the ability to have patience and to relax. 
v. J.Dticipation 
The activity of anticipation is significant to the under-
standing of the hoping process because of the hoping person's 
assertion concerning change. 
It is anticipation that aids the formation of future goals 
at the expense of present ones. 
A momentary pleasure, uncertain in its result, is 
given up, but only in order to gain in the new way an 
assured pleasure coming later.3 
2Ibid ., P• 222 • 
3sigmund Freud, wrormulations Regarding the Two Principles 
in Mental Functioning,• Collected Papers, IV (Londons Hogart 
Press, 1925), P• 18. 
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The individual who applies the pleasure principle alone 
sees reality only as a possible source of pleasure. Through 
the development or the reality principle and its modifications 
or the pleasure principle, the individual is able to make a 
judgment concerning the pertinence or the situation to himself 
and his search for satisfaction. 
Immediate gratification is renounced for a greater one 
in the future. A judgment is made concerning the possibilities 
in the future and anticipation arises so that activity becomes 
goal directed • 
The hoping individual desires release from his captive 
position. He acts upon himself by waiting for the future re-
ward of salvation, meaning release from captive situation, ex-
pecting it to be a greater pleasure than other available action. 
Anticipation is nurtured through the renouncing of im-
mediate pleasure for greater future pleasure. This is similar 
to the historical Judaeo-Christian emphasis upon hope as the 
expectation of some future good. In Christian hope God is the 
source of this better good. And through Whatever means of re-
ality testing used in Christian faith, some degree or immediate 
pleasure has been denounced for the anticipation of greater fut-
ure rewards. 
The hoping person also anticipates change. Based on develop-
mental aspects, it seems that the child is not able to manipu-
late all frustrations caused by confrontation ~th his environ-
ment into victories. Yet, he also learned that often his par-
91 
ents or other external forces are able to resolve these prob-
lems for him when he cannot. Thus, he has learned that it is 
possible to expect and to anticipate the possibility of change. 
Even when he himself cannot do the changing, other external 
forces may be able to do so. Patience is actively awaiting 
the expected possibility of change. 
The criteria for all the senses discussed here are the 
same: a crisis, beset with fears, or at least a general 
anxiousness or tension, seams to be resolved, in that the 
child suddenly seems to •grow together• both psychologi-
cally and physically. He seems to be •more hLmself,• more 
lov.Lng and relaxed and brighter in his judgment (such as 
it is at this stage).l 
The expression •possibility of change• is used because 
of the sophistication and maturity of adult reality testing. 
It would seem that because of the lack of omnipotence and the 
recognition of this deficiency, even a sophisticated system 
of reality testing could never indicate with certainty that 
there ~be no change. The reality testing process of the 
hoping individual still maintains an open recognition of the 
possibility of change. This recognition, coupled with an as-
sertion based on belief that there is a source capable of mak-
ing this change possible, lends strong impetus to the choice 
of the hoping process as a response to a situation of captiv-
ity. 
lErik Erikson, •The Healthy Personality,• Psychological 
Issues, I no. i, (1959), 75. 
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vi. Movement Away ~ Influence .2!_ Captive Situation 
Marcel suggests that the hoping process aids in the 
movemellt away from "having• towarG. "being.•l It is the find-
ing of value within oneself that is important in contrast to 
what one owns or has. For this reason an indicator of the 
hoping process at work is a movement away from the influence 
of the oapti ve situation. 
By nature of the captivity, the process of adaptation 
has been primarily one of alteration of the attitudes of the 
individual involved in the captivity. 
The hoping person seems to promote this self-alteration 
through his response to the condition of captivity. This 
change aids the individual in becoming less dependent and more 
autonomous of the captive environment. 
Man can interpose delay and thought not only between 
instinctual promptings and action, modifying and even 
indefinitely postponing drive discharge, he can like-
wise modify and postpone his reaction to external stim-
ulation. This independence of behavior from external 
stimulation we will refer to as ~ autono;my £!.the~ 
~ external reality.2 
David Rapaport proposes that the "ulti.ate guarantees" 
of the individual's autonomy from the environment are instinct-
ual drives. The •proximal or secondary guarantees• of autonomy 
l:Marcel, ~Viator, P• 46. 
2David Rapaport, "The Theory of Ego Autonomys A 
Generalization,• Bulletin~~ Menninger Clinic, XXII 
(January, 1968), 14. 
93 
from the environment are cognitive organizations, ego interests, 
values, ideals, ego identity, and superego influences.l 
The possible interferences with the ego's maintenance 
of autonomy from the environment are: 
(1) Massive intrapsychic blocking of the instinctual 
drives which are the ultimate guarantees of this autonomy; 
(2) maximized needfulness, danger, and fear which enlist 
the drives (usually the guarantees of this autonomy) to 
prompt surrender of autonomy; (3) lack of privacy, de-
privation of stimulus-nutriment, memorial and verbal 
supports, all of which seem to be necessary for the main-
tenance of the structures (thought-structures, values, 
ideologies, identity) which are the proximal guarantees 
of this autonomy; (4) a steady stream of instructions 
and information which, in the laok of other stimulus-
nutriment, attain such power that they have the ego com-
pletely at their mercy.2 
The individual's decision to employ the hoping process 
is a significant factor in the maintenance of autonomy from 
the captive situation. This is due to the contributions made 
by the hoping process toward autonomy. These contributions 
are: (1) the motivation for autonomy, (2) the provision for 
the setting of independent goals, and (3) the provision of some 
means to better appropriate instinctual motivations for autonomy. 
1) Motivation for Autonomy 
Captivity confronts the person with various external 
stimuli in unfamiliar dosage. They are not subject to change, 
except by external forces. The shook of the initial onrush may 
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be so forceful as to ieprive the person of any other stimulus-
nutriment. Therefore, the verbal supports of others around 
are unable to have their oomfortini effect. The traditional 
stimuli of the presence, opinions, and memories of others, who 
have always proviaed a well-known environment, may be hindered 
by other external stimuli of the captive situation. Such 
stimuli-nutriments are felt by Rapaport to be necessary to the 
maintenance of thought-structures, values, ideologies, and ego 
identity.l Because of the stimuli deprivation there is a lack 
of freedom to act as the individual had prior to experiencing 
the captive situation. 
There may be massive blocking of the instinctual drives 
because of the constrictive quality of the captivity. Needful-
ness, fear, and danger, which ordinarily arouse the instinctual 
drives, instead seem to suggest surrender of autonomy to the 
environment.2 
It has been suggested that in the example of approach-
ing death as a captive situation, that massive blocking can 
cause such severe and complete depression that the ego may 
become overwhelmed and disintegrate before the onrush of ex-
ternal stimuli. But, despair and depression are not the only 
ways of responding to such a situation. 
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The hoping process is another way to respond to such 
onrushing stimuli. And the hoping person in so responding, 
provides some motivation for restoring autonomy from the en-
vironment. 
The primary response of the hoping process consists of 
the individual's acknowledgement of the situation as it is, or 
as suggested, making use of reality testing and secondary pro-
cess thinking. The energy of the hoping person is focused up-
on the alteration of the individual attitudes concerning cap-
tivity. The process of alteration is forced by external con-
ditions, but decided upon and guided by intra-psychic forces. 
The internal search for pleasure or the desire for freedom from 
the external constrictions provide the initiative. 
The stimuli from the captive situation is so intense 
the individual can get little comfort and security from friends 
or other familiar objects. The initiative must come initially 
from the instinctual drive for pleasure. In this case, pleasure 
is release from the captive environment. 
For us, it goes without saying that the apparatuses, 
both congenital and acquired, need a driving force in 
order to function; and that the psychology of action is 
inconceivable without the psychology of instinctual drives.l 
Such liberation is promised by the hoping person's as-
sertion, based on reality testing, that there are external pos-
1Hartmann, op. cit., p. 101. 
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sibilities for alleviating the problem. Therefore, immediate 
discomfort is endured under the anticipation of future reward. 
Anxiety may change to patience, and hostility and bitterness 
to humility. The trial becomes an integral part of the indi-
vidual through introjection. 
The threats of the environment and their effect upon 
the organism are softened some by the increase in instinctual 
drive for pleasure, by the promise of greater pleasure, and 
by intra-psychic forces which acknowledge the external stim-
uli, but assert self-confidently that their destructive for-
ces are not final. This softening has the effect of motiva-
ting an increase in autonomy from the environment. The sick 
person who says, 8 All is lost if I do not get well by a cer-
tain time,• is overcome by the environment. The equally sick 
person ~o says, 8 All is not necessarily lost if I do not get 
well by a certain time,• is the hoping individual who has be-
gun to move to independence from the environment. The orig-
inally external stimuli are not allowed by the hoping person 
to have their initially crushing effect. The individual has 
found some freedom from the environment, and thus provides 
motivation for the seeking of more autonomy. 
It is felt that not only biologically but psychologi-
cally the organism has simultaneous relative dependence upon 
and independence from the environment. Though the initial 
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motivation for autonomy from the environment may be the in-
stinctual drives for pleasure, in this case whatever freedom 
from a captive situation entails, the heeding at other ex-
ternal stimuli through reality testing seems equally valuable 
to motivation for autonomy. The hoping person would seem to 
aid considerably this motivation by his magnification of 
presently meager stimuli to asserted future promises of re-
ward and pleasure. 
2) The Provision for the Setting of Independent Goals and 
the Means of Attainment 
The setting of independent goals and the means of 
their attainment suggests rational behavior. The individual 
involved in a situation of captivity is confronted by a sit-
uation to which he must respond. Perhaps the first indication 
of the determination of goals is the decision of the individ-
ual to respond or not to respond in a particular fashion. Ra-
tional behavior then sets the •orienting-and switching-points 
of actionwl and the appropriate means of accomplishing these 
actions. The hoping process is felt to contribute to the per-
formance of rational behavior in the setting of independent 
goals and in their attainment. Thus, the hoping process is 
felt to aid the ego's maintenance of independence from the en-
1Ibid., P• 68. 
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viroament, especially following a situation of captivity where 
this autonomy seems to have been threatened or decreased. 
The contributions of the hoping process to the making 
of provision for the setting of and the attaining of partic-
ular goals are in the forms of adaptation and synthesis. The 
employment of the hoping process in adaptation to the given 
environment of captivity has been discussed. It is synthesis 
or organization that is of particular concern in this section. 
A situation, which Wholly captivates a person, demands as com-
plete and organized response as possible~ if the individual 
is to be successful in appropriate adaptation. The hoping 
person aids this attempt toward organization and synthesis by 
preparation for the anticipated environment and by the molding 
of goals according to his own ideals. 
The preparation for the anticipated environment includes 
several levels of ego activity. In the hoping process these 
activities are called the acceptance of the captive situation. 
Through rational behavior the situation is evaluated for what 
it is. 
The next step is the delay of initial motor discharge 
to a later time, or the exercise of patience as it has been 
designated in this study. Control of motor discharge indicates 
some degree of advanced differentiation of the ego, and • the 
more differentiated an organism is, the more independent from 
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the immediate environmental stimulation it becomes.•l 
The injunction of patience assumes the function of 
freeing the individual from the immediate perceptual situation 
in order to allow better rational evaluation. The choice to 
alter the individual's attitudes also tends to free the individ-
ual from the need for immediate response to the external stim-
uli. 
Causal thinking (in relation to perception of space 
and time). the creation and use of means-end relations, 
and particularly the turning of thinking back upon the 
. self, liberate the individual from being compelled to 
react to the immediate stimulus.2 
Thus freed from the necessity of an immediate response 
to the captive situation, the individual can more easily pre-
pare for the anticipated environment. The anticipated environ-
ment will probably be judged to be "more of the same" until 
some future and undesignated time when the conditions are ex-
pected to change. 
Patience or the control, postponement, and perhaps even 
the prevention of drive discharge will be continued. Primary 
process thinking tends to give way to secondary process as the 
mood is one of anticipation of a greater pleasure in the future. 
Awareness is broadened and sharpened as the hoping process be-
comes more rational in its attempt to serve the synthetic and 
differentiating functions of the ego. The molding of goals 
lrbid., P• 59. 
2~., P• 60. 
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then begins to occur. This molding of goals is done by ration-
al behavior as long as this can be objective. At some point 
in the formation of goals the process of ra.tional behavior must 
give way to the ideals of a non-rational value system. Reason 
must give emotions their place as it were. 
The very nature of reason is a guarantee that it 
would not fail to concede to human emotions and to all 
that is determined by them, the position to which they 
are entitled.l 
The ideal within the hoping process that is so oondu-
cive to the formation of goals is the assertion that some-
where and somehow in future time there is a solution to this 
particular problem of captivity. In part, at least, the de-
cisions to wait in patience, accept the captive situation, 
regulate drive discharge and the anticipation of some future 
good are related to this value assertion. Also in part, the 
ability to assert is dependent upon these other decisions. 
The hoping person, therefore, makes some provision for the 
setting of independent goals and for the means of their at-
tainment, thereby contributing to the maintenance of autonomy 
from the environment. The hoping process may very well be 
turned from a means into a goal in its own right. 
1sigmund Freud, New Introduoto~ Lectures on Pstcho-
analysis, (New York: w.-w7Norton and Co., 1933),-p. 2 4. 
3) The Provision of Some Means to Better Appropriate 
Instinctual MOtivations for Autonomy from the 
Environment 
Rapaport suggests that the most relative ultimate 
guarantee of the ego's autonomy from the environment is man's 
•constitutionally given drive equipment.•! But. there are 
secondary guarantees as well that can only be regardea as prox-
imal. These secondary guarantees are provided by other ego and 
superego structures and by the motivations arising from them. 
The basic caution in the use of these guarantees for autonomy 
from the environment is that they may be regulated properly so 
that the ego will not lose its autonomy from the instinctual 
forces. It is believed that the hoping person makes some pro-
vision for the proper appropriation of instinctual motivations 
for the purpose of maintaining autonomy from the environment. 
It is held that the hoping individual tends to appropriate 
both the ultimate and secondary guarantees for the purpose of 
maintaining. and restoring if necessary. the autonomy of the 
individual from his environment. 
The hoping person uses the instinctual drive for plea-
sure and satisfaction, in this case the desire to be free from 
a captive situation. to help overcome the force of the external 
stimuli. Through reality testing the prospect of future reward 
~apaport. op. cit •• P• 18. 
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becomes certain enough that the effects of the external stim-
uli are lessened without the ego losing autonomy from the id 
forces. The importance of the anticipated good rises to chal-
lenge the importance of information gained from external sour-
oes. 
The hoping person's appropriation of the secondary guar-
antees of the ego and the superego structures and motivations 
pertaining to them is more extensive. By definition the hoping 
individual turns on and alters his own attitudes concerning cap-
tivity. In this circumstance the ego apparatus is called on by 
the individual to appraise the situation and to make judgments 
concerning the goals and the means of attaining those goals. It 
is this intra-psychic action that postpones indefinitely certain 
kinds of response to the external stimuli and provides the re-
sistance against certain modes of behavior. 
Early feelings of bitterness and hostility seem to be 
channeled into rational reflection. Decisions are made on the 
possibilities of autonomy and finally the assertion of such an 
occurrence. This assertion must in the end be a value judgment 
based on a network of identifications and ideal-formations. The 
assertion is not made in terms of particular or concrete objects. 
The assertion does not state how or when such liberation will 
come. It states simply the belief in the possibility of 
such liberation without placing it in concrete terms. These 
identifications and ideal-formations are supported both by 
superego and ego functions .1 By finding such value within 
himself and his assertion, the hoping individual decreases 
his dependence upon the environmental stimuli and upon the 
oapti vi ty it implies. 
vii. Movement Toward A~ Abstractly Held Object 
Marcel posits the basis for this point of indication 
in his comparison of wishing with hoping. He suggests that 
the distinctions between the two be represented by the ex-
pressions of •r hope• and -r hope that ••• •. The former 
represents the hoping process and the latter, wishing. One 
who wishes is felt to retain quite distinctly an image of 
the specific and concrete object of the wish. 
It is a specific object which permits gratification-
discharge, and it is a specific set of ideas {drive-
representations) the cathecting of Which constitutes 
wishfulfillment.2 
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To the contrary of wishing, the hoping process •tran-
soends imagination, so that I do not allow myself to imagine 
What I hope for, ••• •3 except in such abstract terms as free-
dom or release • 
The relationship between the objects of hoping and 
wishing is similar to the comparison of the objects of anx-
!Hartmann, op. oit., P• 30. 
2David Rapaport, •Toward a Theory of Thinking,• Organi-
zation ~Pathology of Thought, edited by David Rapaport (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1951), P• 712. 
3Marcel, ~ Viator, P• 45. 
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iety and fear. It is held that anxiety rarely refers to any-
thing definite, while fear has a distinct object. 
In the state of fear we have an object before us 
that we can meet, that we can attempt to remove, or 
from which we oan flee •••• Anxiety, on the other 
hand, gets at us from the back so to speak. The only 
thing we can do is to attempt to flee from it, but 
without knowing what direction to take, because we 
experience it as coming from no particular place.l 
Here the similarity must end, however. Where anx-
iety rarely has an object, hope always has an object. The 
distinction between the objects of hoping and wishing is 
that the object of hoping is more abstractly and less con-
oretely perceived aDd interpreted by the individual. The move-
ment toward abstract thinking follows the development of thought. 
1) The Development of Thought 
The development of thought in the individual proceeds 
through various stages. J. s. Kasanin suggests three stages. 
The first stage he calls physiognomic thinking in Which the 
child will project his own ego into objects. The second stage 
is concrete thinking, characterized by literalness and a lack 
of generalizations. The third stage is abstract thinking, char-
acterized by the use of abstractions and generalizations.2 
Jean Piaget reconstructs the development of thought in 
four principal periods. The first period is the development 
lKurt Goldstein~ Human Nature !! ~ Light of Psycho-
pathology, (Cambridge~ Massachusetts: Harvard, 19~, pp. 92-93. 
2J. s. Kasanin (ed.) Language and Thou~t In Schizothrenia, 
(Los Angeles: University of Californi~ress, 944), PP• 4 -42. 
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of symbolic and preconceptual thought. Coinciding with and 
aiding the development of thought is the development of imita-
tion. from which symbolic play. imaginal representation. and 
verbal thought arise. 
The second period in the development of thought for 
Piaget is called •intuitive thought.• This is a state of 
progressive articulations and conceptualizations. Intuition 
is an advancement from pre-oonoeptual or symbolic thought. 
Intuition, being concerned essentially with complex 
configurations and no longer with simple half-individual, 
half-generic figures, leads to a rudimentary logic, but 
in the form of representative regulations and not yet of 
operations.! 
Concrete operations comprise the third stage. These 
operations are reached at the upper limit of the intuitive 
relations, and this upper limit is called ~obile Equilibrium" 
by Piaget. 
A mobile equilibrium is reached when the following 
changes are simultaneously effected: 1. two successive 
actions can be cGmbined into one; 2. the action-schema 
already at work in intuitive thought becomes reversible; 
3. the same point can be reached by two different paths 
without being altered; 4. a return to the starting-
point finds the starting-point unchanged; 5. when the 
same action is repeated. it either adds nothing to it-
self or else is a new action with a cumulative effeot.2 
1 ~·· P• 130. 
2Ibid., PP• 141-42. 
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The final stage is the perfection of formal thought, 
which reaches its fruition during adolescence. Formal thought 
consists of reflection and action upon the operations or on 
their results. 
Formal operations constitute solely the structure 
of the final equilibrium to which concrete operations 
tend when they are reflected in more general systems 
linking together the propositions that express them.l 
Whether one selects the stages of the development of 
thought posed by Kasanin or Piaget, the central concern of 
this section is directed to the change from concretism to ab-
straction and how the hoping process is related to this change. 
A conceptual model of infant behavior based on the 
assumption of energy-distribution may be seen in this sequence: 
"restlessness--appearance~~ sucking action~~ breast--
subsidence of restlessness."2 It may be stated in this form: 
tension--seeking and finding of drive-satisfying object--subsi-
dence of tension. This model implies direction in the search 
for satisfaction. 
Based on this first model is a second model, a primary 
model of thought. This model according to Rapaport is& ~ount-
~ drive-tension--absence of drive-object--hallucinatory image 
l ~·• P• 150. 
2David Rapaport, Organization ~ Pathology ~ Thought, 
p. 689. 
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of it .•1 Memories of gratification are the cathected sources 
of hallucinatory images. These are exercised in the forms of 
dreams and wishful thinking.2 
All of the features of this primary process thinking 
process are primitive and archaic. It is ruled by emotions 
and strives for discharge of tensions. Thinking is carried 
out basically through the development of syncretic and con-
crete pictorial images. There is little distinction of simi-
larities from identities. It is an illogical and ineffective 
attempt to master reality. However, it is able to postpone 
immediate discharge reactions and, thereby, begins to antici-
pate reality. This kind of preconscious thinking may re-
appear in the adult as a substitute for unpleasant reality 
or for a reality that cannot be influenced--a captive sit-
uation. 
When drive-tension mounts and the object for satis-
faction is unavailable, the discharge of tension into idea-
tioo may be too small to cause adequate subsidence of tension. 
The drive-cathexes may then be repressed or transformed from 
an active and mobile state into a bound state. The energy 
used for these purposes is called countercathexes. Delay, 
1
.!.£!!., P• 690. 
2~., p. 691. 
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which has established the countercathecting energy-distribution, 
also serves an important role in the development of the organ-
ism's regulatory function, which is conceptualized as the ego. 
The regulations used by the ego are primarily secondary pro-
cess thought, bound cathexes, ano reality-testing.l 
Secondary process thought radically and specifically 
extended becomes intellectualization, which is •capable of 
binding and neutralizing great amounts of drive-energy.•' 
Intellectualization also: 
Provides a means for an often effective compromise 
between the drives and the ego, wherein prohibited 
drive-goals are permitted and even pursued in the guise 
of more or less realistic goal-pursuits.3 
Intellectualization seems to include, at least, memory, 
anticipation, and concept formation. Where primary process 
thinking is used, concept formation is physiognomic. But, in 
secondary process thinking memory frames of reference, corres-
ponding to reality, formulize into concepts. These concepts 
are assimilated, in terms of time, space, and matter, and re-
lated to every already existing abstract and sensory quality. 
1Ibid., pp. 696-702. 
2Ibid., P• 703. 
3rbid. 
The residue of conceptual frames of reference are not cathected 
instead of the single idea.l 
Memory registers reality-sequences of events, and, there-
by, becomes an important factor in reality testing. There are 
both lower and higher levels of anticipation. The former are 
composed of drive-anticipations of real or ideational objects. 
The higher levels of anticipation differ from the lower in that 
they tend toward action determined by a great variety of inter-
acting motivational forces, they lose the idiosyncratic-individ-
ual character and become socially shared anticipations, and they 
tend toward freedom from restriction to motivations and strivings 
of socially agreed character.2 Thus, the development of thought 
extends from physiognomic animation to concretion, then to ab-
straction. 
2) The Objects of Thought 
The development of the objects of thought makes a simi-
lar progression. An object is generally held by psychoanalysis 
to be that which is considered adequate for the satisfaction of 
an instinctual need. It is not originally attached to the in-
stinct but becomes so attached according to its ability to satis-
1 ~·· PP• 703-09. 
2Ibid., PP• 713-14. 
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fy the need. An object may be an extraneous one or part of 
the individual's body. The object of a particular instinct 
may change, and one object may serve to gratify needs of more 
than one instinct, even simultaneously. 
The first drive-satisfying objects, such as the ~reast,• 
are not sharply defined, discrete percepts to the infant. In-
stead they are the nuclei of diffuse and global experiences. 
It is thought that only later in development are these objects 
first animated, then concretized in literalness, and finally 
categorized in abstractions and generalizations. In the build-
ing of conceptual abstractions and applying them to certain 
oases, there is a tendency to fall back upon the concrete facts 
to which the abstractions refer. 
It goes without saying that every set of abstractions 
may serve as the "concrete material• for higher-order 
abstractions, and this repeats itself in a hierarchical 
series.l 
3) The Influence of the Hoping Process 
The crux of the influence of the hoping process con-
sists primarily in the •kind" of object toward which the in-
dividual is moving in emphasis. It is contended that the •kind" 
of object that the hoping person seeks is an abstract and global 
one, and that his seeking parallels, more or less, the direction 
libid •• pp. 706-Q7. 
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o£ the development of thought. The importance of this argument 
is far the purpose of deciding whether the hoping process can 
be distinguished from other processes of response because o£ 
the ~ind" of object which the hoping person selects. And, 
if in the final analysis, the psychoanalyst must continue to 
hold the hoping process within that of wishing, can the hop-
ing process be considered, at least, a unique aspect of wish-
ing, perhaps mature wishing. 
Marcel's contention is that wishing and hoping are 
separate processes due primarily to the fact that wishing de-
mands a specific object, while hope does not. The more con-
crete and articulate the content of the object, the more prob-
able it is wishing and the less probable it is hoping. 
There is a difference between "I hppe• and •I hope 
that ••• • The more specific the •that" the more 
likely it is that a wish, an illusion or a delusion 
is at hand.l 
This hypothesis, based on Marcel's argument, proposes 
that the hoping process, as a response to a captive situation, 
is a general movement of the individual toward a more abstract-
ly held and perceived object. 
Rapaport contends that when the organism is confronted 
by an enviro~ent that is void of any adequate object to sat-
isfy the instinctual need, then the organism turns back to 
lpruyser, op. cit., P• 4. 
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primary process thinking. As a result the organism directs 
the cathexes toward the memory-trace of gratification, which 
is characterized by wishfulfillment.l These memory-traces 
or ideas are specific and have, at least, literal content. 
The hoping person, by definition, faces a situation 
void of suitable objects for gratification of the immediate 
need to be free from the captive stimuli. The choice for the 
hoping process is not regression toward specific memory-traces 
of past experiences or objects of gratification. Instead, the 
movement is toward an object that can be described only in ab-
stract and conceptual terms. In relation to the concrete and 
specific object, the object of the hoping process must remain 
diffuse and global in content. There are no concrete referents 
with Which to compare and rely upon. The object of the hoping 
process is described by such terms as salvation, liberation, 
and freedom. Secondary process thinking and reality testing 
are involved in the choice of this kind of object. 
Thinking has already been employed to determine the 
lack of suitable concrete objects in the environment, in 
perception of the external conditions, and in the choice of 
response. Reality testing is used also by the hoping person 
in the determination and anticipation of the global object. 
lRapaport, Organization~ Pathology~ Thought, p. 690. 
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Though diffuse and global, the object of the hoping process 
promises enough possibility of satisfaction to induce the an-
ticipation and acceptance of this kind of object in prefer-
ence to that of wishfulfillment. 
The movement of the hoping response is seen then to be 
in the same general movement as the development of thought--
toward abstraction. When the individual is confronted by a 
captive situation, which provides no concrete object of sat-
isfaction, it is held that in addition to the regression to 
wishful thinking there is the choice of a more abstract object. 
For this reason it is assumed that the processes of ~sh­
ing and hoping are different, though not necessarily unrelated. 
In a rational hierarchy, it is judged that hoping is on a high-
er level than wishing; and as a process, hoping is a general 
movement toward an object that is perceived abstractly. 
viii • ~ Interpersonal .A.oti vi ty 
It has been stated that Marcel considers hope to be 
possible only when it includes a process involving more than 
the individual. It is super-relational. It is an experience 
of the wr• and the •Thou• or of the •us.•l 
There is a quality of sharing included in the hoping pro-
cess. The hoping person acknowledges his own limited abilities 
for escaping. But he has confidence in another and his powers. 
lMarcel, ~Viator, p. 10. 
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By the hoping person's sharing of his need with the •Thou• he 
is allowed to share in a relationship that promises ultimately 
to free him from his captivity. 
There are certain, existing, tangential benefits as well. 
That is to say that all the rewards are not in the future only. 
Once the individual has committed himself to the hoping process 
and entered into the relationship with the other person, who he 
asserts will free him, then he enjoys such compensations as peace, 
assurance, and companionship. 
To the individual involved, it is a real experience with 
another person and that other person is perceived to have the 
powers to bring a favorable change to the captive situation. In 
the meantime, while the hoping person awaits the change, it is a 
relationship to be enjoyed. 
This interpersonal activity is based upon a value judgment 
of one person in another. It is an assertion that requests more 
than it demands. It is a request that though it is not deserved 
or merited it is expected. It is so because of the quality of 
the relationship. It is agape in character. 
The hoping response to an apparently insurmountable and 
thereby captive situation is to turn to the strength of this inter-
personal relationship and to say, in effect, •r hope in Thee.• 
When this occurs it is an indicator that the hoping process is at 
work. 
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3. The Consequences ot the Hoping Process 
The result of hoping and its significance to the hoping 
person are the final concerns ot this chapter. These are most 
directly related to or implicated by the indicators of hoping. 
These consequences are best dealt with by looking at them sep-
arately. 
i. Realistic Appraisal 
The hoping person has a realistic appraisal of his need. 
This does not suggest that the hoping person's perception of 
the environmental influence upon himself is accurate. What it 
does suggest is that the hoping person has a clear idea of his 
own inability to cope with the situation. 
From his perspective the problem is real and it involves 
him. He accepts the condition as it appears to present itself. 
It is seen as part of his life space and as something which de-
mands a response from him. 
It is likely that by the time he comes to exercise the 
response of hoping he has already exercised other modes of re-
sponse. Hoping is a response to a situation that is exercised, 
not because it is expected thereby to free one from the trial, 
but because it frees the person from the demand of making any 
particular response immediately. As a result the person has a 
better opportunity to appraise the situation, himself and his 
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needs. 
ii. Individual Desires Are Transcendeci .;.;...;...;;.;;;..;..:..~ - ------
The hoping person, though he has a realistic appraisal 
of his needs, does not concentrate on his own individual de-
sires exclusively. 
There is no doubt on the part of the individual that 
he is caught in a web of environmental circumstances. But 
prior to the exercising of hope he has tried ~is way• and it 
failed. The ordinary ways of response have been tried and 
found wanting. By hoping the person admits in humility that 
the necessary power is cot his. 
Through this admission of his own limitations, the per-
son gives up all claims for demanding how or when he may be 
freed. He doesn't feel that he oan really demand anything, not 
even that he be set free. Coupled with this admission is the 
absence of any feeling that he deserves to be free. 
The hoping person sets aside his own personal desires 
in deference to another's desires. 
iii. Trust Is Placed In Another 
Having recognized and aocepted his own limitations in 
respect to his situation, the hoping person places his trust 
and confidence in another person. This other person is deemed 
powerful enough to change the situation if he so desires. 
The hoping person feels that he knows the strengths 
and the desires of the other person well enough to make an 
assertion concerning his captivity. He maintains that he 
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can be set free. How or when he does not ask or say. Perhaps 
later he will state with more assurance but with no less hu-
mility, that he will be freed. 
The object of hoping then becomes not the need to be 
freed or the circumstances that lead to freedom. The object 
is the other person, who is expected to do the freeing. Hop-
ing is as much a response to a person as it is a response to 
a situation of captivity. 
The hoping person becomes aware of the other person's 
presence and availability. The relationship is a mystery in 
the sense that any interpersonal activity is mysterious. The 
process does not have to be understood before the person can 
know that he is engaged in such a relationship. The hoping 
person knows of the other's presence and availability, and he 
participates in the relationship by trust. It becomes are-
lationship of subject to subject. 
As a result of this relationship the person is able to 
escape some of his awn self-interests which tend to hold him 
captive and make him non-creative. 
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Acceptance ot the relationship by the other person in 
spite ot the expressed limitations of the hoping person, may 
cause the hoping person to feel that he has become a part ot 
this •creative process" that is going to change things. Con-
fidence is placed in the other person's ability to bring about 
a certain process of growth and development. Because of the 
participation in the relationship there is also participation 
in the growth and development. The creative process then is 
promoted from within the hoping person. 
iv. !!!!, !!. Viewed Differently 
Because of the person's view of time the duration of a 
perceived captive situation may actually become another prison. 
The nature of the hoping person is to view time differently and 
thereby reduce its unfavorable influences. 
The attitude of the hoping person toward time of the past 
is to refuse to limit the possibilities of change to those based 
upon past experience. Through his trust in the other person, the 
hoping individual declares that the possibilities are greater 
than those possibilities that he has experienced. 
The present is not allowed by the hoping individual to 
add to the strength of the captive situation. Though the an-
swer to the problem is not on hand it is expected at some fu-
ture time. Neither the past nor the present are allowed to be-
come censors of possibilities. 
Time is considered by the hoping person to belong to 
the other person. Because in admitting his limitations and 
having turned for help. the hoping person relinquished his 
hold on time. And in effect. he decides that time is to be 
trusted to the other person. 
v. Personality Changes 
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Perhaps the greatest change in the personality of the 
hoping person comes as a result of patience in the hoping pro-
cess. 
As a result of patience, the anxiety of the individual 
is decreased. this may lead to relaxation and to the avoid-
ance of the stiffening and tightening up of oneself that could 
rob the person of energy needed for resistance. especially in 
illness. 
It would appear that patience in the hoping process 
could provide for the transference of energy. once expended 
by hostility, bitterness, denial, and anxiety related to the 
captive situation~ to physical and mental resistance of and 
response to the captive situation. 
The abilities to relax, tolerate anxiety, and manage 
fear are related to the hoping person's patience. He places 
confidence in the possibility of change and in the person who 
is expected to bring about that change. There is an attitude 
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of waiting in patience for this change. 
Resistance decreases as patience increases the individ• 
ual's ability to accept reality and to wait for a change in 
circumstances. 
The individual becomes mnre secure as the hoping pro-
cess takes command. He has had to make independent judgments 
relating to acknowledgement of the captive situation and to 
the assertion that this situation does not exhaust all the 
possibilities. 
By declaring that all is not necessarily lost, even 
though he may not live, the individual finds a sense of se-
curity in being a person who humbly and modestly has such ex-
pectations. Finding such value within himself, the hoping 
person feels free enough to respond with increased courage, 
independence and confidence. 
Early personality characteristics of bitterness, frus-
tration, and hostility at being oaptured by a situation that 
is not of one's own choice, are ohanged by hoping to humility. 
There is a decline in the moods of aggressive self-
complacency or pride in the hoping person. There is also a 
decrease in defiance and provocation. Even in the assertion 
that the condition of captivity is not final, the attitude is 
one of quiet self-assurance. 
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This completes the descriptive analysis of the hoping 
process related to its conditions of occurrence, distinctive 
indicators, and dynandc consequences. 
Due to the lack of case material in this analysis, it 
is felt that the hoping process could be defined more ade-
quately by comparing it with another definition of hope that 
makes use of case study materials. 
To this end, such a comparative study is made in the 
chapter which follows. Because it is probably the most high-
ly developed system in relation to the use of hope by a psy-
chiatrist, the work of Thomas French has been selected for 
comparison. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE HOPING PROCESS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
One of the ways to understand and evaluate the hoping 
process is through a comparative analysis Whereby the hoping 
process, as described in the preceding chapter, is examined 
in relation to another definition of hope. 
Thomas French's several volume work, ~Integration 
of Behavior, makes an extensive use and application of the 
word •hope,• and the concept of hope contributes a very im-
portant part to his system. French attributes an arbitrary 
definition to the word ~ope• as well as the motivation for 
the occurrence of hope. Extensive oase studies and materials 
are presented in order to illustrate the major theme, •the in-
tegration of behavior• and the place of hope in this theme. 
French's work has been selected for comparison with 
the hoping process because of his extensive use of the term 
~ope.• 
It is expected that such a comparative analysis of the 
hoping process with •hope• as used and defined by French will 
contribute to a better understanding of the hoping process and 
its later application to the work of the minister and the psy-
chiatrist. 
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The approach taken by this chapter is: (1) to present 
the working methods and intentions of French as outlined in 
his own study, (2) to present a brief summary of the case 
materials that provide the basis for French's study, and (3) 
to present from these case studies 8 hope" as seen by Frenoh. 
Having done these things the intention is to compare 
hope as seen by French ~th the description of the hoping 
process as presented in the preceding work. For the sake of 
clarity, whenever the terms ~oping process• or •the hoping 
person• are used, they are intended to refer to hope as de-
scribed in this study. 
1. Approach to French's Work 
Thomas French is a psychiatrist who attempts a detailed 
analysis of the thoughts and acts of one person during two 
years of psychoanalytic treatment. From this explicit case 
example, French expects to be able to more completely under-
stand the process of integration of behavior. He is inter-
ested in how even the elementary human reactions and responses 
are co-ordinated into a complete pattern of behavior. 
As our working hypothesis, we assume that the component 
factors of rational behavior can be found also, usually in 
exaggerated form and in greater isolation, in less rational 
mental products. In our analyses of the patient's dreams 
and his reactions to conflict, we expect to find reactions 
that are recognizable as disintegration products of normal 
integrative process.l 
lThomas French, op. cit., I, p. 39. 
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Our aim, really, is not to prove anything. We intend, 
rather, to illustrate a method by which anyone may Check 
our conclusions on as many cases as he cares to study in 
this way.l 
The method employed by French in his study of the inte-
gration of behavior is one of successive approximations. 
We devise concepts, first, to make intelligible the 
best-known and most obvious facts. Then we proceed step 
by step, to test, correct, and refine these concepts by 
confronting them with other, more detailed observations.2 
But the concern of this chapter is with French's use 
of hope, how he interprets it, what claims he makes for it, 
and especially how it compares with the hoping process as de-
fined in this study. 
French begins with the psychoanalytic postulation of 
-wishes," wbioh are characterized as a subjective state of 
tension and dissatisfaction that seeks some form of discharge 
and satisfaction. These -wishes• are separated into positive 
and negative goals. The negative wishes are considered to be 
those states of unrest called "needs," Which are urges toes-
cape from something. The positive wishes are those states of 
expectation and longing for future satisfaction, based either 
upon available opportunities or memories of past experiences 
of satisfaction. These are seen as -wishes for something, not 
1 Ibid • , p • 40 • 
2rbid., P• 49. 
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wishes to get away from something.wl 
Needs and hope both play a significant role in the inte-
gration of behavior. 
In the integration of goal-directed behavior, needs and 
hopes play complementary roles. They are the poles, nega-
tive and positive, about which all behavior is oriented. 
Although we try first to escape from painful pressures 
arising from our needs, our efforts tend to be focused more 
specifically on positive goals based on our hopes.2 
But hope has a special function in goal-directed be-
havior. In goal-directed behavior there is a need for direc-
tion as well as for motivation to act. According to French, 
these circumscribed efforts to obtain a particular goal is the 
tendency of hope to execute a plan. 
Hope tends to activate a plan. By activating the 
guiding influence of a plan on motor discharge, hope 
concentrates this motor discharge on efforts to achieve 
a positive goal.3 
Thus in summary, French sees the subjective tension 
of a need arise to such a degree as to demand some form of 
discharge. The integrative process is held intact due to the 
hope of satisfaction, which stimulates the integrative mech-
anism toward the formulation of a plan of action that will ac-
complish this hope. Then this hope of satisfaction becomes 
1~ ... PP• 50-51. 
2Ibid., P• 52. 
3Ibid., P• 53. 
the guiding influence in order to direct motor discharge to 
the proper execution of the plan. 
2. Presentation of Case Material 
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This presentation of case material is not intended to 
be a fully detailed report. Instead~ the purpose is to sum-
marize the material and still retain enough information so as 
to provide a fairly complete picture of the data with which 
French worked. 
The patient was born in July, 1889 1 in a small Polish 
village. The family held some importance in the same village 
because the patient's father was mayor of the village at one 
time. The father's main occupation was that of a blacksmith. 
He apparently did fairly well financially because there was 
always a maid and a hired man in the household. 
The father was very strict with the children, physically 
strong and powerful, and he allowed no one of the family to 
question his actions. The patient admits that he was afraid 
of his father. 
The mother was seen by the patient as one who used to 
help him out of arguments wi 1h his father. The patient felt 
that he got along with his mother. She died when he was 
thirty-nine and he felt that this was one of the major upsets 
in his life. 
The patient was the oldest of six siblings. His birth 
was reported as a difficult one by his grandparents. He was 
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weak and sickly from birth. Between the ages of four and six 
he had eczema and following this period he had chronic bronchial 
difficulties and several severe asthma attacks. 
He was three years old when his first sibling, a brother 
was born. Prior to the birth of his brother, the patient had 
always slept with his mother, but following his brother's birth 
he could sleep with her only when he was ill. Shortly after 
the birth of his brother he developed severe eczema of his face 
and his hands were tied to prevent him from scratching it. He 
never seemed to get along with this brother, but claims that 
his relationship with his other two brothers and two sisters 
was always very pleasant. 
Several events in early life were considered to be im-
portant by the patient. In relation to his first sibling, he 
once was wheeling the brother in a carriage when he •accidently" 
let it roll down a hill and crash. Another time he was supposed 
to watch and care for his brother but instead let him wander off 
so that he was lost for an entire night. 
One outstanding event remembered in relation to his 
father was the time he entered the blacksmith shop, Which he 
had been forbidden to do, and was kicked by a horse. He ran 
terrified with fear of his father. He remembers his father 
grumbling about the hospital bill. This accident left a perma-
nent soar. 
He had a very difficult time with his father during ado-
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lescence. He wanted to be a blacks.mi th like his father • but 
was not allowd to do so. His father felt that there was a 
better kind of life, and thus he forced him to try and do well 
in school. At fifteen he remembers being beaten by his father 
for flunking his examinations. He then ran away from home to 
apprentice himself as a mechanic. He returned home briefly 
when his parents separated, but when the father returned home 
the patient left having decided to emigrate to the United 
States. He was then twenty years of age. 
At twenty-six years of age he developed hay fever-like 
symptoms with coughing, sneezing, and sinus trouble. It seams 
that these symptoms began while he was interested in some girl, 
who was more interested in another man. These hay fever symp-
toms lasted four years. During this time he was in the army. 
He was discharged after four months because of his hay fever 
and coughing. 
He married at the age of thirty-three. He said he was 
happy with the marriage for over a year, until the time of his 
wife's first pregnancy. The patient had bought a school-supply 
store, which he and his wife ran. He began to be unhappy with 
his wife. He complained that she was overly critical and quar-
relsome, careless about watching her weignt and her own personal 
appearance, and that she neglected the children. Whenever he 
would engage in a heated argument with his wife he would have 
an acute asthma attack which would stop him. He thought of 
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separation but such thought seemed to precipitate severe asthma 
followed by chills, fever, and nausea. 
He came for analysis at the age of forty-six. He was 
then working in a railroad yard where his job was to clean out 
cattle and freight cars. His relation with the men in the 
railroad yard was seen as a dependent one since they often cared 
for him when he became ill at work. His social life with men 
was apparently good because he joined lodges and said that he 
liked the men at work.l 
This has been a short summary of the case history of 
the patient prior to his coudng for analysis. Other informa-
tion will be made available as it relates to the interests of 
this study. 
3. Comparison Study 
i. General Differences~ Theory 
The most evident distinction between the hoping process 
defined in this study and hope as described by French is whether 
hoping and wishing are aotually the same process or not. 
French explictly plaoes hope within the wishing process 
as anticipated satisfactions. ~ope of satisfaction implies 
an unsatisfied wish for real satisfaotion."2 Hope and wish-
1Frenoh, op. cit., I, PP• 243-251. II, PP• 333·334. 
2Ib1d., I, P• 60 • 
......... 
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ing are considered only as two separate aspects of the same 
state of mind. These anticipations are ohanged by unabsorbed 
pressure of underlying need into an incentive to aotivity in 
a goal-directed fashion. 
The hoping process is claimed to be different from the 
process of wishing on the grounds that the objects are dif-
ferent; the subjects react differently, particularly in the 
choice of ego functions; the hoping process is a response to 
a particular kind of situation; and the hoping process is not 
goal-directed behavior in the sense that no degree of motor 
discharge is seen able to bring about the desired goal. 
The object or goal of hope for French is specific and 
concrete in nature. It is based upon past experience and 
memory of prior satisfaction and upon the present opportunities 
to again obtain this goal. When the internal need becomes in-
tense enougn, it converts the hope into an incentive to action 
rechanneled through the modifying influence and insight of an 
integrative field. In comparison, the hoping process has only 
abstract objects such as salvation or liberation. It too, is 
based upon past experience, but not tied to it. In fact, the 
hoping process may be employed by the individual in spite of 
the evidence presented by experience that implies there is no 
reason to hope. By definition of the captive experience, the 
individual has no opportunities available to him or else there 
would be no need to use the response of hoping. The hoping 
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process is equally considered to have a modifying effect. How-
ever. the hoping process does not modify the unabsorbed pressure 
so that it will be better directed toward efforts to achieve a 
goal. Instead. it modifies the unabsorbed pressure to alter 
the individual's attitudes in order to aid the individual to 
adapt to the environment and to increase his autonomy from 
the stimuli of the environment. The hoping person does not 
try to launch a plan to change the environment, but he acknow-
ledges and accepts the environment. 
The subjects of French's hope and of the hoping process 
react differently. To begin with, in the terms of hope as de-
fined by French, if there are no opportunities or memories of 
past experiences upon which to base these anticipated satis-
factions then there is no hope. In addition, if the goal-
directed plan fails to materialize as expected, then the hope 
fails. Thus, it is subject to a continual possibility of frus-
tration Whenever there is a belief that the goal is unobtain-
able. 
In other words, the immediately effective cause of 
frustration is destruction of the hope of attaining a 
goal that has previously seemed quite attainable.! 
In this respect, it seems that the subject loses rather 
than gains autonomy from the environment. The individual em-
ploying the hoping process, in contrast, seeks to avoid being 
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tied to the environment and the frustrations of whether or not 
he can accomplish a particular goal that he has set. The hop-
ing person sets no goals of attaining a definite and concrete 
object and sets no time lt.its, and, thereby, attempts to de-
crease the possibility of disappointment or frustration. In 
addition, the hoping person needs no present opportunities or 
memories of past experiences to stimulate the formation of 
hope. In fact, it is just the lack of present opportunities 
that causes one to turn to hope, and the hoping person may 
look into the face of the situation and the memories of past 
experience and hope in spite of them. The hoping person does 
anticipate future satisfaction, but he does not base this an-
tioipation upon present opportunities or memories of past sue-
cesses. The hoping process is based on a degree of reality 
testing, which goes as far as this is possible, and then it 
is based upon a value judgment. That value judgment may be 
so vague and abstract as to state that, •somewhere, somehow, 
there is an answer to this problem of mine." French admits 
the value of subjective confidence as well: 
Confidence of success is the most important factor 
in maintaining the integrative capacity of a goal-
directed striving.! 
However, while French places the bases of confidence 
in present opportunities to obtain that goal, the hoping per-
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son, in contrast, would base his confidence in the probability 
of change, ~ich would bring future opportunities; in his 
courage to accept reality; and in his ability to gain more au-
tonomy from his environment. 
Related to the sUbject of hope, is the choice of ego 
functions. French is not really concerned with ego functions 
but with integrative functions instead. French expects to be 
able to substitute the integrative mechanism for the functions 
of the ego as termed by Freud. In addition, he is concerned 
not only with motivations for behavior but also with the guid-
ing function of insight. French feels that "integrative meoh-
anism• is a better term than •ago." 
In our formulations a guiding integrative field plays 
the part that Freud ascribes to the Ego. By introducing 
the concept of a guiding integrative field, we try to re-
construct in detail the part played by insight in the in-
tegrative function. We try to determine the exact con-
tent of the knowledge or plan that has guided a particu-
lar bit of behavior or has helped the dream work in its 
search for a solution to the dreamer's conflict; and 
then we try to measure the effectiveness of this know-
ledge against the disruptive influence of opposing im-
pulses or needs or desires.1 
It is felt that the hoping process serves equally well 
in an integrative capacity, but as a part of the ego functions. 
The response of the hoping person to a situation of captivity 
is a response intended to integrate the individual and his ef-
forts and to aid in keeping the activities of the organism 
lrbid., p. 111. 
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orderly. But in accepting the captive situation as given, in 
tending toward more ego autonomy from the environment, and in 
the general movement toward a more abstract object; the hop-
ing person makes ample use of the available ego functions. It 
is this kind of usage that causes the hoping process to be con-
sidered an ego apparatus. 
As an ego apparatus, the hoping process is only one of 
the many functions available to the choice of the individual. 
The hoping process is not seen as a whole system of integration 
on a level with the ego. Instead, it is seen as a pattern of 
response that is available for selection as are other ego ap-
paratuses. 
A closely related difference of hope defined by French 
and that of the hoping process concerns the situation at which 
hope occurs. French describes hope as a process continually 
available for use as wishing in a state of anticipated satis-
faction. It would seem that the only conditions needed for 
hope's presence are present opportunities or memories of pre-
vious satisfactions. The oiroumstanoes for creating a re-
quirement for hope are the internal instincts in need of satis-
faction. By definition of the hoping process, it has been 
stated that the hoping process is a response to a particular 
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kind of situation--a captive one. The initial circumstances 
providing the impetus for the use of the hoping process are 
the constricting forces of the external situation. These ex-
ternal forces may became so great as to prevent gratification 
of the internal needs. It seems that both the external forces 
and the internal needs require that a response be made. The 
individual must determine if the hoping response is the one 
to be made. 
The discharge of motor activity is another area of dis-
agreement. For Fr~nch, the goal can be achieved only if the 
pressure of a need, which is the impetus behind motor activity, 
is integrated with the guiding influence of hope. The hope of 
satisfaction or the accomplishment of the goal acts to focus 
motor discharge on efforts toward obtaining the goal. In con-
trast, the hoping person tries to delay motor discharge. There 
are no goals set by the hoping person that are concrete enough 
to focus motor discharge upon them. Instead, the person in-
volved in the hoping process delays motor discharge through 
patience or directs it back upon the alteration of his own 
attitudes through the acceptance of the environmental con-
ditions. The hoping person is not able to employ the neces-
sary energy of motor discharge in the service of goal-directed 
behavior. This is because the hoping person formulates no 
goals specific enough to plan for, unless they are the ten-
dencies toward acknowledgement of the situation, more auton-
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omy from the environment, and toward a more abstract object. 
Finally, the hope as defined by French differs from the 
hoping process in respect to the tendencies described in the 
definition of the hoping process. The hoping person has the 
tendency to acknowledge and accept the situation as unalter-
able through his own efforts, and instead turns to alter his 
inner attitudes. The goal-directed behavior of French's hope 
sets out for the very purpose of altering the environment 
through the action of the individual upon the environment. 
The intensity of the goal-directed behavior depends upon the 
anticipation of completing this goal, which amounts in some 
degree to alteration. 
Another tendency of the hoping person as defined is 
that movement toward the attaining of more autonomy from the 
environment. Freedom from the onrush of external stimuli is 
necessary to independent activity. The hoping process aids 
the activity af obtaining more autonomy from the environment 
through the provision of motivation for ego autonomy, pro-
vision for the setting of independent though vague goals, and 
the provision of some means to better appropriate instinctual 
motivations toward ego autonomy from the environment. 
The tendency toward an abstract object by the hoping 
person has been discussed as differing from the goal-directed 
behavior of hope defined by French, which determines a specific 
object and initiates a plan to attain it. •rn purposive be-
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havior we have a single, dominant end-goal."l The hoping per-
son moves in his thinking toward a more abstractly held and 
perceived object. The object of the hoping process is des-
cribed by such terms as liberation and salvation. 
ii. Comparison~ Differences!! Application 
The intention is now to take some examples of French's 
use of hope as applied in reference to his case study material, 
and determine how the hoping process would be used or inter-
preted differently under the same conditions. French inter-
prets the function of hope largely as it relates to the anal-
ysis of the patient's dreams. Therefore, the examples cited 
here will begin with the presentation of the patient's dream 
and French's use of hope in the interpretation of the dream. 
Then the hoping process will be compared with and distinguished 
from French's use of hope in these examples. 
This group of dreams are given by French as examples 
of the patient's hope of or positive goals of pleasing his 
mother. 
The first dream example is called the "bridge dream.• 
Dream of school days. On weekend I was going home. 
We always walked unless someone picked us up. I walked 
alone until I got to bridge. A girl was there leaning 
on bridge, watching boats. I stopped and pinched her 
1~., P• 95. 
on back, and then we walked on home. Getting dark. 
Mother met her and thanked me and asked me in and 
gave me a glass of Rdlk.l 
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One of the bases for hope, the opportunity for satis-
faction, is felt by French to be supplied by the analyst's 
expressed interest in dreams.2 
Hope based on this opportunity is reinforced by 
an adolescent memory of winning a mother by assum-
ing a protective role toward her daughter.3 
A second dream is called the •railroad station dream.• 
Last night kind of embarrassing. I was in railroad 
station with a lot of people. Wife and me. We were 
separated, she in one end and I in other. Old friends 
around. They came and asked me why I married her. I 
dodged her too.4 
French interprets hope in this case to be the antioi-
pation of winning the analyst's sympathy ~ complaining about 
his wife. The present opportunity is provided by the sympathet-
io listening of the analyst. Memories of how his mother felt 
about sex are seen as the basis in past experience for this 
hope.5 
lrbid ., P• 79. 
2Ibid ., P• 96. 
3rbid. 
4-rbid., P• 79. 
5Ibid., P• 96. 
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The •clinic dream• forms a third example. 
Something toward morning about doctors and ladies. 
I was taking some kind of treatment. Doctors taking 
culture. Lady comes along and says now we've hit 
spot.l 
The hope in this example, as seen by French, is that 
he will establish a claim to the attention of the analyst 
through his illness. ~s hope is thought to be based on 
special care and attention he received in childhood due to 
his illness, or so interpreted by French.2 
In these three dreams the attempt by French has been 
to show that these •different attempts at solution are hopes.•3 
The hopes are positive goals of pleasing the mother. These 
hopes with their positive goals focus discharge on the efforts 
to achieve this one particular goal. The general goal is one 
of pleasing the mother. For French, the first dream reveals 
this in the receiving of thanks; the second dream sho~ this 
by the receiving of sympathy; and the third dream indicates 
this by the claim on attention. 
In the comparison of the hoping process with French's 
notion of hope, it must first be recognized that these sit-
uations in themselves do not provide the necessary captive 
1Ibid., P• 79. 
2Ibid., P• 96. 
3Ibid. 
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situation to which hope responds, by definition. It is, there-
fore, likely that the hoping process would not be employed in 
these instances. The hoping process is understood, as well, to 
be a special kind of response to a particular situation and aot a 
trial and error means of finding an adequate response. There 
is no indication of any tendencies of the hoping person within 
the dreams interpreted by French, to ao~ept the captivity, to 
move toward more ego autonomy, or to move toward an abstract 
object. Thus, it would seem that the necessary conditions are 
either not recorded or not present in order to make use of the 
hoping process as it has been defined. 
For the sake of comparison, let us suppose that the hop-
ing process could be employed. Let us further assume that the 
captive situation is the external threat of the mother. Before 
the hoping process would be applied, the individual in the cap-
tive situation would have already explored the possibility of 
goal-directed behavior. Otherwise, he would not feel captive. 
He would have exhausted the known present possibilities and 
feel that it was impossible to change the threat of the external 
captivity by the mother, at least, by his own actions alone. 
Then being confronted by this onrush of external stimuli which 
he, at first, feels constraining him from even relative free 
action, the individual faces the selection of a response. Among 
others, the responses of depression, wishing (which French calls 
hope), and the hoping process are seen to be some available 
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choices. The response of depression is to disintegrate before 
the onrush of the external stimuli and to lose the formerly 
held autonomy from the environment. the response of wishing 
is to attempt the cathexis of psychic energy to some outside, 
specific object, or so reasons much of psychoanalysis. This 
failing, ~shing then directs the energy inward toward the 
object's representation within the mind. This response of 
wishing largely circumscribes the •anticipated satisfaction,• 
"goal-directed behavior,• and •positive goals" that French 
calls hope. 
The hoping process is also considered to be an avail-
able response. The hoping person, if involved in such a sit-
uation, would first recognize and acknowledge the external 
threat of the mother as a situation perceived as captive, one 
which through his own actions he cannot alter. At first, the 
individual may feel lonely and separated from others and from 
any help they might give him. Comforting things of past ex-
periences are not accessible to him, or he believes that they 
are not. He may feel held aDd forced into compulsory modes 
of existence so that he does not feel that he has the same 
freedom to act as he had prior to confrontation by this sit-
uation. There may be an accompanying loss of self-esteem due 
to his inability to change the situation by altering the power 
of the mother's threat to him. 
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So the hoping process is selected. The first tendency of 
the hoping person is to accept the captive situation. The in-
dividual acknowledges the presence of the external foroes which 
present the problem, the need for some kind of response to the 
demands and stress of the situation, and the faot that he can 
(or thinks he oan) alter only his own attitudes. While he ac-
cepts the situation, he makes a private assertion regarding the 
finality of his captive situation. He asserts that though he 
himself cannot do anything to alter the threat of his mother, 
this does not necessarily mean that there is no answer whatso-
ever to his problem. The individual does not allow past ex-
perience to become the total criterian for possibilities of 
change. 
The basis for this assertion could be many things. A 
suggested one is that of childhood where omnipotence is credit-
ed to the parents or to some other external force which changed 
a situation that the child was not able to ohange. No matter 
what the basis for this is in past experience, it appears that 
suoh an assertion is a value judgment on the part of the in-
dividual involved. As a result, it is assumed that the indi-
vidual will become more patient and relaxed. Time is no real 
problem because there are no time limits. The possibilities of 
disappointment decrease because there is no specific object 
formulated for the purpose of deliveraace from the mother's 
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threat. 
There are several personality changes that accompany 
the hoping process. Earlier hostility, bitterness, denial 
and anxiety related to the captive situation are transferred 
by patience into body and mutual resistance, or at least are 
made more readily available for resistance to the external 
stimuli of the captive situation. Individual aims and de-
sires are set aside through reduced narcissism. There are 
new feelings of humility and modesty. There is a decline 
in the moods of aggressive self-complacency and in defiance 
and provocation. Patience helps the individual to relax, 
regulate the effects of anxiety, and to control fear. There 
is confidence and quiet self-assurance in the assertion that 
change will come. 
The acceptance of the situation as given requires the 
usage of several ego functions. Judgments are made concerning 
the perception of reality and reality in relation to the self; 
memory, thinking, and affects are used in the evaluation and 
acknowledgement of the situation; attempts are made to recon-
cile conflicting ideas, unite contrasts, assimilate the ex-
ternal and internal elements, and to adapt to reali~. 
Through the reality principle and its modifications of 
the pleasure principle the individual may renounce immediate 
satisfaction due to the anticipation of some vague and global 
future pleasure, which promises to be greater. Thus in this 
example of a captive situation, the anticipation of some future 
salvation from the captive threats of the mother may cause the 
individual to renounce whatever immediate pleasures are avail-
able. 
Thus, the hoping person would seem to maintain a cer-
tain mastery over the influences of the environment through 
the use of the reality-principle and secondary process think-
ing; through introjection of and identification with the real-
ity of the situation and with the omnipotence of reality's 
possibilities for removing the threats of the mother; through 
the development of tension tolerance and the reconciliation of 
tt.e through patience; and through a commitment or value judg-
ment concerning a source omnipotent enough to guarantee future 
liberation from the threat of the mother. 
A second tendency hypothesized concerning the hoping 
person is that of moving toward more ego autonomy from the en-
vironment. Hope, based only upon present opportunities or 
memories of past satisfactions as defined by French, would seem 
inadequate due to the fact that the captive situation, such as 
the threat of the mother, may help determine these opportunities 
and past memories. To hope under these conditions would appear 
to be losing rather than gaining autonomy. In the dream examples 
of French, the assumed goals are deter.mined by the dependence on 
the captive situation. In contrast, the hoping person tends to 
attempt to gain more autonomy from the environment. 
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In this hypothetical comparison, the hoping person moves 
toward more autonomy from the threatening mother. The threaten-
ing stimuli coming fran the mother may be so intense that famil-
iar aids and means seem inaccessible to the individual. The in-
dividual may be deprived of any other stimuli. As a result there 
may be a decline in the individual's maintenance of thought-
structures, values, ideologies, and ego identity. There may be 
massive blocking of the instinctual drives because of the con-
strictive quality of the captivity. Needfulness, fear, and dan-
ger, which ordinarily have aroused resistance may now be in ser-
vice of the desire to surrender the autonomy to the environment. 
The hoping person responds to this threat of the captive situ-
ation by moving toward more autonomy and independence from the 
environment. 
The hoping person may turn initially to alter his own 
outlook. The individual attempts first to master the environ-
ment by withdrawing. He acknowledges the captive situation, 
but also asserts that it is not final. This assertion magni-
fies the presently meager stimuli of future promises of free-
dom and, thereby, softens the effect of the stimuli from the 
captive situation. The hoping process, thus employed, aids 
the individual in the setting of independent goals based upon 
the individual's own ideals or value judgments. Through the 
exercise of patience in the hoping process there is a delay of 
the initial motor discharge to a later time. Not having to act 
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immediately helps to free the individual for better evaluation. 
Awareness is broadened and sharpened as the hoping pro-
cess becomes more rational in its attempt to serve the differ-
entiating functions of the ego. 
Somewhere in this process, rational behavior gives way 
to the non-rational value system. The person asserts his in-
dependence from the environment. He declares that the captive 
constrictions are not as final as they seemed initially. 
Independently the individual decides to act to change 
his own viewpoint, to delay motor discharge, and to deliberate 
upon the full significance of the external stimuli. He now 
moves to challenge the finality of his captive situation, to 
set independent goals of seeking more autonomy and a more ab-
stract object of salvation. The selection of the hoping pro-
cess as a response is in itself an autonomous decision. 
In terms of the case in point, the individual would 
declare that the threatening mother is not as final a threat 
as she seems. The decision is made by the individual to 
change his attitudes rather than change his mother or alter 
her behavior. 
Motor discharge is delayed and the captive situation 
is evaluated, acknowledged, and accepted. The individual then 
seeks to gain autonomy from the mother. 
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Let us suppose that we accept French's interpretation 
of this man's fear as relating to sexual wishes of which the 
patient feels his mother will not approve or accept. Hope as 
described by French at this point is behavior directed to the 
purpose of winning approval. It is dependent upon the con-
ditions of the captive situation and is directed to the chang-
ing of the environment. 
The hoping process would show a different response if 
used by the individual. Should this happen, the hoping per-
son would first act to alter his own outlook. Motor discharge 
would be delayed and the individual would wait in patience for 
a change in the captive situation. The change would come in 
relation to a decrease in the mother's threat of disapproval. 
There would be no conditions set by the hoping person 
as to how or when this change would take place. It would sim-
ply be asserted that the change will oome. The hoping person 
would not determine any goal-directed behavior to bring about 
this change. 
No goals such as winning the approval of the mother by 
a protective role toward her daughter, by assuming a sickly 
posture, or by complaining, as are described by French as ex-
amples of hope in the dreams of this patient, are set by the 
hoping person. 
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The hoping person oan alter his awn attitudes in spite 
of the environment. All is not necessarily lost even though 
the mother forever remains disapproving. He can acknowledge 
and accept the fact that his mother is the way she is, and 
quite possibly will continue to remain this way. 
The awareness of the hoping individual may become 
sharpened where he strives to differentiate more completely 
the functions often attributed to the ego. The hoping per-
son learns that he can delay motor discharge and have patience. 
He is left to make his own value judgment that his mother's 
attitude will change, or he claims that her attitude may not 
always have the effect of captivity upon him. 
Another tendency of the hoping process is to move in 
the direction of a more abstractly and less concretely repre-
sented object. 
As previously explained, the goals that are set out in 
the dreams of Frenoh's case studies and called hope by French 
are not abstract but concrete. The wishes of the patient are 
specific with manifest content. The hoping process strives to 
formulate a more abstract object. By definition of the captive 
situation the hoping person faces a condition void of suitable 
objects for gratification of the desire to be free. The hoping 
person then turns toward the object of salvation, which remains 
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diffuse and global in content. 
French attempts further to demonstrate the function of 
hope through the study of Freud's. -rragm9nt of an .Analysis 
of a Case of Hysteria.• or the case Qf ~ora.•l 
The dream of -nora• used by French for the purposes of 
demonstration is the following: 
A house was on fire. lfJ father was standing beside rrr:r 
bed and woke me up. I dressed ayself quickly. Mother 
wanted to stop and save her jewel-case; but Father said: 
•I refuse to let myself and my two children be burnt for 
the sake of your jewel-case.• We hurried dowustairs. and 
as soon as I was outside I woke up.2 
Freud interpreted the conflict of this dream as the 
patient's infantile sexual wish for her father and the fear 
of yielding to the advances of Jfr. K. Dora •summoned up an 
infantile affection for her father so that it might protect 
her against her present affection for a stranger."3 
It is upon this statement of Freud's that French bases 
his interpretation of the dream quoted above. The interpre-
tation proffered by French is as follows: 
1sigmund Freud. •Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of 
Hysteria,• Collected Papers, III (3rd ed.; London: Hogarth 
Press., 1946). 
2French., op. cit., II, P• 12. 
3Freud, Collected Papers. III, P• 104. 
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Dora's dream is organized about her conflict about 
yielding to Mr. K; the dream work has utilized. first. 
the memory of being waked up by her father. and then 
her recent resolution to leave with her father, in an 
unsuccessful search for a solution of her present prob-
lem. Then the jewel-ease episode gives her evidence 
that the decision to leave with her father is itself 
in conflict with her desire to cling to her former ten-
der relationship with Mr. K in spite of his sexual ad-
vances.l 
French postulates that dreams like waking behavior 
are polarized between negative goals (needs) and positive 
goals (hopes). In this dream of Dora's the negative pole 
is her conflict over yielding to Mr. K's advances. Hope 
is illustrated for French by Dora's positive goal of turn-
ing to her father for protection. based upon a reassuring 
memory of be r father having awakened her as a child to pre-
vent bed wetting and upon the present opportunity of leaving 
the house with the father. 
In brief comparison. the hoping process would not be 
considered to be invoked in this setting because the sit-
uation is not a captive one. Dora is still able to act on 
the environment and alter some conditions. There is no in-
dication that she considered the conditions to be captive. 
This study would hold that it is unlikely that She would se-
lect the hoping response due to the other alternatives that 
are apparently open to her selection. 
In summary, hope as defined by French and the hoping 
process as defined by this study T<ary considerably in their 
presuppositions, intentions, and actiTities. 
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It seems that the first outstanding difference in re-
spect to any case, would be the presupposition proffered here 
that the hoping process is a response to a situation perceiTed 
by the indiTidual to be captive. French has no such require-
ment for the occurence of hope as he defines it. In fact, the 
possibility of hope is seen by French to be involved in eTery 
situation where there are motivating pressures. The presuppo-
sition of French that hope is a positive goal differs measur-
ably from the presuppositions concerning the hoping process. 
These were outlined under the general characteristics or ten-
dencies of the hoping person toward acceptance of reality, the 
seeking of additional autonomy from the enTironment, and the 
consideration of a more abstract object. 
French's interpretation of hope's intentions is the ser-
vice of the integratiTe function, which takes the place of the 
term ego. Hope is seen to stimulate the integratiTe mechanism 
into formulating a plan for realizing th~ goal of anticipated 
satisfaction. Hope then actiTates this plan to the point that 
it acts as an influence in the guiding of motor discharge to 
the accomplishment of that goal. In comparison, the intentions 
of the hoping process are seen as serving the ego in the process 
of adaptation, which by definition is a response to a captive 
situation. 
In terms o~ activity, the di~ferences can be grouped 
basically in the ~ollowing fashion. For French the activi-
ties of hope are primarily goal-directed behavior. The 
energy of hope is directed against the environment in order 
to accomplish the desired goal. 
In contrast, the hoping process is directed towards 
changing and altering the personal attitudes and towards 
establishing and maintaining a personal relationship with 
another. 
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The hoping process has been analyzed from many di~fer­
ent viewpoints. After having done this the question arises 
as to the value of the hoping process. It may also be asked 
for what purposes has the hoping process been analyzed. It 
is to these two questions that this study now turns. or 
primary concern are the implications of the hoping process to 
the work of the psychiatrist and the minister and their re-
lation to a person caught in a captive situation. 
CHAPTER V 
IM.PUCATIONS FOR THE PSYCHIATRIST AND 'IHE MINISTER 
This chapter is concerned with the more practical ap-
plications of the hoping process. The intention is to take 
the conditions of occurrence, the indicators, and the conse-
quences of the hoping process and to indicate how they are 
related to the work of the psychiatrist and the minister. 
1. Implications of Captivity 
The situation of captivity has been described as one 
in which the individual feels that he is oaught. He cannot, 
by his own efforts alone, change either the environment or 
his own attitudes related to the captivity by the environ-
ment. 
The individual conceives himself to be isolated from 
the help of others. He is lonely. He may feel deserted. He 
is anxious and frustrated. He may be questioning his 01111 
worth. He is looking for a means of escape. 
i • .!!!.! Person's Approach 
The individual's approach for help from the psychia-
trist is basically the same aa the approach made to the min-
ister. The most obvious reason for the individual's coming 
is that he needs help in dealing with his problem. 
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The person comes believing that there is something 
special in the psychiatrist and/or the Ddnister that qual-
ifies them as being able to help. He believes that they 
have special training, skill, and personal preparation from 
which he can draw the strength that he lacks. 
From time immemorial certain individuals have been 
set apart in every human society as possessing power 
to assist in the process of personal reparation, the 
power to relieve pain, to forestall death and promote 
recovery from injuries--in short, to minister to an 
individual upon whom the assaults of a hostile environ-
ment have fallen more heavily than upon his fellows.l 
The individual also comes to the psychiatrist or the 
minister with certain expectations. 
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He expects, of course, to receive help. He confesses 
either to the psychiatrist or the minister that he is not e-
qual to the demands of the environment upon him. And he re-
quests assistance. 
Depending upon the individual, the person will ask for 
help to either change the environment or effect a change with-
in himself, perhaps both. He may expect the psychiatrist or 
the minister to be able to bring about a change in either of 
the two areas. 
Another expectation of the person who comes for help 
is that he expects to be treated as a person with value. He 
lKarl A. Menninger, A Psychiatrist's World, ed. Bernard 
Hall (New York: The Viking-Press, 1959), PP• 378-79. 
is a person with an immensely complex problem. He believes 
that he needs and deserves help. Be expects proper concern 
and respect from the psychiatrist or the minister. 
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A third expectation is related to the second. It has 
to do with growth and development. The individual is anxious 
that he will not continue to grow and develop because of the 
constriction placed upon him by the captive situation. He 
expects the helping person to be equally concerned and will-
ing to help him to continue to grow and develop. The psy-
chiatrist or the minister must care whether he is going to 
rise or fall. 
Generally the person's expectations toward the psy-
chiatrist and the minister are favorable or else he wouldn't 
appeal to them for help. 
Even though the expectations are favorable. the indi-
vidual still may approach the helping person with some fear. 
hostility. shame. and distrustfulness. His coming may be 
hampered by some social stigmatization or fear of being 
laughed at by others. It is quite likely that both internal 
and external pressures have become fairly severe before he 
seeks help. Especially is this true when seeking the help 
of the psychiatrist. 
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ii. .!!!!. Response of ~Psychiatrist ~ the Minister 
There are boundaries and limitations to the work of the 
psychiatrist and the minister but each has an interest that 
overlaps with the other's--that of helping other human beings 
who are in trouble. 
The psychiatrist's and the minister's response to the 
person coming in need of help will be comparable with the ex-
pectations of that person. Within reason and purpose. every-
thing will be done to enhance and mobilize the person's ex-
pectancy for help. As little as possible will be done to 
counteract the person's expectancies. Their own response 
will be modified within limits so as to meet the person's 
conceptions as much as possible. 
Generally the psychiatrist and the minister make an 
effort to know and to appreciate the conditions under which 
the individual comes. 
The individual who comes for help is held to have 
value as a person regardless of who he is or what he is with-
in the community. There is a special sense of recognition by 
the psychiatrist and the minister for the dignity of the human 
being who is in trouble. 
The individual is seen as one who has potential growth 
and development. It is recognized that these potentialities 
can become realities in the life of the individual. In fact, 
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the psychiatrist and the minister may consider it their re-
sponsibility to encourage the realization of these potenti-
alities. 
An effort is made by the helping person to remove the 
person's feeling of loneliness through friendship and an offer 
of service. The individual's shame, fear, distrustfulness, 
and anxiety are accepted as a part of the person and his prob-
lem. 
Though the interests of the psychiatrist and the min-
ister.overlap, each also has an unique way in which he works 
and relates to the various expectations of the person who 
comes seeking help. 
Because of these characteristic qualities the responses 
of the psychiatrist and the minister will vary. In the first 
place, there is not as much social stigmatization in going to 
a minister for help as there is in going to a psychiatrist. 
Neither is there as much fear of ~eing locked up.• The psy-
chiatrist has these additional factors to consider before he 
responds. 
The individual going to the psychiatrist expects him 
to take more direct action than is expected of the minister. 
The psychiatrist is expected to •give him something,• or to 
•take something away,• or to •do something to him.•l The 
minister is supposed to •do something• too, but the person 
1~., PP• 379-80. 
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expects more communication than direct action. 
Both the psychiatrist and the minister have as their 
goals the relief of the person's distress and the improve-
ment of his functions. These goals can be expressed in more 
ambitious terms such as modifYing the person's self-concept, 
enlarging his perspective, and stimulating his internal re-
sources. But the manner in which these goals are brought 
about, of course, are different. 
iii. ~Implications 
The psychiatrist and the minister are considered to be 
a means of escape by the person who believes himself to be en-
closed in a captive situation. 
The individual comes for help believing that he has ex-
hausted his own personal resources. He comes humbly and de-
pendently. He is expectant. He desires relief, and he is open 
to suggestion and manipulation. He is more willing than ever 
before to take measures and accept conditions that are new and 
different. 
This attitude of the individual allaws the psychiatrist 
to take measures that, perhaps, he could not have taken at an 
earlier time with the individual. He can probe in places that 
were previously closed to him. He oan offer suggestions and 
provide treatment that he can more reasonably believe will be 
159 
accepted and acted upon. 
For the minister this attitude of the individual offers 
an opportunity to bring theological truths to bear upon the 
person's life in a way that was not possible before. Because 
of the dimensions of the captive situation to the person in-
volved, the captive person is concerned with ultimate questions, 
and he comes to the minister expecting to receive ultimate 
answers. 
The most important implication of captivity to the psy-
chiatrist and the minister is the fact that it precedes hoping. 
This is to suggest that the same grounds that bring the person 
in desperation and despair to ask for help are also the same 
grounds for the beginnings of hope. Not only are they the 
same grounds but they are also the only grounds for hoping. 
If reality does not first give us reasons for despair-
ing, it cannot give us grounds for hoping.l 
The person who comes asking for help from the psy-
chiatrist and the minister is asking also for hope. He is 
not requesting that they •give• him hope as much as he is so-
liciting the means whereby he may begin to exercise hope. He 
wants to be able to make a proper response to the tragedy in 
which he is involved. 
lpruyser, op. cit., P• 13. 
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Intuitively the person realizes that despair, bitter-
ness, or extreme anxiety are not the best of responses. He 
has a feeling that these are negative responses which are 
detrimental to his own welfare. And when the person asks for 
relief, he is also asking for a realistic, yet positive and 
dynamically active process, by which he can respond differ-
ently than he is presently. 
Christianity has consistently brought man's attention 
to the fact that it is possible tor man to be something other 
than a despairing creature. It is possible for man to be a 
hoping being. With this tradition as a background the minis-
ter is expected to help people towards the process of hoping. 
The psychiatrist is by profession a healer. He applies 
his healing arts as scientifically as possible. Yet there is 
a quality in his work that says if this does not work then 
something else will. He is expected to be a hopeful person. 
He is expected as well to be a hope-instilling person. 
Having considered that it is captivity that brings 
many people to the psychiatrist or the minister for help, and 
that this captivity is also grounds for hoping, we now turn 
to the next section of this study. The next section is di-
rected to the determination of the implications of the hop-
ing process for the psychiatrist and the minister. 
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2. The Implications of the Hoping Process 
The hoping process has been demonstrated to be a re-
sponse of a person who is attempting to free himself from a 
captive situation. In very broad terms this is also the work 
of the psychiatrist and the minister. Because of this simi-
larity it is possible to draw some implications for the work 
of the psychiatrist and the minister from the hoping process. 
i. ~ Exposure 2.!:, Unsound Expectations 
The hoping process is valuable to the psychiatrist and 
the minister because it can be used to support the exposure 
of unsound expectations. 
The hoping process involves acceptance and acknowledge-
ment of the external conditions. The hoping person considers 
the situation of captivity to be a part of himself. It is 
something that he cannot avoid and of which he must remain a 
part. He makes no attempt to put distance between himself 
and reality, neither does he separate himself from others. 
From the perspective of the hoping person, he is 
caught in a process that is carrying him. Unlike the per-
son who wishes or is optimistic, the hoping person does not 
imagine or predict a specific means of deliverance will come. 
With the encouragement of a realistic view of the sit-
uation, the hoping person discourages the formation of unsound 
expectations. It is true that the hoping person makes a state-
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concerning a future change in his predicament. But by keep-
ing it as void as possible ot concrete and particular demands, 
the hoping person moves beyond wishing and unsound expecta-
tions. 
For the psychiatrist who continually searches tor the 
clear and the relevant evidence, the hoping person's stress 
upon inquiry and realistic acceptance of conditions can be of 
help. There is also implied in the distinction between wish-
ing and hoping that hoping may be an advanced stage of a dy-
namic sequence. Hoping may be seen by the psychiatrist as 
mature wishing. 
The hoping person recognizes his position within the 
problem and his inability to change things without the help 
of another. He makes no attempt to fashion unwarranted ex-
pectations. He does not delude himself concerning his own 
powers or the powers of others. He simply takes a hard look 
at his problem, believes that it is possible for the problem 
to change, and goes seeking the necessary help. He may then 
turn to the psychiatrist or the minister for help. 
The minister also desires a realistic approach to the 
problems of life. It the truth he proclaims has virtue, it 
will also provide some genuine answers to people's problems. 
The minister realizes that a belief in God's protective love 
is neither an excuse for unwarranted claims nor an invitation 
to engage in unsupported expectations. 
The refusal of the hoping person to indulge in wish-
ful thinking and to demand specific requests of time and of 
action. lends support to a realistic approach. Acceptance 
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on the part of the hoping person reinforces that person's ex-
pression of faith in the love of God and of his willingness 
to wait upon God for a solution to his problem. 
ii. Direction~ Sound Expectations 
In the same fashion that the hoping process wards ott 
unsound expectations. it also helps provide direction for the 
acceptance of more sound expectations. 
Wishing and optimism have been presented as antitheses 
of hoping because both imply a distance from reality that hop-
ing does not. Both emphasize the importance of~· while hop-
ing is more modest. Also hoping is not so concerned about the 
ambiguities of past experience. Instead. hoping acts as a pro-
cess that probes for some means ot escape. 
In searching for escape. the hoping person investigates 
the situation and the possibilities with an eye toward realis-
tic appraisal. The hoping person engages himself in a process 
that searches for novel but real opportunities which may pro-
vide a solution for his problem. Such activity provides di-
rection for the discovery of sound expectations. 
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The individual who comes to the psychiatrist may very 
well expect to be healed. This expectation may prove to be 
unsound. Despair may result if this person is faced with the 
exposure of his unsound expectation without first being led 
to discover a sound means of evaluating and accepting reality. 
The quality of patience in the hoping process provides 
a measure of protection against despair while the individual 
is moving from unsound to sound expectations. 
Many who oome to the minister for help do so because 
of unsound expectations that have been revealed to them for 
what they are. Prayers for specific demands may seem to go 
unanswered. An expression of faith may be based upon expec-
tations of certain reciprocal benefits. Ordinarily these are 
based upon theological misunderstandings. But when the per-
son discovers that he has been entertaining unsound expecta-
tions concerning theology, he may then come to the minister. 
The hoping process provides a means whereby the per-
son may accept his unrealistic expectations and abide in pa-
tience while he explores his theology for more realistic ex-
pectations. In respect to the captive situation and the need 
for a change in conditions, it may be said that hoping pro-
vides the courage to be while waiting to become. 
The person who comes to the psychiatrist or the min-
ister has certain expectations concerning the instruments 
they use. The psychiatrist is expected to do wonders with 
his pills or with his insight into the problems of another. 
The minister is expected sometimes to use his office to re-
quest special favors from God for the person who comes in 
need of help. 
Again there is a period of difficult transition from 
unsound expectations to the acceptance of realistic expla-
nations concerning the powers of the psychiatrist and the 
minister. The hoping process absorbs some of the distress 
and possible despair involved in this transition. 
iii • ! Sustaining Quality 
There is a sustaining quality in the hoping process. 
The tendency of the hoping person to endure and not to des-
pair despite all conditions to the contrary serves to sup-
port him when he is involved in a captive situation. 
It is not a counter-phobic denial of the problem 
that provides the sustaining quality. It is not memory 
of parental infallibility, though this might provide some 
basis for the ability to hope later in life. Hoping is in-
stead, an enduring pursuit of the resolution of captivity 
accompanied by a belief that such resolution is actually 
possible. 
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This quality of the hoping process is similar to the 
life instincts postulated by Freud. The life instincts were 
seen by Freud to serve the purpose of individual survival. 
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They were creative in nature. The hoping process can be seen 
in a similar way. 
The hoping process is supportive. It helps to keep the 
individual from despair and possible disintegration of the per-
sonality while the person pursues reality searching for a so-
lution to his problem. The implication of the sustaining 
quality of hoping is that it could be a factor in recovery 
and in remaining alive in extreme conditions. 
The choice of responding to perceived captivity indi-
cates some sustaining quality in the act of responding in this 
fashion. This selection suggests that the individual has some 
intention of resisting and has not yet fallen into depression 
in the face of these external conditions. 
The sustaining quality of the hoping process is not 
dependent upon the fulfillment of expectations. All avenues 
of escape may be closed realistically, the anticipated may 
not come, and the individual can still be sustained by the 
hoping process. This is due to the fact that the hoping per-
son sets no specific goals to anticipate and he determines 
no limitations of time. 
The hoping person exhibits a sustaining quality when 
he takes a realistic view of the perceived captivity. The 
effect of the situation upon the individual is acknowledged 
and the person selects the hoping process as his response. 
Karl Menninger considers it a sustaining task of the 
psychiatrist to aid the person in the understanding of the 
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truth about himself and his environment.! The hoping person 
tends to accept the captive situation as it is and thereby sus-
tains himself in the process. 
The task of the psychiatrist is also seen by Menninger 
to include the helping of the individual to determine his own 
destiny.2 This task reflects the tendency of the hoping per-
son to seek more autonomy from the environment. 
The hoping person seeks to sustain his own autonomy 
and ego identity by lessening the effects of the external 
stimuli. He attempts to act more independently when he de-
termines the response he will make in relation to the oap-
tiTe situation. In this respect, the hoping process suggests 
a sustaining qu•lity. 
The minister also finds the hoping process valuable 
because of its sustaining quality. T.he gospel of Jesus Christ 
tells those who would follow the example of Christ to seek 
first the kingdom of God. As a consequence of his seeking, 
he will be sustained in all of his other needs. Hoping sus-
tains because it looks beyond itself and seeks first the king-
dom. The resolution of ultimate captivity is the pursuit of 
that which is beyond oneself, or the knowledge of God. 
libid., P• 780. 
2Ibid. 
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For those who come asking for help from present sit-
uations of captivity, the minister's ability to help is, at 
least, partly determined by how well he communicates, and the 
person accepts, the principle of seeking first the kingdom. 
Hoping is a process. It underpins action and sustains 
the seeking of the kingdom. It supports the person during 
the uncertain moments of the seeking. Hoping is the •reach-
ing• part of the individual as he tries to stretch beyond 
his present experience for communion with the Thou, and it 
is the strength that supports while one reaches. 
The hoping process is an angwer to the parishioner's 
request for help in a particular dilemma. Both alternatives 
of a decision may be unsatisfactory to the point of provoking 
extreme anxiety. Not to make any decision at all may be 
equally provocative. ro hope is to accept the dilemma and 
to seek a solution while waiting in patience. 
The strength of the hoping process as used by the 
minister is in its present provisions as well as in its prom-
ise of something different and better for the future. The 
minister and the symbols of his office are the strongest in-
dicators of the present provisions. Hope is realized in the 
companionship of the minister, who represents God, with the 
parishioner. It is further realized in their shared efforts 
to seek the answer, to wait patiently •on the Lord,• and to 
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accept the conditions of the problem. 
Prayer, scripture reading, and exhortation are used by 
the minister along with certain ritual to reinforce the pa-
rishioner's sense of communion With and sense of trust in God. 
They are also used to strengthen the person's hoping process 
by encouraging acceptance and patience. 
By the reinforcement of the realized aspects of hope, 
the hoping person is less likely to resort to resignation or 
despair. He will actively seek the kingdom instead. The 
promise of hope to be fulfilled is a spur to action and a 
sustaining quality of life. 
i v. ! Reviving Quality 
An individual reacting to a situation of captivity 
has been described as feeling helpless, caught, lonely, and 
isolated. His first responses may be hostility and bitter-
ness or they may be disorganization and fear. 
The hoping process is constructive and reconstitutive. 
The consequences of hoping such as patience and relaxation re-
place earlier bitterness and frustration. There is a suggest-
ed decline in defiance and provocation with a corresponding 
increase in humility and modesty. 
A person who o..omes hoping to the psychiatrist or the 
minister has attitudes that make it easier for the helping 
person to respond to the need. In the person who is not hope-
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ful, there are attitudes that must first be overcome before the 
help can be offered or accepted. It is advantageous to all con-
cerned if these negative attitudes are changed as early as pos-
sible to positive ones. 
The encouragement of the for.mation of the hoping process 
in the individual who comes for help serves a reviving function 
in the individual. 
There are several activities that the psychiatrist and 
the minister perform that are done simply to put the person at 
ease. But these activities are also contributory to instill-
ing hope. They encourage the formation of the hoping process 
in the individual. 
Both the psychiatrist and the minister maintain cer-
tain symbols of their office, other than their own person-
alities that contribute to a revival of hope in the person. 
Their places of work are representative. The psychia-
trist usually has a receptionist, an attractive waiting room, 
diplomas and licenses, book cases, and other symbols of his 
power to help. The minister has many of the same symbols. 
They vary slightly, with the place of work for the minister 
usually located within his church, and perhaps, there are re-
ligious pictures or symbols on the wall or desk. 
Their personal approach is friendly, courteous, and 
expresses the wish to be helpful. The invitation is extended 
for a personal relationship. 
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These activities do more than serve the purpose of put-
ting the person at ease. They also symbolize some means of 
the help which the person is seeking. T.hese may start the per-
son to hoping because they symbolize a new set of possibilities 
in which may lie a new solution. 
The person who begins to hope will not expect a partic-
ular kind or time of solution. He will begin simply to be-
lieve very strongly that there is a solution and says that, 
perhaps, it will be found here. 
Neither the psychiatrist nor the minister desire to 
communicate unsound expectations or to contribute to the 
individual's despair. The hoping process is valuable at this 
point because nothing specific is promised that may later fail 
and thereby contribute to more despair. It only promises the 
possibilities of a solution at same future date. 
Because of this promise it revives courage to seek a 
solution, patience to wait for it, and the fortitude to be-
come autonomous of the captive environment. The person is 
then encouraged by these things to search for possible solu-
tions with the psychiatrist or the minister. 
v. MOdification of Personal Attitudes 
Change is an important faotor in the hoping process. 
It has significant value for the work of the psychiatrist and 
the minister. 
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For the person who comes requesting relief from a cap-
tive situation, change is important. It is true that it may 
be a circumstance of captivity perceived only by the person, 
still a change in perception, if nothing else, is needed. A 
change from unsound to sound expectations is also needed. The 
most important changes needed are those that concern the per-
son--his personal attitudes of fear, despair, and loneliness. 
The psychiatrist and the minister not only contribute 
to the modification of a person's attitudes but the success 
of their help may also depend upon such change. 
For the individual enclosed in captivity, change or 
the promise of change is important. Depending upon the per-
son's preparation, change can be helpful or it can be detri-
mental. 
In the case of the psychiatrist and his work, the per-
son may properly look at the mental hospital as a possible 
means of solving his problem and providing escape from his own 
form of captivity. On the other hand, the placement in a hos-
pital may result in a feeling ot abandonment and cause a return 
to an attitude of despair. 
The psychiatrist must then help the person to modify 
his attitude of fear to trustfulness and his attitude of lone-
liness to companionship. The person must be encouraged to see 
that though this particular treatment may not be the proper 
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remedy, there are other possibilities to explore. The atti-
tudes of patience, acceptance, confidence in others, and the 
willingness to keep seeking are encouraged. 
Without these modifications of attitudes, changes may 
prove to be detrimental instead of hopeful. Such changes in 
attitudes contribute to a disposition favorable to the accep-
tance of and reaction to the symbols of healing. 
It is a change for the person to seek outside help. 
The psychiatrist continues the atmosphere of change by his 
probing, empathizing, and helping the person to recover early 
memories, develop insight, and modify his self-concept. Often 
just a glimpse of relief from the unbearable quality of captiv-
ity oan be a change sufficient enough for hoping to begin. 
If the person, as a result of these changes, believes 
strongly enough in the possibilities of other and greater 
changes, then he begins at once to obtain sufficient moral 
support with which to face his problem with some degree of 
equanimity. 
The minister attempts to encourage the same kind of 
changes in personality attitudes, though the means are some-
what different. 
The initial approach is the same, but the symbols are 
different. The person's dependency on others for help is rec-
ognized and sometimes used to indicate man's dependency upon 
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God. It is also used as a starting point of a relationship. 
After the relationship is solidified then the modification 
of personal attitudes can be suggested. 
As far as the minister is concerned, helping is almost 
synonymous with the production of attitude change. The person 
is encouraged to change his feelings about himself in relation 
to God. He is often exhorted to accept the humble and depend-
ent attitudes toward God, and to make God the abstract, but 
personal, object of his hoping. At the same time he is taught 
how he might decrease his dependency upon the environment and 
modify his self-concept by using the religious resources that 
are available to him. 
Change is important to the minister. whether it means 
the strengthening of a previous system of faith or the conver-
sion to a new system of faith. 
The person's ability to hope is enhanced by his commdt-
ments of faith in God and in God's ability to do something about 
his captivity. 
One of the most influential reinforcing agents of hope. 
employed by the minister. is the use of ritual. Ritual rein-
forces and validates the person's faith each time it is re-
peated. Belief is strengthened; patience. autonomy. and hu-
mility are practiced; and companionship is enjoyed through 
ritual. 
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Perhaps the ability to accept the situation and to as-
sert, despite patterns of past and present failures, that there 
is a solution to captivity are also reinforced by ritual and 
the practice of it. The knowledge of previous failures need 
not diminish the person's belief that he will be helped. 
vi. Transmission 2£_ Hoping 
It has been demonstrated by this study that hoping oc-
curs in the context of interpersonal contacts. This is in 
direct contrast with the feelings of loneliness and isolation 
found in the nonhoping person who is also caught by the environ-
ment. 
The experience of hoping is one of sharing. The person 
acknowledges his own limited abilities for escaping the sit-
uation of captivity. At the same time he places his confi-
dence in another person and his powers. There is an exchange 
that occurs. The person gives or shares his need with another 
and at the same time receives an assurance of the possibility 
ot change. 
Because the experience is shared the hoping of one per-
son may well be reflected in the attitude of hoping adopted by 
the other. The response to hope of the hoping person may well 
be to hope also. Hence the transmission of hoping from one 
person to another is suggested. 
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It is possible that if hoping is not started in the 
doctor-patient or the minister-communicant relation then it 
is at least continued and promoted. The relation is the key 
to the process. 
Together the person in need and the psychiatrist or the 
minister explore the possibilities of change and adopt a posi-
tive and patient attitude while searching. Together they be-
lieve that there is so much novelty in reality which is still 
unknown or experienced,.it'a unsound to let past experiences 
liait the search for the needed answer. 
There is an expectation of the person who comes for 
help that the psychiatrist and the minister have a hopeful 
attitude. Intuitively the person sees a hopeful attitude on 
the part of the psychiatrist or the minister as indicative 
of how well he is going to be helped. 
A hopeful attitude is seen as a goad to the search-
ing for new discoveries. The person goes to the psychiatrist 
or the minister because he expects them to have knowledge of 
a solution that he does not have, and thereby expects them to 
be more hopeful than he. 
When some of the knowledge is shared, it can serve to 
encourage the adoption of a hopeful attitude by the person in 
need of help. From this point the person in need aDd the 
helping person begin their search together. 
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It is more than reassurance or even relief that the per-
son desires from the psychiatrist or the minister. He wants 
freedom from the situation. He also wants freedom from the 
state of mind that has made him captive to his own captivity. 
The hoping process is generated in the relation. It is 
beyond the individual and involves a relationship of the I and 
the Thou. It is not only transmissible from one to another, 
but it is also experienced one with another. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The hoping process is an interpersonal response to 
captivity, characterized by an enduring pursuit of the res-
olution of captivity and by a belief that such resolution 
is possible. 
The purpose of this study has been to provide some 
insight into the hoping process and to answer some questions 
relating to the conditions of the occurrence of hoping, the 
indicators of hoping's activity, and the dynamic consequences 
of hoping. The answers to these questions provide the bases 
for the implications made concerning the hoping process and 
the work of the psychiatrist and the minister. 
1. Conclusions 
i. The Conditions of Occurrence 
The hoping process occurs only as a response to a 
perceived situation {or real situation) of captivity. Cap-
tivity is understood to be that condition where the external 
environment places the individual in an apparently unohangeabl•• 
highly anxiety provoking situation. 
There are other modes of response to a captive situation 
that are both available to the individual and exercised by him. 
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Among these are despair, fear, hostility, and wishing. Hoping 
is only one possible means of response. 
It is believed that hoping is a response that will not 
be exercised as often as other modes of response because of 
its complex nature. The person is more likely to exercise 
first those modes of response which are simpler and more 
habitual. Upon the failure of these responses to solve the 
problem of captivity, the individual may choose to exercise 
the response of hoping. 
The need for the hoping process lies precisely at the 
point of failure in other modes of response to combat fear 
and to prevent the disintegration of the personality due to 
the captive condition. 
Because of the complexity of the hoping response, there 
is the implication that hoping is an advanced stage of a dy-
namic sequence. This means that hoping is an advanced stage 
of response generated out of prior dynamic processes. This 
has been demonstrated through the comparison of hoping with 
wishing and the preference of the hoping person to select an 
abstract object against the concrete object of the wishing 
person. 
Hoping is as muoh a response to the individual's per-
sonal feelings relating to the perceived captivity as it is 
to the captivity itself. The feeling of despair in response 
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to captivity, for example, may only deepen the sense of being 
caught in captivity. Hoping is just as much a response to 
despair as it is to the external conditions that might promote 
an attitude of despair. 
The most important implication of the occurrence of 
hoping to the work of the psychiatrist and the minister is 
that the same conditions which bring the individual in des-
peration to ask for help are also the only grounds for hop-
ing. 
ii. The Indicators 2!_ Hoping 
Hoping is a process that is different than wishing, an-
ticipation, optimism, desiring, and other modes of expectation. 
This is characterized by several indicators of hoping. 
First, hoping is characterized by acceptance of the re-
ality of the situation and its pertinence to the individual. 
Acceptance also includes the acknowledgement that the individ-
ual alone is powerless to alter the circumstances. 
Second, patience is involved in hoping. Included in 
this attitude is the assertion that reality is full of novel-
ty and that there is a power beyond oneself that can bring a-
bout a change in the situation. Patience is the attitude of 
awaiting this change. 
Third, hoping is indicated by a reduced self-reliance. 
The individual humbly recognizes his own limitations and places 
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his reliance in an external object beyond himself. Self-love 
is reduced and energy is thereby released for interpersonal 
love relations. 
Fourth, the hoping process includes the alteration of 
one's own outlook. This includes the alteration of one's 
attitudes, expectations, and desires. 
Fifth, the hoping person anticipates change. There is 
the added quality in this anticipation of change that says it 
will be a change for the better. The hoping person believes 
in the possibility of change, yet some tension remains because 
he does not know what that change will be. He believes the 
change will be good but he does not say what that change will 
be or when it will occur. 
Because he is convinced of this change in his own per-
sonal future, the hoping person is better able to tolerate 
his present pain and the reality of the situation. 
Sixth, the hoping person seeks personal autonomy from 
the influence of the captive situation. The hoping process 
aids the seeking of autonomy by providing motivation for au-
tonomy, by setting independent goals, and by providing some 
means for better appropriating instinctual motivations for 
autonomy. 
Seventh, the hoping person seeks an abstractly held 
object of hoping. Though diffuse and global, the object of 
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the hoping process promises enough possibility of satisfaction 
to induce the acceptance of this kind of object in preference 
to that of wishfulfillment. The movement of the hoping pro-
cess is seen to be in the same general direction as the de-
velopment of thought--toward abstraction. 
Eighth. the hoping process is an interpersonal activity. 
It is a shared experience. It is a relationship of the I and 
the Thou. The experience of hoping is also transmissible from 
one individual to another. It is agape in character. 
iii. ~ Consequences ~ Hoping 
As a result of hoping several changes occur within the 
individual. 
The individual is able to make a realistic appraisal of 
his need and his inability to cope with the problem. Because 
of this appraisal, the hoping person humbly admits his own limi-
tations and he sets aside his own personal desires in deference 
to the desires of another person. 
The hoping individual is able to place his trust and con-
fidence in another person who is either considered to be power-
ful enough to change the situation or looked upon as one who 
will help search for the oeeded change. The object of hoping 
thereby becomes the other person as the relationship is form-
ed. Because of this relationship, the hoping person feels that 
he has become a part of a creative process that is going to 
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change things. 
Time is viewed differently. Neither the past nor the 
present are allowed to limit a belief in the possibilities of 
the future to provide a solution to the problem. No time is 
set for the expected change of the problem because the hoping 
person relinquishes his hold on time and trusts it to the 
care of the other person. 
Several personality changes accompany the hoping pro-
cess. Because of patience the person is better able to relax. 
tolerate anxiety. and manage fear. Energy once expended by 
hostility. fear. anxiety, and despair are released by the hop-
ing process for more advantageous responses that could possi-
bly prolong life or ward off the occurrence of an expected 
gloomy future. 
Resistance to help and interpersonal relationships is 
decreased. The individual becomes more secure as he moves to 
make independent judgments and becomes more autonomous of the 
environment. 
Early bitterness, frustration, and hostility are changed 
by hoping to humility. There is a decline in aggressive self-
complacency or pride. There is also a decrease in defiance 
and provocation. The person is more trustful and personal re-
lations are easier. 
Hoping is a safeguard against distorting reality or 
the accepting of unsound expectations. It both exposes the 
unsound expectations and provides direction for finding the 
sound expectations. 
There is a sustaining quality in the hoping process. 
184 
The tendency of the hoping person is to endure despite all 
conditions to the contrary. It sustains the individual while 
he searches for a realistic solution to his problem. 
The sustaining quality of hoping provides the patience 
to await a solution and the courage to face captivity and to 
assert that this intolerable situation cannot be final. These 
results are the direct opposite of the capitulation found in 
despair where the individual disarms before the seemingly in-
evitable and appears to fall apart under the sentence of cap-
tivity. 
There is also a reviving quality in hoping. It is 
constructive and reconstitutive. The courage to seek a so-
lution is renewed and the patience to await the solution is 
fortified. 
Hoping provides a certainty in a personal future. Re-
ality is viewed as open-ended and full of novelty. The hoping 
process becomes a search for that personal future, which actual-
ly has its basis in another person. It is at this point that 
the psychiatrist and the minister become involved as a part of 
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the hoping process. 
iv • .!!, Relation~~ Psychiatrist ~~Minister 
The hoping prooess, based upon Gabriel Marcel's theory 
of hope, is relevant to the work of the psychiatrist and the 
minister. 
Many of the indicators and consequences of the hoping 
process parallel the goals of the psychiatrist and the minis-
ter. Others would be helpful to the psychiatrist's or the 
minister's attempts to fulfill the expectations of the person 
who comes in need of help. Still others contribute to the 
individual's own attempts to find a solution to his problem 
while under the guidance of the psychiatrist or the minister. 
The captive situation has been demonstrated to be not 
only a source of despair but also the source of hoping. The 
despair of a captive situation brings the person to the point 
that he seeks help. An opportunity is provided for the form-
ing of a relation. Hoping can be generated in such a relation. 
The most direct result of the generation of hoping is the 
changing of the individual's personal attitudes so that they now 
include the qualities of modesty, humbleness, patience and cour-
age. It is these changes that enable the psychiatrist and the 
minister to proceed in their functions of helping others because 
the person is now willing to accept help, join in the search for 
a solution, and to believe in the possibilities for a change in 
his situation of captivity. 
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2. Implications For Future Study 
This study has provided some insight in the occurrence 
of hope and into the indicators and consequences of hoping. 
Some clarity into the functioning of the hoping process has 
been provided by the descriptive analysis of hope, which may 
provide terms that can be more easily adapted to clinical study. 
But this study must be thought of as only the beginning. 
Because of the required scope of this study it was not 
possible to give adequate attention to clinical data. The con-
clusions of this study will need to be subjected to further 
clinical research before the merits of the hoping process can 
be sufficiently appreciated. 
The psychiatrist is probably the best equiped individ-
ual to make the necessary clinical applications. Because of 
his interest in saving lives either from death or personality 
disorganization, the psychiatrist likely will be most inter-
ested in studies relating to the sustaining and reviving qual-
ities of the hoping process. 
He will also be interested in studying the distinctions 
between hoping and other modes of expectation, especially those 
claiming the possibility of hoping being an advanced stage of 
a dynamic sequence. Perhaps he also will want to study hoping 
in relation to the use of placebos, which suggests a possible 
predisposition to accept and react to symbols of healing. 
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The minister, perhaps, will be most interested in the 
implications of hoping to attitude change. He will want to 
study the plaoe of ritual--including prayer, Scripture reading, 
and exhortation--in the aspects of sustaining and forming hope. 
In addition, the minister will want to research the im-
portance of interpersonal relationships in the fostering of a 
hopeful attitude. He ~11 be interested to know more about the 
apparent dependency involved in the relationship and its in-
fluence upon hoping. 
This writer believes that a program of research that 
involves both the psychiatrist and the minister would prove 
to be the most helpful. 
The setting for this study could be a hospital where 
both the psychiatrist and the minister can work with the same 
persons. Preferably they would work with terminally ill patients 
because these are judged to be the best examples of a captive 
situation as set out in this study. 
The psychiatrist would bring the necessary scientific 
objectivity and experience to the study, while the minister 
would bring the required openness to belief in the personal 
possibilities of a scientifically undemonstrable future. 
Together they oan study the implications of the hop-
ing process to their individual work and consolidate their 
strengthening ministration to the terminally ill person. 
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The problem of this dissertation is to formulate a 
theory of hoping, based upon Gabriel Marcel's theoretical 
analysis of hope, and to indicate what implications this 
theory of hoping has for the work of the psychiatrist and 
the minister. 
To study hope, or the hoping process, necessarily 
inTolves the consideration of: (1) the conditions of hope's 
occurrence; (2) the distinctive indicators of hoping, in 
contrast to other modes of expectation; and (3) the dynamic 
consequences of hoping. 
Gabriel Marcel's analysis of hope considers these 
problems, as well as others; and it, therefore, provides a 
foundation for further study. 
The general procedure of the study has been to sum-
marize Marcel's theoretical analysis of hope. Based upon 
this aummary, a descriptive theory of hope was formulated. 
199 
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Implications were then drawn from this theory and related to 
the work of the psychiatrist and the minister. 
The hoping process, its condition of occurrence, its 
indicators, and its consequences~refurther analysed by a 
comparative study. The hoping process was applied to the 
same case study material as was used by Thomas Frenoh to demon-
strate what he oalled hope in the •integration of behavior.• 
This comparison showed that: (1) hoping and wishing are dis-
tinct, (2) hopin~ is not goal-directed behavior, (3) hoping 
is a response to a particular kind of situation, and (4) the 
subjects of the hoping process reaot differently than the sub-
jects who are expressing other modes of response. 
From the descriptive analysis of the hoping process the 
following implications for the work of the psychiatrist and the 
minister were determined: (1) the hoping process aids in the 
exposure of unsound expectations and directs the search for 
sound ones; (2) it provides a sustaining quality to the person 
exercising hope; (3) it has a reviving effect upon those persons 
who have been responding differently to captivity; (4) it aids 
in the modification of personal attitudes and thereby promotes 
the positive aspects of the psychiatrist-patient and the minister-
counselee relationships; and (5) the exercising of hope promotes 
the transmission of a hopeful attitude from one person to another. 
001 
Summarized 1 the conclusions drawn from this study are 
as follows: 
1. The hoping process is an interpersonal response to 
captivity. characterized by an enduring pursuit of the reso-
lution of captivity and by a belief that such resolution is 
possible. 
2. The hoping process occurs only as a response to a 
perceiTed or real situation of captiTity. 
3. The need for hope lies precisely at the point of 
failure of other modes of response to provide an adequate re-
sponse. 
4. Hoping is an adTanced stage of response that has 
been generated out of prior dynamic processes. 
5. The same conditions of the environment which bring 
the person to ask for help are also the only ~rounds for the 
beginning of the hoping process. 
6. The hoping process is characterized by (l) aoceptance; 
(2) patience; (3) reduced self-reliance; (4) alteration of one's 
attitudes. expectations. and desires; (5) anticipation of change; 
(G) belief in a personal future; (7) seeking of personal autonomy; 
(8) seekin~ of an abstractly held object; and (9) establishment 
of a personal relationship. 
7. The consequences of hoping include: (1) an increase 
in the ability to make a realistic appraisal. to place trust in 
another. to view time differently, to relax1 to tolerate anxiety. 
and to manage fear; (2) a decline in earlier bitterness, frus-
tration, hostility, aggressive self-complacency, defiance, and 
provocation; (3) an increased interest in establishing sound 
expectations, in reviving and sustaining courage and patience, 
and in a personal future; and (4) the beginning of a personal 
relationship which supports the search for a solution. 
8. The hoping process is relevant to the work of the 
psychiatrist aDd the minister. Many of the indicators and the 
consequences of the hoping process parallel the goals of the 
psychiatrist and the minister. Others would be helpful to their 
attempts to fulfill the expectations of the person who comes in 
need of help. Still others contribute to the individual's own 
attempts to find a solution to his problem of captivity while 
under the guidance of the psychiatrist or the minister. 
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